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Introduction 
 
This dissertation is composed of three integrated essays. The first two investigate the 
impact on the firm’s cost of capital and on the firm’s trading liquidity from a reduction 
in the asymmetric information levels, while the last one focuses on how the presence of 
asymmetric information amongst investors influences trading liquidity trends before 
scheduled announcements. The common factor of the three research works is the analy-
sis of the impact and of the consequence that the presence of the asymmetric informa-
tion amongst market agents has on some firm’s variables. 
 Asymmetric information is present among agents when the level of information 
is different amongst parts, or when one part has relevant information whereas the other 
does not. The presence of asymmetric information generates different agents’ behav-
iours, which determine the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. The ad-
verse selection is a typical problem that occurs before a trade is made, and it arises from 
the inability of the buyers to differentiate the quality of products that they are going to 
buy. In the equity market, such adverse selection is present when investors are going to 
invest in securities. If they are unable to observe the quality of the securities, due to 
lack of information and, hence, less transparency, they will avoid the investment or ask 
for a higher risk premium1. This behaviour has important consequences, especially on 
the firm’s cost of capital and on the firm’s trading liquidity.  
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze these consequences, knowledge of 
which can be used to improve decision processes. Specifically, the object was to try to 
understand  if a reduction of asymmetric information between firms and their share-
holders may encourage a reduction in the firm’s cost of capital, and also to find the 
consequences on the firm’s daily trading volume. Finally, attention was centred on the 
investors’ behaviour, and what the existence of asymmetric information generates close 
to a firm’s disclosure.  
Common characteristics of the three research works are both the empirical 
analysis approach, which is made with different methodologies, and the use of samples 
of Swiss firms listed at the Swiss Stock Exchange. 
                                               
1
 See, for example, Barry and Brown (1984, 1985) 
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The presence of information asymmetries usually increases the phenomena of 
adverse selection between askers and bidders of a firm’s securities. A typical conse-
quence is a reduction in the trading liquidity2 that arises from the reluctance of inves-
tors to hold securities. To prevail over this, firms must offer securities at discounted 
prices with a consequential increase of cost of capital. To avoid this, a theoretical 
method could be a reduction in the existence of information asymmetries, made by in-
creasing the level of disclosure between firms and their stakeholders. In fact, as in 
Levitt (1998), an increase in levels of disclosure should increase the investor’s confi-
dence to ask for securities, reducing the possibility of information asymmetries and 
most likely increasing the levels of liquidity. This should reduce the discount at which 
securities are sold, and hence lower the costs of firms’ capital3.  
One way to increases the level of disclosure, as the Ashbaugh’s (2001) analysis4 
suggests, could be the adoption of an international accounting standards IAS5 or U.S. 
GAAP6. In the analysis made, it is assumed that the choice between IAS and US GAAP 
is inconsequential. In fact, literature reports evidence7 that the difference between the 
two accounting standards has a negligible effect on some variables that are used in this 
analysis. 
 The choice to adopt an international accounting standard for Swiss firms can be 
considered as a real necessity to improve not only the disclosures to shareholders, but 
also their quality, as shown in Daske and Gebhardt (2006). In fact, disclosure require-
ments in Switzerland are regulated by the Code of Obligations, which was instituted in 
1936. It establishes the Swiss generally accepted commercial principles (GACP), on 
which many revisions have been made, up until the last revision of the Code of Obliga-
tions in 1992. Prior to this revision, the only requirement for listed companies was to 
                                               
2
 See for example Copeland and Galai (1983), Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). 
3
 As reported in Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and in Baiman and Verrecchia 1996) 
4
 Ashbaugh’s (2001) analysis suggests that firms adopt IAS to improve disclosures to shareholders. 
5
 International Accounting Standards (IAS) was named International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) in summer 2002. 
6
 United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  
7
 Leuz (2003) analyzing German firms, reports evidence that differences in the bid-ask spread and share 
turnover between IAS and U.S. GAAP firms are statistically insignificant and economically small. 
Thus, the choice between IAS and U.S. GAAP appears to be of little consequence for information 
asymmetry and market liquidity. Harris (1995) provides evidence that accounting measures under IAS 
can produce results similar to U.S. GAAP. 
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provide an annual balance sheet and a profit and loss account. In 1984 a standardization 
body was created, the Swiss foundation for financial reporting standard, which issues 
the Swiss Accounting and Reporting Recommendations (Swiss GAAP ARR or Swiss 
GAAP FER8). But, as reported in Murphy (1999), although Swiss companies have a set 
of national standards, these standards can be criticized for their lack of disclosure and 
for the use of special reserves. The adoption of an international accounting standard for 
Swiss firms can eliminate the lack in disclosures and reassure investors that they do not 
use special reserves with consequential benefits in terms of firms’ cost of capital.  
The aim of the first essay is to investigate if there is a well defined relationship 
between the voluntary choosing of an international accounting standard and a reduction 
in the firm’s cost of capital for Swiss listed companies. To achieve this goal, I have 
used three proxies for measuring the impact on the cost of capital: the bid-ask spread, 
the volume turnover and the return’s volatility. The choice of these proxies is motivated 
by the fact that they are often used in similar literature9 and indicated as appropriate 
tools to measure the asymmetric component of the firm’s cost of capital. The reduction 
of bid-ask spreads positively affects the firm’s cost of capital. In fact, greater transpar-
ency on the firm’s situation can reduce the adverse selection behaviour of the investors, 
generating costs savings related to need to provide incentives for the demand of less 
transparent securities. The increase of the trading liquidity can suggest a reduction of 
the firm’s cost of capital because it is associable either with a decrease of the cost of 
transaction, which is related to a lower level of transparency which implies more risk, 
and therefore greater cost in order to compensate a higher risk premium10, or to an in-
crease in the demand of shares, due to the willingness of the investors to exchange 
those more transparent11. The reduction of the return’s volatility can suggest a reduction 
of the firm’s cost of capital following the choice of disclosing more information, be-
                                               
8FER, “Fachempfehlungen der Rechnungslegung”, is the German indications of ARR, Accounting and 
Reporting Recommendations  
9See, for example, Bartov and Bodonar (1996), Callahan, Lee and Yohn (1997), and Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000). 
10
 Barry and Brown (1984, 1985) argue that in the presence of imperfect information investors have 
greater probabilities of risk in estimating the futures payoff of their investments. 
11
 Diamond and Verecchia (1991) argue that the publication of information apt to reduce the information 
asymmetry can reduce the cost of capital through the increase in the demand of securities that are more 
transparent 
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cause an increase of the level of information contributes to reducing the probability of 
an investment’s loss for investors, who will be stimulated to reduce the frequency of 
going in and going out from a firm’s share investment. Moreover, an increase of the 
transparency also contributes to reducing the probability of unexpected events that 
could be reflected in a less volatile share price, as suggested by Lang and Lundholm 
(1993).  
Following this argumentation, I have proposed and tested the hypotheses that an 
adoption of an international accounting standard determines a decrease in the bid ask 
spread, an increase in the trading liquidity level and a significant impact on the return 
volatility.  
  Regressions are made with OLS technique, considering the problems of pres-
ence both of heteroskedasticity between residuals and of self selection of the variable 
indicating the adoption of the accounting method. In fact, the choice to adopt an inter-
national accounting standard is not a random event, but the result of a precise manage-
ment choice. The methodology proposed by Heckman (1979), in which residuals are 
corrected with a term called “Inverse of Mill’s ratio” will be used as control for this self 
selection problem. Using this methodology, the explanatory power of the proposed 
models increases, broadening the significance of the relationship. To solve the het-
eroskedasticity problem, I have made a transformation of the proposed models. A 
common technique used today is to do regression estimations that are heteroskedastic-
ity-consistent. I have employed this technique in the subsequent essays.  
The analysis results show the existence of a significant relationship between the 
adoption of an international accounting strategy and the two variables of bid-ask spread 
and volatility of return, and the insignificance of the relationship with the trading li-
quidity. These results are also confirmed both by robustness checks and by a simulta-
neous approach. The analysis shows evidence of a negative relationship between the 
adoption of an international accounting standard and the bid-ask spreads and of a posi-
tive relationship between the adoption of an international accounting standard and the 
return’s volatility. This evidence is therefore in line only with the first and the last hy-
potheses. The explanation of the insignificant relationship between the adoption of an 
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international accounting standard and the trading liquidity comes out from the analysis 
made in the second essay.  
The goal of the second essay was to investigate if there is a definite relationship 
between the adoption of an international accounting standard and the increase in the 
trading liquidity for Swiss listed firms. This goal emerges from the limited12 literature 
on the Swiss evidence, and, especially, because in the first essay a significant relation-
ship between the adoption of an international accounting strategy and the increase in 
firm’s trading liquidity was not found. In fact, following both the theoretical predic-
tion13 and the empirical evidence of other studies14, the relationship between the de-
crease in asymmetric information and increase in trading liquidity should be positive. 
Therefore, it was my purpose to do the analysis with a different approach15.  
According to economic theory, a reduction of the information asymmetry is re-
flected positively on the trading activity for a listed company. Adopting an international 
accounting standard, and by doing so deciding to increase the quantitative level of dis-
closure16, leads to a higher transparency on the firm’s economic and financial situation. 
An increase of the firm’s transparency is followed by an increase in the investors’ con-
fidence17 to ask shares in the firm, therefore increasing the trading volumes. Moreover, 
the increase in trading activity should be relatively higher for small firms, considering 
that these start from a higher level of asymmetric information due to the limitation of 
their numbers and sources of information18. It follows that the standardization of the 
level of disclosure through the adoption of an international accounting standard should 
have more effect on the firms with higher information asymmetries, hence with the 
small firms.  
                                               
12
 Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2007) find increase in market liquidity and cost of capital benefits for 
European firms, Switzerland included,  that switch to IFRS before  this reporting became  mandatory.  
13
 See, for example, Glosten and Milgron (1985) and Karpoff (1986). 
14
 See, for example, Leuz and Verecchia (2000). 
15
 In the second essay, I use a panel data approach to complete the cross analysis of the first essay. Due to 
incomplete data availability, the analysis’ sample decreases to 64 firms from 159. 
16
 The International Accounting Standards (IASs) are developed by the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee (IASC), the goal of which is to improve the quality of the financial statements and the 
degree of comparability amongst firms’ release. (International Accounting Standards Committee, 1995, 
33) 
17
 Mainly for informed investors. 
18
 The tendency of the media is to report more news on large firms.  
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Following this argumentation, I have proposed and tested the hypotheses that 
firms that adopt an international accounting standard  show an increase in trading li-
quidity, and that the magnitude of the increase is relatively higher for the small firms. 
Time series statistical tests, time series regressions and cross sectional analysis 
confirm the hypothesis, showing evidence of an increase in trading liquidity after the 
adoption of an international accounting standard, and also that the magnitude of the in-
crease is higher for the small firms. It is interesting to note the evidence that emerges 
from the analysis conducted in this essay helps to explain the insignificant result in the 
first essay. During the adoption of an international accounting standard, on average, 
firms also increase the total number of outstanding shares. This operation has a non 
negligible effect on the trading liquidity when it is proxied by the volume turnover. In 
fact, the volume turnover, which is defined as the ratio between the number of shares 
traded and the total number of shares outstanding, is influenced by a denominator ef-
fect, which determines an artificial reduction of the relative trading liquidity. Control-
ling the analysis for this effect, results are in line with the hypothesis.  
A goal for future research is to review the first essay, including this evidence. 
Perhaps, controlling the regression for this artificial effect, I will obtain results in line 
with the proposed hypothesis.  
The last essay differs from the first two, in that it is focused on the analysis of 
asymmetric information amongst investors, instead of asymmetric information between 
firms and their investors. Specifically, the analysis is focused on the impact from the 
presence of asymmetric information on the trading liquidity trend before earnings an-
nouncements. In fact, while the literature on the analysis of the volume turnover around 
and after earnings announcements is abundant, it is very limited on the analysis of the 
volume turnover before earnings announcements, and to my knowledge is completely 
lacking in the Swiss evidence.  
In general, trading volumes are positively related to asymmetric information, 
but when there is time discretion, the relation is likely to become negative, as show in 
Admati and Pleiderer (1988) and in Foster and Viswanathan (1990). The aim of this 
analysis is to empirically verify the existence of this inverse relationship for a sample of 
Swiss listed firms. To achieve this purpose, I have analyzed trading volume trends be-
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fore scheduled earnings announcements. In fact, before such events, asymmetric infor-
mation between informed and uninformed investors is higher19, and the adverse selec-
tion problem of the uninformed investors increases, as argued by Wang (1994). In this 
situation, rational uninformed investors, to protect themselves from adverse selection 
risk, tend to either postpone their investment until after the announcement when the ad-
verse selection problem is resolved, or demand a higher discount price in order to cover 
the risk of trading against informed investors. These behaviours should have both a 
negative impact on trading volume before earnings announcements and a positive im-
pact on the relationship between trading volume and contemporaneous price change. In 
fact, if an uninformed trader is time discretionary, they can decide to postpone their in-
vestments until the adverse selection problem is less severe or resolved. By doing so, 
the trading liquidity before an earnings announcement should decrease. According to 
this behaviour, it is likely that uninformed investors will trade less before scheduled 
announcements to avoid being overwhelmed by investors with more precise private in-
formation. On the other hand, if uninformed investors are not time discretionary and 
cannot avoid trading, they will protect themselves by asking for a premium for trading 
against pre-disclosure private information. In response, stocks’ price change should be 
positively related to trading liquidity before a scheduled earnings announcement. 
Moreover, informed investors, using their pre-disclosure private information, try to an-
ticipate the announcement rebalancing their portfolio before news is released. In case 
they expect positive surprises from the earnings announcement, they can be motivated 
to ask for stocks even at higher price levels to take position. In contrary, they can also 
be motivated to not take position or to close their position if they already hold one. It 
follows that in case of positive earnings surprises, ex-ante firms’ price levels should in-
crease more than in case of non positive earnings surprises. 
Following this argumentation, I have proposed the hypotheses that before a 
scheduled earnings announcement there is a decrease in the firm’s trading liquidity, that  
the magnitude of the decrease should be positively related to the simultaneous price 
change, and that the magnitude of the decrease should be lower in case of positive an-
                                               
19
 Informed investors increase their process of acquisition and elaborate private information in proximity 
of an earnings announcement, increasing the asymmetric information with uninformed investors. 
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nouncements surprises. Moreover, the cause of these relationships is the presence of 
asymmetric information amongst investors. Therefore, evidence for this phenomenon is 
explored in the last part of the analysis. 
To test the proposed hypotheses, I have used three approaches: the event study 
of the abnormal volume turnover before, around and after the scheduled announce-
ments; the pooled time series analysis of the abnormal volume turnover around the an-
nouncements; and the pooled time series analysis of the cumulative abnormal volume 
turnover before the events. 
Event analysis confirms a significant daily average decrease of about 2% in the 
abnormal volume turnover from 10 to 3 trading days before the announcement; that 
means a cumulative decrease of about 17%. Regressive analysis confirms the second 
and third hypothesis, suggesting that before earnings announcements there is a decrease 
in firm’s trading liquidity, which is positively related to the simultaneous price change 
and whose magnitude is higher in case of positive earnings release.  
In the last part, an analysis is made with the aim to verify whether a necessary 
condition of the decrease in trading liquidity before a scheduled announcement is the 
presence of asymmetric information. I have proxied the asymmetric information by the 
firm size and the bid-ask spread, which are indicated in literature as reasonable proxy 
for the asymmetric information20. 
Regression results do not show evidence of any connection between the cumula-
tive abnormal volume turnover and the level of asymmetric information, in contrast to 
Chae’s (2005) results. A possible motivation could be the open order book characteris-
tic of the exchange market. In fact, in an open order book exchange market information 
asymmetries amongst investors are lower than in a specialist market, if for no other rea-
son than lower inventory risk and higher transparency21. 
This thesis research can be divided into two integrated parts. The first part can 
be viewed as an analysis of the relationship between reduction in asymmetric informa-
                                               
20
 Amongst researchers that report evidence on the firm size there are also Atiase (1985), Freeman (1987) 
Bamber (1987), Merton (1987) and Lev and Penman (1990). Amongst researchers that report evidence 
on the bid-ask spread there are also Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), 
Greenstein and Sami (1994), and Welker (1995). 
21
 In an open order book market investors have access to the order book and can infer their competitor’s 
information. 
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tion amongst firms and their shareholders and decreases in firms’ cost of capital, while 
the second part can be viewed as an analysis of the effect on trading liquidity prior to 
earnings announcements from the presence of asymmetric information amongst inves-
tors. Results can also been summarized in two correspondence groups. The first one re-
ports significant evidence that listed firms that adopt an international accounting    
strategy benefit from a reduction in the cost of capital as a consequence of a reduction 
in the asymmetric information level amongst firms and shareholders, and that the   
magnitude of the decrease is higher for greater levels of asymmetric information. The 
second one reports evidence of a significant decrease in trading liquidity prior to earn-
ings announcements, however, in contrast with the theoretical prediction, does not 
show evidence that this decrease is due do the existence of asymmetric information 
amongst investors.  
The first part of this research contributes to the research field that analyzes the 
consequences of increases in disclosures following the Leuz and Verecchia (2000) 
study on the German firms. The question that can be spontaneously asked is, consider-
ing the apparent savings that derive in terms of cost of capital, why haven’t all of the 
Swiss firms adopted an international accounting standard. Possibly because such adop-
tion involves a series of added costs that are not always less than the benefits derived; 
however, this question is beyond the scope of the current research22. The answer must 
be found using a method of research which would identify specific factors of costs and 
benefits deriving from the adoption of an international accounting strategy. Further-
more, the adoption of an international accounting standard has recently become manda-
tory for the EU member countries and several analyses have not reported evidence of a 
decrease of the firm’s cost of capital. For example, Daske (2006), using a large set of 
German firms, does not find supporting empirical evidence for a decrease in the  cost of 
equity capital for firms that adopt an IAS, rather his result would suggest an increase of 
the cost of equity capital during the transition period. Moreover, Daske, Hail, Leuz, and 
Verdi (2007), using a sample of European countries, Switzerland included, find a mixed 
effect on the cost of capital from the mandatory adoption. 
                                               
22
 As highlighted by Joos (2000) relatively to the Leuz and Verecchia (2000) analysis. 
11 
 
The second part of this research contributes to the limited research field opened 
by Chae (2005) with his evidence on the U.S. firms. In fact, while literature on trading 
liquidity around and after scheduled announcements is abundant, the literature on trad-
ing liquidity prior to scheduled announcements is very limited and, to my knowledge, is 
completely lacking in the Swiss evidence. The major contributions are those that reveal 
evidence on firms listed in a stock-exchange market with a limited order book, follow-
ing on Chae’s (2005) suggestion for future research. Evidence of this analysis is similar 
to the evidence reported by Chae (2005), (cumulative average abnormal log trading 
volume of 17% against over 15%, respectively), however, unlike Chae’s research, this 
analysis does not reveal significant evidence of a relationship between a decrease in 
trading liquidity and asymmetric information amongst investors. This could be attrib-
uted to the different characteristics of the exchange market: a specialist23 market in the 
U.S. case and an auction market with open and limited order book24 in the Swiss case.  
Reading the three essays it is evident how my knowledge regarding empirical 
research methods has increased over time. Moreover in each essay some problems have 
emerged, which I have tried to solve. In the first essay, the self selection problem is im-
portant. The methodology proposed by Heckman (1979), in which residuals are cor-
rected with a term called “Inverse of Mill’s ratio”, was used as control for this self se-
lection problem. In the second essay, because of scarcity of observations and presence 
of firm effects, the panel data regression is used. Finally, in the last essay, in testing the 
relation between trading liquidity and asymmetric information, I have used a panel data 
regression and, considering the presence of both firms and time effects, and that the 
time effect is not constant during years25, I have controlled the regression both by firm 
and by time effect, as suggested in Petersen (2006). 
                                               
23
 Specialist is referred to a specialist agents like market makers 
24
 An open and limited order book exchange market is characterized by lower asymmetric information 
amongst investor, at least due to the possibility to read the order book and, hence, to infer competitor’s 
information. 
25
 The OLS White heteroskedasticity consistent regression reports decreasing significance estimation rel-
ative to the year dummies across years.  
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1.1 Abstract 
 
The relationship between disclosure and a firm’s cost of capital is an important topic in 
contemporary accounting theory. Theoretical prediction suggests that greater disclosure 
should lower the firm’s cost of capital through the reduction of information asymme-
tries. In this paper I empirically analyze the impact on variables such as bid-ask spread, 
trading liquidity and return volatility from the adoption of an international accounting 
standard that is indicated as a choice to increase disclosure to shareholders. The three 
variables are used as proxy for the asymmetric component of the firm’s cost of capital. 
The hypotheses made are that the adoption of an international accounting standard de-
termines a decrease in the bid-ask spread, an increase in the trading liquidity and a sig-
nificant impact on the return volatility, respectively. For a cross sectional sample of 159 
Swiss listed companies, I find a negative and significant association with the bid-ask 
spread, a positive and significant association with the return volatility and an insignifi-
cant association with the trading liquidity from the adoption of an international ac-
counting strategy. The magnitude is such that the firm that adopts an IAS enjoys of an 
average reduction of more than 45% in the bid-ask spread. This finding persists even 
after controlling for omitted variables and for simultaneous effect. The findings on trad-
ing liquidity are inconsistent with the hypothesis probably because the effect coming 
from an IAS adoption is hidden from the higher effect coming from the state of eco-
nomic cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G14, G19 
Keywords: Information asymmetry, Accounting standards, Cost of capital. 
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1.2 Introduction 
 
Contemporary accounting theory is focused on the relation between disclosure and the 
costs of firms’ capital using the concept that greater disclosure should lower the costs 
of firms’ capital that come up from information asymmetries.  
 The existence of information asymmetries usually increases the phenomena of 
adverse selection between askers and offers of a firm’s securities. A typical conse-
quence is the reduction in levels of liquidity26 that arises from the reluctance of inves-
tors to hold securities. To prevail over this, firms must offer securities at discounted 
prices with a consequential increase of cost of capital. To avoid that, a theoretical ap-
proach could be a reduction in the existence of information asymmetries, increasing the 
level of disclosure between firms and its stakeholders. In fact, as in Levitt (1998), an 
increase in levels of disclosure should increase the investor’s confidence to ask for se-
curities, reducing the possibility of information asymmetries, which then ought to in-
crease the levels of liquidity. This should reduce the discount at which securities are 
sold, and hence lower the costs of capital27. One way28 to increase the level of disclo-
sure could be the adoption of the international accounting standard IAS or US GAAP29. 
In this work I want to investigate if there is one well defined relation between the 
choice of an international accounting standard and a reduction in a firm’s cost of capital 
for Swiss listed companies. The choice of a Swiss sample is to verify whether the re-
sults found by Leuz and Verecchia (2000) are also evident for the Swiss case. Switzer-
land can be of particular interest because financial disclosure has been largely discre-
tionary in this country. In fact, although Swiss companies have a set of national stan-
dards, these standards are criticized for their lack of disclosure and for use of special re-
                                               
26
 See for example Copeland and Galai (1983), Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). 
27
 As reported in Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and in Baiman and Verrecchia (1996). 
28Ashbaugh (2001) evidence suggests that firms adopt IAS to improve disclosures to shareholders. 
Moreover, several studies have shown that accounting quality is determined primarily by market forces 
and institutional factors, rather than accounting standards (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003).  
29
 Leuz (2003), analyzing German firms, reports evidence that differences in the bid-ask spread and share 
turnover between IAS and U.S. GAAP firms are statistically insignificant and economically small. Thus, 
the choice between IAS and U.S. GAAP appears to be of little consequence for information asymmetry 
and market liquidity. Harris (1995) provides evidence that accounting measures under IAS can produce 
results similar to U.S. GAAP. 
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serves. Hence, the adoption of an international accounting standard for Swiss firms can 
eliminate the lack in disclosures and reassure investors that they do not use special re-
serves, with a consequential increase in the transparency.  
 For such an objective I followed the approach proposed by Leuz and Verecchia 
(2000). The choice to increase the disclosure level is obtained with the adoption of an 
international accounting standard. The reduction of the cost of capital that it derives is 
observable in an indirect way through the variation of its asymmetric component, which 
is measurable with the reduction of the bid-ask spread, with the increment of trading ac-
tivity and with the variation of the return’s volatility level. The approach used is the 
cross-sectional analysis through the estimation of three models that relate the three 
proxies to the adoption of an international accounting strategy. The estimation is made 
with OLS technique imposing the correction of the residuals of the models considering 
the non-casual nature of the managements’ decisions to adopt an international account-
ing standard. The relationship between the adoption of an international accounting 
standard and the two variables of bid-ask spread and return volatility is statistically 
meaningful. On average the sample companies that adopt an international accounting 
standard show an inferior bid-ask spread of 45%30 and a significant increase in the re-
turn volatility; therefore in line with theoretical predictions and previous empirical evi-
dences. The relationship with the trading liquidity turns out to be insignificant. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews prior 
research on the topic. Motivations, hypotheses and research design are presented in sec-
tion three. Section four provides sample selections and descriptive statistics and section 
five describes the models used. Section six presents empirical results and section seven 
reports additional reports of robustness checks. The final section is devoted to conclu-
sions and suggestions for future research. 
 
                                               
30
 The reduction is calculated using the antilog of the estimated coefficient reported in table 7 column II: 
antilog (-0.5886) - 1 = e(-0.5886) -1= 0.55-1=0.45 
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1.3 Review of the literature 
 
The presence of the lemons31 problem in financial markets creates the incentive for 
managers of companies to resort to voluntary disclosure of greater information with the 
goal to reduce the cost of capital. Barry and Brown (1984, 1985) argue that in the pres-
ence of imperfect information, investors have greater probabilities of risk in estimating 
the future payoffs of their investments. If such risk is not diversifiable in other ways, 
then the investment will be undertaken only against a greater risk premium, which 
means firms have to offer discounted securities while increasing the cost of collection 
of financing capital. It follows, therefore, that in order to save this cost it is necessary to 
reduce the information asymmetry with the disclosure of greater information. Diamond 
and Verecchia (1991) argue that the publication of information apt to reduce the infor-
mation asymmetry can reduce the cost of capital through the increase in the demand of 
securities that are more transparent, thereby favouring an increase in the trading turn-
over. 
From an empirical point of view, several studies have tried to verify this theo-
retical prediction. Some have analyzed the relation between the level of information 
and the asymmetric component of the cost of capital, others have concentrated their at-
tention directly on the cost of capital, and others have observed the relation between in-
formation’s level and some firms’ characteristics. 
Generally, the results are in line with theoretical predictions even if they show 
limits compatible with difficulties related to the use of correct tools for measuring the 
cost of capital. Empirical problems arise because of biases, which depend either on the 
presence of self selection or on omitted variables. Moreover, the presence of an already 
rich information environment, especially in the U.S., could hide the evidence (Verec-
chia 2001) 32.  
                                               
31
  The lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970) is given by the existence of different level of information be-
tween parties, especially between investors and managers. There are many possible solutions, among 
them that of giving more information to reduce the difference between parties (Diamond and Verecchia, 
1991 and Kim and Verecchia, 1994). 
32
 Recent studies, for example Zhou (2004), in information environments less rich of information as the 
emerging markets, show results more significant in favor of the theoretical argumentations. 
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 Among those that belong to the first research area, there are Leuz and Verecchia 
(2000), Welker (1995), Greenstein and Sami (1994), and Glosten and Milgron (1985). 
Leuz and Verecchia (2000) have analyzed for German companies the impact on the 
cost of capital from the commitment to give more information, measuring the asymmet-
ric component of the cost of capital through the measure of the bid-ask spread, of the 
trading liquidity, and of the price return volatility. The commitment to give more in-
formation is proxied by the decision to adopt an international accounting standard. 
They report evidence of an inverse association with the bid-ask spread and of a direct 
association with the trading liquidity from an increase in disclosures level, hence in line 
with theoretical prediction. They also report, contrarily to the hypothesis, that the price 
returns volatility is significant and positively associated with the increase in disclosure 
to shareholders. Welker (1995) analyzes for a sample of firms listed on the NYSE the 
relation between information level and market liquidity through the variation of the bid-
ask spread, that it is used as proxy for the market liquidity according to the paradigm 
that says that a reduction of the bid-ask spread indicates an increase in the market li-
quidity as a consequence of a higher demand of securities that become more transparent 
after the increase in the information level. Results show that the bid-ask spread is 
higher for companies with a low information index compared to those with a higher 
one, therefore in line with the theoretical prediction that says that an increase in the in-
formation level reduces spreads between ask and bid prices, increasing the market li-
quidity. Greenstein and Sami (1994) analyze the effect of the increase in disclosure on 
the bid-ask spread with a time series approach. They observe that the spread decreases 
more rapidly for companies with an initial low information level. Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) analyze the bid-ask spread as a function of the presence of imperfect informa-
tion between investors. They propose models in which the market liquidity is expressed 
as an inverse function of the adverse selection. The results show the existence of a re-
duction of the informative asymmetry as a benefit of the increase in disclosure. 
 Amongst researchers that measure the impact on the cost of capital directly, 
there are Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Gietzmann and Ireland (2005), 
Hail (2002), Daske (2006) and  Lambert et al. (2007). Botosan (1997), in a study on 
U.S. manufacturing companies, analyzes the association between information levels 
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and cost of capital through the estimation of the relationship between the firm’s cost of 
capital and a self constructed index that measures the quantity of voluntary information 
added in annual reports. The results show a significant reduction of the cost of capital 
only for companies with a low analysts following. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) analyze 
the relationship between cost of capital and information level through measuring the 
impact on the firm’s cost of capital from the variation of a self constructed index that 
considers the information level in the quarter and in the annual reports. Their results 
show contrasting associations: the cost of capital decreases with an increase of the in-
formation level in the annual reports, but increases with an increase of the level of in-
formation in more frequent disclosure like quarterly reports and voluntary disclosure. 
Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) analyze, as Botosan and Plumlee (2002), the relation be-
tween cost of capital and timely disclosure33 using a different measure for the informa-
tion level. They introduce a variable that indicates the typology of accounting strategy, 
chosen between aggressive and conservative strategies. For a sample of UK firms they 
find results in line with the theoretical predictions observing a significant negative as-
sociation between cost of capital and timely disclosure. Furthermore, they find a posi-
tive association between cost of capital and an aggressive accounting strategy, in line 
with other research34. Hail (2002) tries to quantify the effect of a firm’s voluntary dis-
closure policy on its implied cost of capital for a sample of Swiss firms through the 
analysis of the relationship between the ex-ante cost of capital and a qualitative disclo-
sure index. His results are in line with the theory and show an inverse and significant 
association between the two variables. Daske (2006) investigates empirically the claim 
that the adoption of international accounting standard lowers the cost of equity capital 
for a sample of German firms in the period 1993-2002. Estimating the expected cost of 
equity capital directly, he finds no evidence confirming a reduction of the cost of capi-
tal. Lambert et al. (2007) examine whether and how the quality of a firm’s accounting 
information can influence the cost of capital. Their contribution is interesting because 
they provide a link between information quality and firms’ cost of capital without refer-
ence to market liquidity. In line with others analyses that use an indirect link through 
                                               
33
 It includes information that is frequently published like the quarterly report, and other disclosures 
among which press conferences. 
34
 For example that assumed from Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003). 
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either market liquidity or adverse selection, they find evidence that an increase in in-
formation quality leads to an unambiguous decline of the cost of capital.  
 Finally, a series of analyses on the relation between information and firms’ 
characteristics are reported in relevant literature. Covrig et al. (2006) find evidence that 
the voluntarily adoption of IAS increases a firm’s ability to attract foreign capital. They 
argue that such increase is due to an increase of the market liquidity and a decrease of 
the firms’ cost of capital, suggesting that an important consequence of the IAS adoption 
is to lower the cost of capital. Francis et al. (2004) analyze the extent to which firms 
with favorable values of earnings attributes enjoy a lower cost of capital. They find that 
each earnings attribute, which are quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value 
relevance, timeliness and conservatism of the firm-specific information, is significantly 
associated with the cost of equity capital. Specifically, firms with the most favorable 
values of each attribute have significantly lower costs of equity than firms with the least 
favorable values. Easley and O’Hara (2004) present an asset-pricing model in which 
both public and private information affect asset returns, providing a linkage between a 
firm's information structure and its cost of capital. A significant characteristic of their 
model is that the information plays an important role in equilibrium, where a lesser dis-
persion of public information corresponds to a lower firm’s cost of capital. This impli-
cation suggests that firms could lower their cost of capital by reducing the dispersion of 
private information, for example, disclosing more information to the market. Bartov 
and Bodnar (1996), show that firms can increase the market liquidity as a consequence 
of a reduction of the informative asymmetry through the adoption of more informative 
accounting methods. Heady, Hutton and Palepu (1999), show that an increase of the 
disclosure level is followed by an increase of the stock liquidity, of the firm’s perform-
ance, of the institutional ownership and of the analysts following. Lang and Lundholm 
(1996, 1999) find that for firms that give more information a higher analyst following 
can be observed, as well as less dispersion of the analyst’s forecasts, less volatility of 
the revision of the result’s forecasts, and a positive impact on the price of new shares 
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issues35. Murphy (1999), in a study analyzing the characteristics of Swiss firms that 
have voluntarily decided to adopt an international accounting standard, finds that the 
foreign activity (analyzed by the shares listed in foreign exchange markets and by the 
foreign sales), in contrast to the ratio between debt and capital, has a significant impact 
on the decision. The insignificant evidence of the debt to capital ratio is an unexpected 
result. In fact, for Swiss companies the debt holders are mainly banks, which have eas-
ier access to the firm’s private information in respect to other shareholders, and hence 
do not need to increase the disclosure. Murphy (1999) claims that the benefit from the 
adoption of an international accounting standard could be noticeable for firms orien-
tated to international investors, and unnecessary for those orientated only to the domes-
tic investors. The same conclusion is formulated in the international analysis of El-
Gazzar et al. (1999), which has observed that the domicile in a UE country and a low 
debt to capital ratio are characteristics positively correlated with the adoption of an in-
ternational accounting standard for firms that use more share capital than debt. Aurer 
(1998) examines the impact of the choice of an international accounting standard on 
some risk parameters for Swiss firms, especially for the return volatility, the volatility 
of the abnormal return and the beta parameter, which indicates the correlation with the 
market index. The results based on observations from 1988 to 1993 show that a change 
in the accounting standard has a significant impact, without a clear direction, on the re-
turn volatility, but doesn’t have a significant impact on the cost of capital. 
 
1.4 Motivations, Hypotheses and Research Design 
 
Economic theory suggests the existence of a well defined relationship between asym-
metric information and firms’ cost of capital according to which a reduction of the in-
formation asymmetry is reflected positively on the cost of financing for a listed com-
pany. Adopting an international accounting standard, and by doing so deciding to in-
                                               
35
 In their study there is evidence that the management voluntarily increases the amount of information 
given to the investor in correspondence of the emission of new shares for being able to obtain a higher 
issue price.  
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crease the qualitative and quantitative level of disclosures, leads to a lower level of in-
formation asymmetry between issuers and buyers of securities. In fact, the increased 
transparency on the financial situation of the company permits a more accurate analysis 
of the economic situation of the company, decreasing the risk level which is related to 
an investment in shares by the company itself. Starting from this consideration, an in-
vestor who asks for shares will ask for a smaller risk premium as well. On his side, the 
issuer will sell his shares more easily, saving the cost to convince the investors to buy 
shares of the company even in the case of a lower transparency level. Less incentives 
and less risk premiums are involved in decreasing the cost of financing. 
 The demonstration of the reduction of the cost of capital for firms that adopt an 
international accounting strategy can be obtained in an indirect way, through the use of 
tools that the literature has demonstrated36 as useful for estimating the cost of capital: 
the bid-ask spread, the trading liquidity and the shares return volatility37. 
 The reduction of bid-ask spread, derived from the decrease of its adverse selec-
tion’s component38, positively affects the cost of capital because greater transparency 
on the firm situation can reduce the adverse behaviour of investors, permitting thereby 
a savings in the cost of providing incentives for the demand for less transparent securi-
ties. This argumentation suggests the formulation of the following hypothesis. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The increase of the amount of information disclosed, therefore the adop-
tion of the international accounting standard, reduces the firm’s bid-ask spread be-
cause of a reduction in asymmetric information between a firm and its shareholders. It 
follows the existence of an inverse association between quantitative level of information 
and bid-ask spread. 
 
An increase in the trading volume can also reflect a reduction in the firm’s cost 
of capital because it is associable either with a decrease in the cost of transaction, which 
is related to the idea that a higher level of transparency implies less risk and, therefore, 
less cost in order to compensate less risk premiums, or to an increase in the demand of 
                                               
36See, for example, Bartov and Bodonar (1996) and Callahan, Lee and Yohn (1997). 
37
 The same tools used by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) for German firms. 
38
 The bid-ask spread is composed at least of three components: order processing, adverse information 
and inventory holding cost. See Huang and Stoll (1997). 
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shares due to the willingness of investors to exchange those more transparent. This ar-
gumentation suggests the formulation of the following hypothesis. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The increase of the amount of information disclosed, therefore the adop-
tion of the international accounting standard, increases the firm’s trading liquidity be-
cause of a reduction in asymmetric information between a firm and its shareholders. It 
follows the existence of a positive association between the quantitative level of informa-
tion and trading volume. 
 
The volatility of the shares’ return can also be used as an instrument for measur-
ing the variation of the cost of capital as a consequence of an increase in disclosure to 
shareholders. In fact, a decrease in the asymmetric information between firm and 
shareholders contributes to the reduction of the probability of unexpected events, which 
reduces the investors’ uncertainty and, hence, the frequency of portfolio rebalancing. 
This follows a consequential negative impact on the price fluctuations. But, empirical 
researches provide opposite evidence on the relation between disclosure and volatility. 
For instance, Lang and Lundholm (1993), contrarily to their hypotheses, find evidence 
of a positive relation between the  level of public information and the share’s return 
volatility. The result is confirmed by the Welker (1995) and Leuz and Verecchia (2000) 
analyses. Bushee and Noe (2000) try to explain this empirical evidence. They suggest 
that an improvement in corporate disclosure practices may attract short-sighted inves-
tors, whose aggressive trading strategies may lead to higher stock return volatility. 
Moreover, institutional investors, who hold a large position, a diversified portfolio and 
trade infrequently, tend to invest in more transparent firms, hence, in firms that release 
more information to shareholders. The consequence is a negative relation between high 
disclosure level and return volatility. So, the relationship could be mixed, and the net 
change in price return volatility depends on which type of investor presence dominates. 
This argumentation suggests the formulation of the following hypothesis. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The increase of the amount of information disclosed, therefore the adop-
tion of the international accounting standard, has an impact on a firm’s share price 
volatility because of a reduction in asymmetric information between a firm and its 
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shareholders. It follows the existence of an association between the quantitative level of 
the information and the price return volatility. 
 
The common factor to the three hypotheses remains therefore the impact of the 
quantitative level of information on the existing informative asymmetry between inves-
tors; impact that has consequences on some market variables of listed firms, especially 
on those used as proxies in this study. 
 In order to test the hypotheses, cross-sectional analysis and regression of eco-
nomic models has been used to try and explain the relationship between the choice of 
adopting an international accounting strategy and some financial characteristic of the 
analyzed firms. Regressions are made with OLS technique after the adaption of the 
economic models for resolving problems related to the presence of heteroskedasticity 
between residuals, and to the non-random nature of the variable indicating the adoption 
of an accounting method. The models used are those proposed by Leuz and Verecchia 
(2000), which are adapted to better describe the Swiss case. 
 
1.5 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The sample’s selection begins from the 229 Swiss firms included in SPI index 
during 2004. For each of them, the information on the accounting standard used is 
available on the WorldScope database. Among these, they show 52 firms that belong to 
the financial sector, which are eliminated reducing the sample to 177 non-financial 
firms. At least 18 of these lasts are eliminated for insufficiency of observations, reduc-
ing the final sample to 159 non-financial firms. Table 1.1 reassumes the procedure of 
selection process and shows the distribution of the adoption of accounting standard 
among the firms. Of the 159 firms, 59 adopt a local accounting standard, while 100 
adopt an international one. Of these last, 90 firms follow the IFRS norms, and 10 fol-
low the U.S. GAAP. 
 The statistic description of the sample is reported in table 1.2. The average size 
of the market value of the sample is of 3.89 billion of CHF, with the biggest firm capi-
talizing 152,9 billion and the smallest 3,91 million. A meaningful difference is ob-
27 
 
served  among the firms that adopt an international accounting standard and those that 
adopt a local one, with an average (median) market capitalization that varies from 5.798 
billion (0,446) to 0.645 (0,166), respectively. The same trend is obtained for the trading 
liquidity that is measured by the median of the daily volume turnover ratio. The firms 
that opt for an international accounting standard show a daily turnover ratio in mean 
(median) of 0,16% (0,11%) against 0,08% (0,05%) of the others that adopt a local ac-
counting standard. An inverse trend is observed for the price returns volatility and for 
the bid-ask spread ratio. This last shows a meaningful difference in average (in median) 
that varies from 4,03% (2,1%) to 1,16% (0,74%) for the firms that respectively adopt 
either local or international accounting standards; the volatility varies in average from 
2,03% to the 1,87% while the median  remains almost the same. 
 Therefore, in line with the expectations, the firms that adopt an international ac-
counting standard have in average a greater market value, a greater volume, a smaller 
bid-ask spread and a smaller volatility. Also in line with the expectations, the financial 
leverage and the following of the analysts are respectively smaller and greater for the 
firms that adopt an international standard. Contrary to expectation, the return of the as-
sets is in average worse for the firms that opt for the international accounting standard. 
Table 1.3 contains the coefficients of the correlations amongst selected variables and 
indicates that those used as tools to proxy the cost of capital move themselves online 
with the hypotheses: the MV and the VTR increase while the BAS and the VLTY de-
crease to the adoption of an international accounting standard. Movements in line with 
theoretical and empirical evidence for the other variables, except for the proxy of the 
performance, the ROA, are also contrary to expectations. Moreover, it is observed that 
the correlations are sufficiently low among variables to exclude collinearity among 
them and that the maximum value of 0.541 is between the shares’ return volatility and 
the bid-ask spread, showing the idea that the more volatile firms are those with greater 
bid-ask spread. The higher correlation of the variable indicating the adoption of the in-
ternational accounting standard is with the variable indicating the internationalization 
of the firms, showing therefore that the firms listed also in foreign markets are those 
that mainly opt for an international accounting strategy. Consequently this is in line 
with Ball, Robin e Wu (2000) and with Murphy (1999), which suggests that disclosing 
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results only one time in a unique international standard is less costly than disclosing re-
sults more times in respectively local standards. 
 
1.6 The model 
 
1.6.1 Cost of Capital 
 
For cost of capital models, I use those proposed by Leuz and Verecchia (2000) in a 
study done on German firms. The basic idea of this model is the indirect measure of the 
cost of capital through the estimation of the variation of tools like the bid-ask spread, 
the trading liquidity and price return volatility. 
The general structure of the models is the following: 
 
                     (1.1) 
   
where iIR  is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the i firm adopts an international 
accounting standard or 0 if the i firm adopts a local accounting standard, and iX  are k 
explanatory variables for controlling the estimations between proxy and adoption of an 
international accounting standard. These variables indicate some firms’ characteristics 
that are different for different proxy used.  
 In the case in which the bid-ask spread is used as proxy for the variation of the 
cost of capital, the model has the following form: 
 
 
(1.2) 
 
 
 
In this case, I want to estimate the relationship between bid-ask spread and the adoption 
of an international accounting standard controlling the regression for variables like the 
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firm’s size, the firm’s trading liquidity, the price return volatility and the free float per-
centage. 
 In the case in which the trading volume is used as proxy for the variation of the 
cost of capital, the model has the following form: 
 
 
      (1.3)                
 
 
In this case, I want to estimate the relationship between volume turnover and adoption 
of an international accounting standard, controlling the regression for variables such as 
the size, the volatility and the free float percentage. 
Finally, in the case in which I use the returns volatility as proxy for the variation 
of the cost of capital, the model has the following form:  
 
 
     (1.4) 
 
 
In this case, I want to estimate the relationship between the return volatility and the 
adoption of an international accounting standard, controlling the relation for variables 
as the firm size, the free float percentage and the market correlation. 
Estimations of these models are made with the OLS methodology. In order to 
obtain efficient and unbiased estimates it is necessary to analyze the relatively prob-
lems. 
  
1.6.2 Estimation’s problems  
 
The models’ estimations are made with the methodology of minimizing the sums of 
squared residuals, namely the OLS, which as the Gauss-Markov theorem said, gives 
among the class of the correct estimators those with lower variance. 
 So for this to happen, it is necessary that the basic hypotheses of that methodol-
ogy are respected. Hypotheses’ violations could be given by the presence of collinearity 
amongst explanatory variables, presence of heteroskedasticity amongst residuals and 
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non-random nature of the dummy variable IR39 indicating the accounting strategy 
adopted. 
 
1.6.3 Collinearity analysis. 
 
If the explanatory variables are collinear, namely strongly correlate, the estimations 
given by minimizing the sums of squared residuals are biased. To verify the presence of 
collinearity amongst variables I use the Variance inflation factor VIF test, which is a 
regression diagnostic suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980). To calculate the 
VIF of a variable, it is required to express the variable in function of the other, to esti-
mate it with the OLS regression and to calculate the 1/ (1-R2) statistic. 
 Table 1.5 shows the VIF value for each variable. Generally it is said that a VIF 
value around 5 can express the presence of collinearity, while a value of around 10 ex-
presses the presence of strong collinearity. Results given are largely inferior at 5, there-
fore it is realistic assume no presence of collinearity among variables.  
Other confirmations emerge from the analysis of the correlation matrix, which does not 
report  significant high correlation coefficients.  
 
1.6.4 Heteroskedasticity problem. 
 
The heteroskedasticity problem is present when the variance of residuals is not con-
stant, biasing the estimators obtained by minimizing the sums of squared residuals. To 
verify the presence of heteroskedasticity with the data used, I use the test proposed by 
White (1980). Results, reported in table 1.4, confirm the presence of heteroskedasticity 
for the bid-ask model and for the volatility model. To solve this problem, the scale of 
the measure of some variables with the logarithmic transformation has been changed. 
After this transformation the models become: 
 
                                               
39The same problem has characterized the Leuz and Verecchia (2000) analysis for German firms, while 
being insignificant in the Botosan (1997) analysis.  
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(1.5) 
+  
 
for the bid-ask spread model, and 
 
    (1.6) 
 
for the volatility model, while the trading volume model remains unchanged. 
Table 1.4 reports results of White tests on the modified models and shows absence of 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
1.6.5 The self selection problem. 
 
Another incompatibility with the hypothesis of the OLS methodology is the problem of 
self selection. Amongst the characteristics of the OLS regression there is the random 
nature of the explanatory variables. The choice to adopt an international accounting 
standard is not a random event, but the result of a precise choice. For this reason, the 
estimations obtained minimizing the residual sums of squares could be biased. The so-
lution of this problem is obtained using the methodology proposed by Heckman (1979), 
in which residuals are corrected with a term called “Inverse of Mill’s ratio”. The In-
verse of Mill’s ratio is estimated with the help of a probit model on the dummy variable 
IR indicating the adoption or not of an international accounting standard. The probit 
model associate to IR would explain the relationship between the probability of adopt-
ing an international accounting strategy and some firm characteristics.  
 
1.6.5.1 The accounting system model.  
 
The adoption of an international accounting standard is compatible with more charac-
teristics of the listed companies. The relative scientific literature reports evidence of a 
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significant relation between the firm size, the operating performance, the share struc-
ture, the financing leverage, the necessary of financing resources, the foreign listing and 
the following of the analysts. On the basis of this evidence the probit model utilized is 
the following: 
 
)7.1()lg)log(()1( 6543210 iiiiiiii InterSaPffLevROAMVIRP µβββββββ +++++++Φ==
 
 
where IR i international reporting is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if 
the i-firm adopts an international accounting standard, 0 otherwise. Explanatory vari-
ables are MV market value for firms’ dimension, ROA as measure of the operating per-
formance, Lev as indication of the variation rate of the financing leverage, Pff as the 
percentage of free float, Salg as the three year average sales growth rate, Inter as an-
other dummy variable with a value of 1 if the i-firm is listed in foreign markets. 
To estimate this model, I use a Likelihood method that, using a hypothesis less restric-
tive than those of the OLS, does not consider the existence of problems related to the 
presence of heterosckedasticy among residuals. 
 The expected relations between dependent and explanatory variables are all 
positive except for the financing leverage that should show an inverse relation with the 
probability to adopt an international accounting standard. 
 Table 1.6 reports the results of regression. Not all the explanatory variables have 
the expected sign: ROA and Free Float show insignificant negative signs, while the Lev 
is still insignificant but positive. The explanatory power of the model is not high and 
results are inferior in respect to the similar model proposed by Leuz and Verecchia 
(2000). A plausible motivation that helps to explain the contrary trend of the ROA is 
identifiable in the trend of the economic cycle, which unlike the last few years of the 
90’s, has negatively incised on the firms’ performance, on the market liquidity, on the 
firms’ expansions and on the trust of the investors. 
 The estimation of the accounting system model is due to the necessity to solve 
the self selection problem in the cost of capital models; for this reason the attention on 
the accounting system model is not high. Moreover, if the objective is to explain the 
motivation of the choice of an international accounting standard, it would be more op-
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portune to make an analysis at the time of switch for each company from a local ac-
counting standard to an international one. 
 
1.6.6 Proposed models. 
 
The necessary modifications to solve estimations problems and, hence, to make the 
models compatible with the characteristics of the OLS regression such as to obtain es-
teem that is less biased possible, has led to the proposition of the following three mod-
els: 
 
Bid-ask spread model: 
  
 
 
(1.8) 
 
 
 
 
Trading Volume model: 
 
 
 
(1.9) 
 
 
 
 
Share volatility model: 
 
 
 
(1.10) 
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1.7 Empirical results. 
 
The models estimations are done using the ordinary least square regressive technique. 
The three used models emerged from the building process described in the previous 
paragraph. The purpose of this process is to achieve conformity with the basic hypothe-
ses of OLS  technique in order to obtain unbiased estimations. Interestingly, the models 
proposed seem to present neither the collinearity problem among explanatory variables, 
nor the heteroskedasticity problem of the residuals. Finally, the models are corrected in 
their error components by the addition of the Inv. Mill’s ratio to consider the non-
random nature of the IR variable. 
 
1.7.1 Bid-ask spread 
 
Previous empirical evidences and theoretical predictions reported in literature suggest 
that the bid-ask spread is negatively associated with the quantitative level of public in-
formation, with the trading liquidity and with the free floating of the share, while it is 
positively associated with the shares return volatility. 
 Regression results of the bid-ask spread model are reported in table 1.7. The 
signs of the estimate coefficients are all in line with the expectations and the estima-
tions are all statistically significant at a level higher than 99%, except for the constant. 
A decrease of the bid-ask spread results to be positively associated with the adoption of 
an international accounting standard. Results are in line with Leuz and Verecchia 
(2000), with Walker (1995) and with Amihud e Mendelson (1986). Furthermore, the 
marginal effect of the dummy variable IR is also economically significant. In fact, con-
sidering the antilogarithmic of the estimated coefficient, the model suggests that the 
adoption of an international accounting system is associated with a reduction of the bid-
ask spread in average of 45 percent. The decrease of the bid-ask spread results to be 
positively associated at the market valuation, at the free floating percentage and at the 
daily change share volume, while resulting to be negatively associated at the standard 
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deviation of the shares’ price return. The explanatory power of the model is high with 
an Adj- R2  of the 90.36%. 
 The result of a lower bid-ask spread for the firms that adopt an international ac-
counting standard confirms the first hypothesis, according to which an increase of the 
quantitative level of the information generates in average a savings of the cost of capital 
as consequence of a decrease in the asymmetric information between asking and offer-
ing of securities. 
 In table 1.7 results are reported of two regressions that are different because in 
the first, in column I, the estimation is made without adding the Inv. Mill’s ratio term at 
the error term. It is observable that the adding of the Inv. Mill’s ratio term increases 
both  the explanatory power of the model and the significant level of the variable, espe-
cially that of the IR variable. Moreover, the estimate coefficient of the Inv. Mill’s ratio 
is statistically significant,  which demonstrates that the addition of it is a correct opera-
tion to solve the distortion given by the self selection. 
 
1.7.2 Trading Liquidity  
 
Previous results reported in literature suggest that the trading liquidity is positively re-
lated with the return volatility, while it could be either positively or negatively related 
to the market dimension and with the free floating. 
 Regression’s results on the trading volume model are summarized in table 1.8. 
The trading liquidity is measured by the median of the daily volume turnover ratios 
VTRi defined as the number of shares exchanged divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. It is observed on the period from 01/01/2004 to 12/31/2004. Estimated co-
efficients result to be not statistically significant. After the correction of the residuals 
with the adding of the Inv. Mill’s ratio, the estimation of the dummy variable IR still 
remains insignificant (p-value 0.3534) even if the direction remains in line with the 
theoretical prediction. Thus, the results are not in line with the results of Leuz and 
Verecchia (2000), of Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) and of Bartov and Bodnar 
(1996). Market capitalization, percentage of free float and return volatility result to be 
positively related with the choice to adopt an international accounting standard. The 
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explanatory power of the model is discreet with an Adj-R2 of 37.44%. Therefore, results 
here obtained seem not to confirm with the second hypothesis, according to which an 
increase in the quantitative level of the information produces a reduction of the cost of 
capital as consequence of an increase of the trading liquidity. It is notable that the uni-
variate analysis reported in table 1.3 shows a significant positive correlation, therefore 
in line with the hypothesis.  
  Table 1.8 reports two estimations differentiate themselves by the adding of the 
Inv Mill’s ratio. Results show that the adding of the Inv. Mills ratio does not increase 
the explanatory power of the model in which the Adj-R2 decreases to 37.44 from 
37.67%. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the Inv. Mill’s ratio results to be insig-
nificant showing that the adding of it does not contribute to solving the bias given by 
the self selection problem.  
 
1.7.3 Share Volatility 
 
The effect of disclosure on volatility can be different and complex as suggested by Bu-
shee and Noe (2000), because it may depend on many factors, some of them unrelated 
to information asymmetry. Generally, more disclosures reduce information asymmetry 
with a consequential decrease in price fluctuations, as suggested by Brown et al. (2004) 
and by Welker (1995). But, when investors are more informed, their expectations about 
future cash flows become more variable because of the different investors’ ability to 
transform public information in private information, generating higher informative 
asymmetries among investors. The consequences is of an increase in the price volatil-
ity, in line with the results obtained by Lang and Lundhom (1993), who, contrarily to 
their hypothesis, report  evidence that the volatility level increases with the increasing 
of the level of public information.  
 The same result emerges from the estimation of the volatility model here pro-
posed. The results, summarized in table 1.9, column II, show that the estimation of the 
coefficient of the dummy variable IR is positive ( 1β = 0.2557) and statistically different 
from zero (p-value = 0.0665) for a significant level higher than 90%. This result is in 
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line with those found by Leuz and Verecchia (2000) for German companies. Therefore, 
the return volatility seems to increase for firms that, adopting an international account-
ing system, increases the level of its disclosures. Another piece of evidence that in-
creases the uncertainty of the results, emerges from the analysis of the correlation coef-
ficients among variables, reported in table 1.3. It is observable that the correlation coef-
ficient between volatility and adoption of an international accounting strategy is nega-
tive, even if insignificant. 
 The estimation of the other coefficients show that the volatility is negatively as-
sociated with the market capitalization and is positively associated with the market cor-
relation that is measured by the beta index, while an insignificant negative association 
with the free float also emerges. Therefore, results confirm the third hypothesis, show-
ing the existence of a different level of volatility for the firms that adopt an interna-
tional accounting standard.  
 Table 1.9 reports two estimations that are different from the adding of the Inv. 
Mill’s ratio. Results show, in line for what happened for the bid-ask spread model but 
not for the trading volume model, that the adding of the Inv. Mill’s ratio increases both 
the explanatory power of the model and the significant level of the estimated coeffi-
cients; significantly different from the zero estimation of the dummy variable IR, that in 
the case of no correction results to be insignificant. 
 Moreover, it is observable that the Inv. Mill's ratio coefficient is statistically 
significant at a level higher than 95%; this shows that the adding of it in the volatility 
model is a correct operation to solve the bias given by the presence of self selection. 
 
1.8 Results’ Robustness 
 
To check the robustness of the obtained results, situations that can characterize the pro-
posed model are considered and analyzed. Is it opportune to verify the impact of even-
tually omitted or substitutive variables without forgetting the eventuality of a simulta-
neous impact by the adoption of an international accounting strategy on the variables 
used as tools to measure the cost of capital. 
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1.8.1 Simultaneity. 
 
The adoption of an international accounting strategy could be endogenously determined 
by the variables used as proxies. That means the firms that opt for an international stan-
dard are those that achieve certain levels of bid-ask spread, of trading liquidity and of 
return volatility. To test this, I estimate a simultaneous equations system in which vari-
ables like the bid-ask spread, the trading liquidity and the return volatility are endoge-
nously considered. The system used is opportunely modified with respect to the previ-
ous models’ equations, both for relating the endogenous variables and for satisfying the 
necessary criterions to solve the equations system: the identification problem and the 
rank conditions. 
The system used is the following: 
 
 
)lg)()()(()1( 16151413121110 iiiiiiii SaFExFreeFloatMVLogVLTYLogBASLogIRP µβββββββ +++++++Φ==
    
(1.11) 
iiiiiii FreeFloatVLTYLogVLMELogMVLogIRBASLog 2252423222120 )()()()( εββββββ ++++++=
   
            (1.12) 
iiiiii FreeFloatVLTYMVIRVTR 33433323130 )log()log( εβββββ +++++=                                              (1.13)
  
iiiiii BetaFreeFloatMVIRVLTYLog 44443424140 )log()( εβββββ +++++=                                       (1.14) 
 
in which the variables IR, Log(Bid Ask), VTR and Log(VLTY) are considered endoge-
nous. The solution of this system is obtained with a mixed, two-stage procedure, be-
cause of the simultaneous presence of discreet and continuous variables. The approach 
used is that reported in Maddala (1983). From the reduced40 form of each model, it is 
obtained the estimation of each endogenous variable that is subsequently used as in-
strument to estimate the system. This is to outline that the estimation of the first model 
is made with the likelihood method, due to its probabilistic nature, while the other esti-
mations are made with the OLS. Solutions, reported in table 1.10, show, first, that the 
choice of an accounting system is not a function of the bid-ask spread and of the return 
volatility levels, and second, that its adoptions has a conjoint effect especially on the 
bid-ask spread and on the return volatility. Moreover, results remain in line with those 
                                               
40Form in which each endogenous variable is expressed in function of only exogenous variables. 
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obtained from the previous OLS regression: the bid-ask spread still shows a significant 
negative association with the adoption of an international accounting strategy  (β21 = -
0.8064; p-value = 0.0063), the return volatility still to be positively associated (β41 = 
0.3345; p-value = 0.0549), while negative but insignificant (β31 = -0.0006; p-value = 
0.3899)  is the association between trading liquidity and the adoption of an international 
accounting strategy. Therefore, these results confirm those previously observed, serving 
to increase the doubt on the simultaneously or consequentially of the effects. This doubt 
could be resolved using a different analysis method like an event study.  
1.8.2 Omitted variables 
 
The share price could be an omitted variable in the models used. In fact, the bid-ask 
spread could be influenced by the price, considering that for different levels of price the 
minimum spread changes. Moreover, it is possible that the price level can influence the 
trading liquidity and the return volatility independently from the accounting strategy 
adopted. For testing this, an estimation of the models is again used, adding the average 
price as a further control variable. 
 Regressions show results, which are reported in table 1.11, in line with those 
previously obtained. The adding of the average price to the bid-ask spread model con-
firms the existence of an inverse and statistically significant association between the 
adoption of an international accounting standard and the bid-ask spread variation. 
Moreover, the t-student’s test shows that the estimation of the price variable is statisti-
cally different from zero, therefore its adding helps to explain further the error struc-
ture, increasing the explanatory power of the model.  
 The estimation of the volatility model with the adding of the average price again 
shows results in line with those previous observed, confirming the existence of a sig-
nificant positive relation between the adoption of an international accounting standard 
and the variation of the volatility level. In this case, however, the estimation of the 
added  variable is not statistically significant and does not contribute to an increase of 
the explanatory power of the model. Finally, the adding of the average price to the trad-
ing volume model shows again a positive but insignificant association between the 
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adoption of an international accounting strategy and the variation of the trading liquid-
ity, even if its estimation, statistically significant, helps to explain the error structure, 
increasing the explanatory power of the model. 
1.8.3 Others tests 
 
The models used measure separately the impact on the bid-ask spread, on the trading 
volume and on the share price volatility. The change of the accounting strategy should 
have a conjoint effect on the three variables. So, their contemporary presence in a re-
gressive model can attenuate the evidence. Especially, the presence of the volume turn-
over variable in the bid-ask model and the presence of the volatility variable in the trad-
ing volume model could attenuate the evidence of the relation with the variable indicat-
ing the adoption of an international accounting system. To verify that, I exclude the 
volume turnover ratio variable from the bid-ask spread model and the volatility variable 
from the trading volume model. Results, not reported here, show more consistent esti-
mation for coefficients confirming a significant negative association between the adop-
tion of an international accounting standard and the bid-ask spread, and again a positive 
but not statistically significant with the trading liquidity.  
 Finally, the use of substitutive variables in the proposed models contributes to 
shows the results’ robustness. The share turnover and the free float utilized as proxy of 
trading liquidity and presence of institutional investors are substituted from the turnover 
amount of Swiss francs and from the quota of institutional investors respectively. Re-
sults of this new regressions are again in line with the previous, confirming once more 
significant negative and positive associations between the adoption of an international 
accounting standard and the bid-ask spread and the volatility respectively, with a posi-
tive but again not significant association with the trading liquidity. 
 
1.9 Economic magnitude 
 
The analysis shows that the companies that adopt an international accounting standard 
benefit of an average reduction of the bid ask spread of 45% compared with the compa-
nies that adopt a local accounting standard. These reductions are not only statistically 
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significant, but also economically significant. In fact, a reduction of the BAS has a 
positive consequence on the firm cost of capital. 
 To stress the economic magnitude, a possible way is to use the Hail evidence 
(2002). Hail analyzes the relationship between disclosure quality and cost of equity 
capital for a sample of Swiss listed firms. Using a disclosure score elaborated by the 
Swiss Banking Institute of the University of Zurich, he quantifies the effect of the 
firms’ voluntary disclosure policy on its implied cost of capital. Hail reports evidence 
that a sample of Swiss firms with better value-rating benefits of lower cost of equity 
capital from 1.8 to 2.4% in respect to the Swiss firms with a worst value-rating. Using 
this evidence, my aim is to estimate the magnitude of the cost of capital’s variation in 
function of the firm’s BAS variation. The first step is to estimate the relationship be-
tween firms’ BAS and the firm’s disclosure score. For this purpose, I estimate a regres-
sive model that relates the BAS to the disclosure score controlling the relationship by 
firm size, the volatility and cross-listings. For disclosure score, I use the same disclo-
sure score used by Hail computed for the fiscal year 2004. Like Hail, I use a fractional 
ranking score such as values near 0 to indicate a high value-rating and values near 1 to 
indicate a low value-rating. The explanatory variable is the logarithmic of daily average 
Bid Ask Spread. Table 1.12 reports the estimation’s results. The estimation shows that 
the BAS has an average change of 31% between firms with better and those with worst 
value-ratings. Doing a comparison with the Hail results, it make sense to assume that 
for a Swiss’s sample a BAS reduction of 31% corresponds to a reduction of between 
1.8 and 2.4% of the cost of equity capital. That means, for each percentage reduction of 
the BAS there is a reduction between 5.8 and 7.2 bps of the cost of equity capital. This 
deduction can be used to estimate the magnitude of the cost of capital saved due to the 
adoption of an international accounting standard. Considering that in average the reduc-
tion of the BAS for firms that adopt an IAS is of 45%, the magnitude of the reduction 
of the cost of capital can be estimated between the 2.6 and 3.4%. 
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1.10 Conclusions 
 
In this study, I analyzed the relationship between the quantitative level of information 
and the firm’s cost of capital. The theoretical prediction suggests a paradigm according 
to which an increase in the quantitative level of disclosure determines a decrease in the 
firm’s cost of capital as consequence of a reduction of the asymmetric information be-
tween firms and shareholders. The analysis of the cost of capital is focused on the 
measure of its asymmetric component through the analysis of the variation of the bid-
ask spread, of the trading liquidity and of the share price volatility. The approach used 
is that of the cross sectional analysis through the estimation of three models that relate 
the three variables to the adoption of an international accounting strategy. Regressions 
are made with the OLS technique that imposes the correction of the residuals of each 
model considering the non-random nature of the adoption of an international account-
ing standard that arises from a voluntary manager decision.  
 The tests completed accept the first and the last of the three hypotheses made in 
this study. Results confirm the existence of a statistically significant association be-
tween the adoption of an international accounting strategy and the two variables of bid-
ask spread and return’s  volatility, confirming in line with the hypothesis a negative as-
sociation and a positive association, respectively. Results of relation with the trading 
liquidity turned out to be insignificant. 
 The robustness of these results is confirmed from further analysis. The adding 
of the share price as an ulterior control variable in the three models confirms the results 
previously obtained. Also, the substitution of variables as the percentage of free float 
and the percentage of trading volume with variables like the participation quota of insti-
tutional investors and the trading amount of Swiss French shows the same results. Fi-
nally, the estimation of a simultaneous system in which the explanatory variable are 
endogenously definite, suggest the same conclusions. 
 The estimation of the accounting system model, necessary for solving the self 
selection problem, shows the existence of common characteristics for Swiss firms that 
have adopted an international accounting strategy. So, like the univariate analysis 
shows, the firms that adopt an international accounting strategy are those that on aver-
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age have larger market value, higher market liquidity level, bigger daily turnover vol-
ume, higher degrees of financial leverage, higher rate of revenue growth, major per-
centage of free float, high correlation with the market index, lower bid-ask spread, 
lower volatility and a more contained return on invested capital. Nevertheless, the ac-
counting system model used isn’t analyzed accurately because it isn’t the aim of this 
study and that could be indication for future research. 
 This study also accepts only the first and the last hypothesis, rejecting the sec-
ond on the trading liquidity. The rejection of this hypothesis could be motivated not 
from the absence of consequences coming from the adoption of an international ac-
counting system, but from the hiding of those consequences from consequences that 
come out from the economic cycle that has characterized the exchange markets from 
2001 to 2005. In fact, this period of time was characterized by a general decrease in the 
market liquidity level and by a substantial increase of the uncertainty that could have 
overwhelmed the consequences coming out from the adoption of an international ac-
counting standard. That suggests the use of a different method in the future research. 
 In conclusion, this study confirms the theoretical prediction that listed firms that 
adopt an international accounting strategy benefit from a reduction in the cost of capital 
as a consequence of a reduction in the asymmetric information level. What could spon-
taneously be asked of us is the reason, considering the saving that derives, that all firms 
do not adopt an international accounting standard. Probably the answer is that its adop-
tion involves a series of added costs that are not for all inferior to the benefits. As high-
lighted by Joos (2000) relative to the Leuz and Verecchia (2000) study, such research 
design is not able to answer the posted question. The answer must be found in a differ-
ent method of research in which specific factor of costs and benefits deriving from the 
adoption of an international accounting strategy are identified. What can be observed, 
as suggested in Ball, Robin and Wu (2000), is that for Swiss firms too, those that are 
foreign listed opt all for an international accounting standard, confirming the idea that 
disclosing results in a unique standard is less costly than disclosing them to different 
standards. 
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1.12 Tables 
 
TABLE 1.1: Sample Selection Procedures 
Panel A: Sample selection   Number Percent 
 
Firms listed in SPI       229  100.0 
Financial firms           52    22.7 
Firms with insufficient data        18      7.9  
Total sample firms        159    69.4 
 
The sample is composed of firms included in the SPI Swiss Performance Index on the 
31st December 2004. Financial firms are firms that belong to the sectors of bank, in-
surance and asset management. For insufficient data are considering firms for which is 
not available the information of the accounting standard used (10), the data on the last 
bid and last ask (3) and more of two information on firm’s characteristics (5). 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sample by Accounting Standard Number Percent 
 
All firms       159  100.0 
Firms following Local Standard  59  37.1 
 of which with some EEC guidelines  10  16.9 
Firms following International Standard 100  62.9  
   of which IAS/IFRS    90  90 
   of which U.S. GAAP    10  10  
 
The sample is composed of firms included in the SPI Swiss Performance Index at De-
cember 31rst, 2004. The information about the accounting standard followed came 
from Worldscope database. 10 of the 59 Firms with a local accounting standard com-
plete their disclosure with some EEC guidelines. 
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TABLE 1.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Firm Characteristics 
 
Variable         Reporting Mean       Median       Max  Min          Std. Dev             
 
Firm Size   if IR=0                645.42***      166.40*   19757.7  3.91    2574.29 
MV  if IR=1 5798.17***  446.86* 152999.1  8.07 21363.33 
 All 3886.14†         282.96† 152999.1  3.91 17164.94 
 
Bid-ask spread   if IR=0    0.0403*           0.0210* 0.2625 0.0024 0.0503 
BAS  if IR=1 0.0116*           0.0074* 0.0650 0.0010 0.0125 
  All 0.0222†           0.0096† 0.2625 0.0010 0.0349 
 
Liquidity   if IR=0    0.0008 0.0005* 0.0074  0         0.0012 
VTR  if IR=1 0.0016 0.0011* 0.0065  0  0.0015 
 All 0.0013†  0.0008† 0.0074  0  0.0015 
 
Volatility   if IR=0    0.0203 0.0174 0.0452           0.0079     0.0085 
VLTY  if IR=1 0.0187 0.0168   0.0445 0.0066 0.0082 
  All 0.0193†           0.0172† 0.0452 0.0066    0.0083 
 
Volume    if IR=0    22.41           0.2 1089.9                   0             134.13 
VLME   if IR=1  228.90        5.85*            8429   0                 1012.17 
  All  152.28††   1.2† 8429   0             812.07 
 
Profitability   if IR=0    0.0433 0.0362 0.1927 -0.0597 0.0467 
ROA  if IR=1 0.0374 0.0555 0.3049 -0.4042  0.1051 
  All 0.0396†           0.0502† 0.3049 -0.4042 0.0878 
 
Leverage   if IR=0    0.3218**         0.2710  3.8210  -18.872             2.7068  
LEV  if IR=1 0.3781**         0.2540  3.1419    -1.419             0.5415 
  All 0.3572†           0.2610†  3.8210             -18.872              1.6953 
 
MV is the firm’s Market Value (in millions of Swiss francs) as observed on December 31rst, 2004. BAS 
is the firm’s average bid-ask spread ratio (difference between last daily bid and ask  traded divided by the 
average sum between last daily bid and ask traded) and is observed from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. VTR is the 
median of the daily volume turnover ratio (daily number of shares changed divided by total number of 
outstanding shares) and is observed from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. VLTY is the firm’s return volatility (stan-
dard deviations of daily price’s returns  from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04). VLME is the firm’s volume (average of 
the daily numbers of shares changed express in thousands) and is observed from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. ROA 
is the three year average of the firm’s profitability (operating income divided by total asset) and is calcu-
late from 2002 to 2004. LEV is the firm’s three year average financing leverage (long term debt divided 
by common equity) and is calculated from 2002 to 2004. 
50 
 
TABLE 1.2: CONTINUED 
 
Firm Characteristics 
 
Variable         Reporting  Mean Median       Max Min               Std. Dev       
 
Sales Growth if IR=0 0.0441 0.0396 0.5361 -0.5726 0.1577 
SALG if IR=1 0.4243 0.0502 33 -0.3944 3.3088 
 All 0.2832 0.0417† 33 -0.5726 2.6274 
 
Foreign Listing   if IR=0    0.3051* 0*          1 0             0.4644 
INTER   if IR=1 0.8* 1* 1 0             0.4020 
  All 0.6163† 1†     1 0             0.4878 
 
Beta    if IR=0    0.7039*          0.623* 2.566 0.018               0.4492 
BETA   if IR=1 1.1041*          1.086* 2.867  0.033 0.5618 
  All 0.9546†          0.863† 2.867   0.018 0.5557 
 
Free Float   if IR=0    0.5751 0.60 1                 0.16 0.2471 
FF  if IR=1 0.6181 0.63 1 0.14 0.2555  
  All 0.6031† 0.61† 1    0.14              0.2526 
 
SALG is the three years average sales growth rate (yearly variation in sales divided by previous year 
sales) and is calculated from 2002 to 2004. INTER is a dummy variable indicating if the firm is listed in 
foreign exchange market (1 if yes, O otherwise) and is observed at December 31rst, 2004. Beta is the 
firm’s correlation with the SPI Index and is observed at December 31rst, 2004. FF is the firm’s Free 
Float (percentage of share’s floating) and is observed at December 31rst, 2004. IR is a dummy variable 
indicating whether (1 if yes, O otherwise) the firm adopts an international accounting standard during 
2004. * (†), **(††) and *** (†††) indicating that the test of differences in mean or in median (that the 
relative measure is different from zero) are (is) statistically significant at a level of 99, 95 and 90 percent 
respectively. Data on the accounting standard are obtained from Worldscope database and the others 
from Datastream.  
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TABLE 1.3: Correlations 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Firm Characteristics 
 
Variable  IR MV BAS VTR VLTY VLME ROA LEV SALG INTER BETA 
MV  0.145           
  (0.067)           
BAS  -0.398 -0.129          
  (0.000) (0.105)          
VTR  0.270 0.170 -0.354         
  (0.001) (0.032) (0.000)         
VLTY  -0.092 -0.192 0.541 -0.098        
  (0.247) (0.015) (0.000) (0.218)        
VLME  0.123 0.538 -0.108 0.265 -0.037       
  (0.122) (0.000) (0.174) (0.001) (0.646)       
ROA  -0.033 0.160 -0.250 0.176 -0.535 0.066      
  (0.682) (0.045) (0.002) (0.027) (0.000) (0.407)      
LEV  0.016 -0.015 0.196 -0.018 0.031 0.050 -0.046     
  (0.840) (0.853) (0.014) (0.824) (0.698) (0.533) (0.567)     
SALG  0.070 -0.022 0.047 -0.040 0.236 -0.017 -0.299 -0.016    
  (0.380) (0.785) (0.553) (0.620) (0.003) (0.829) (0.000) (0.839)    
INTER  0.492 0.170 -0.435 0.394 -0.092 0.148 0.097 -0.114 0.080   
  (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.248) (0.063) (0.226) (0.153) (0.316)   
BETA  0.349 -0.062 -0.287 0.427 0.238 0.240 -0.076 -0.039 0.053 0.417  
  (0.000) (0.436) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.342) (0.622) (0.507) (0.000)  
FF  0.046 0.067 0.066 0.029 0.044 0.119 -0.156 0.068 0.099 -0.031 -0.019 
  (0.581) (0.417) (0.423) (0.723) (0.593) (0.151) (0.059) (0.414) (0.229) (0.712) (0.817) 
 
MV is the firm’s Market Value. BAS is the firm’s average bid-ask spread ratio (difference between ask and bid divided by the average sum between bid and 
ask). VTR is the median of the daily volume turnover ratios (daily number of shares changed divided by total number of outstanding shares). VLTY is the 
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return’s volatility (standard deviations of daily price’s returns). VLME is the volume (daily average numbers of shares changed). ROA is the three year average 
of the firm’s profitability (yearly operating income divided by total asset). LEV is the firm’s three years financing leverage (average yearly long term debt 
divided by common equity). SALG is the three years average sales growth rate (average yearly variation in sales divided previously sales). INTER is a dummy 
variable indicating if the firm is listed in foreign exchange market (1 if yes, 0 otherwise). Beta is the firm’s correlation with the SPI Index. FF is the firm’s  
Free Float (percentage of share’s floating). IR is a dummy variable indicating whether (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) the firm adopts an international accounting stan-
dard during 2004. MV, ROA, LEV, SALG, INTER, FF are observed at the December 31rst, 2004 and BAS, VTR, VLTY, VLME, from 1.1.2004 to 
31.12.2004. All calculations are based on 159 observations except ROA, BETA and FF that are calculate on 158,158 and 152 observations respectively. The p-
values in parentheses are for a two-tail test of statistical significance. 
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TABLE 1.4: Heteroskedasticity 
 
White Heteroskedasticity tests 
 
   No cross analysis                Cross analysis                    Presence of 
Model   nR2          F-stat          nR2            F-stat         Heteroskedaticity 
  
BAS  32.89          21.66*  47.75     36.19*  Yes 
 
Log(BAS) 13.46          14.68*** 31.94     36.19*  No   
 
VTR  4.11          12.01*** 6.79      19.81***  No 
 
VLTY  34.41          18.47*  39.57       27.68*  Yes 
 
Log(VLTY) 14.46          18.47*  18.62       19.81***  No 
 
White Heteroskedasticity test: if the nR-squared statistic is less than the critic F- value then the null hy-
pothesis of absence of error’s heteroskedasticy is accepted . *, **, *** indicate a significance level of 99,  
95 and 90 percent respectively. The models are:  
 
iiiiii FreeFloatVLTYVLMEMVLogIRBAS εββββββ ++++++= 533210 )(
iiiiiii FreeFloatLogVLTYLogVLMELogMVLogIRBASLog εββββββ ++++++= )()()()()( 533210  
iiiiii FreeFloatVolatilityLogMVIRVTR εβββββ +++++= 43210  
iiiiii BetaFreeFloatMVLogIRVolatility εβββββ +++++= 43210 )(  
iiiiii BetaFreeFloatMVLogIRVolatilityLog εβββββ +++++= 43210 )()(  
 
MV is the firm’s Market Value (in millions of Swiss franc) and is observed at December 31rst, 2004. BAS 
is the firm’s average bid-ask spread ratio (difference between last daily ask and bid divided by the average 
sum between last daily bid and ask) and is observed from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. median of daily volume 
turnover ratio (daily number of shares changed divided by total number of outstanding shares) and is ob-
served from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. VLTY is the firm’s return volatility (standard deviations of daily price’s 
returns from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04). VLME is the firm’s volume (daily average share’s turnover) and is ob-
served from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. Beta is the firm’s correlation with the SPI Index and is observed at De-
cember 31rst, 2004. Firm’s Free Float is the percentage of share’s floating and is observed at December 
31rst, 2004. IR is a dummy variable indicating whether (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) the firm adopts an interna-
tional accounting standard during 2004. Data on the accounting standard are obtained from Worldscope 
database and the others from Datastream 
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TABLE 1.5. Variance Inflation Factors 
 
 
Panel A: Bid-ask spread model 
Variable    R squared       VIF 
 
MV     0.3306    1.49 
 
Volatility    0.0499    1.05 
 
Free Float    0.0624    1.07 
 
Volume    0.3021    1.43 
 
IR      0.0407    1.04   
   
 
Panel B: Trading Volume model 
Variable    R squared   VIF 
 
MV     0.0817    1.09 
 
Volatility    0.0422    1.04 
 
Free Float    0.0543    1.06 
 
IR     0.0389    1.04 
   
 
Panel C: Volatility model 
Variable    R squared   VIF 
 
MV     0.0795    1.09 
 
Free Float    0.1106    1.12 
 
Beta     0.1686    1.2  
 
IR     0.1301    1.15 
 
The VIF statistic is used for analyze the presence of collinearity between variables. It’s defined for each 
variable as the ratio 1/(1-R squared), where R squared is computed from OLS regression in which the 
variable is used as dependent variable and is a function of the others. Generally with VIF around the value 
of 5, the variable may suffer for collinearity. In this case all the VIF values are enough lower than 5.    
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TABLE 1.6: Accounting System Model 
Probit Regression’s Results 
 
)lg)log(()1( 6543210 iiiiiiii InterSaPffLevROAMVIRP µβββββββ +++++++Φ==  
 
Accounting System Model                                         
Variable   P(IR=1)     
 
Constant   -1.5753 
      (0.0026) 
 
Log(MV)    0.2706 
     (0.0032) 
 
ROA    -3.884 
     (0.0287) 
 
LEV    0.0781 
    (0.2678) 
 
Free Float   -0.0720 
    (0.8849) 
 
SALG    0.0495 
    (0.8212) 
 
INTER   0.9789 
    (0.0003)  
 
 
McFadden      0.2424               
Prob(LR/F-statistic)     0.0001 
No. Obs       159  
 
 
Table reports result of the Accounting System Model regression. The dependent variable is a dummy IR 
indicating whether the firm adopts an international accounting standard during 2004. MV is the firm’s 
market value and Free Float is the percentage of share’s floating and is observed at 31.12.2004. ROA, 
SALG and LEV are  the three years average of  firm’s profitability (operating income divided by total as-
set),  sales growth rate (yearly variation in  sales divided by previously year sales) and  financial leverage 
(long term debt divided by common equity) respectively , and are calculated from 2002 to 2004. INTER is 
a dummy variable indicating if the firm is listed in foreign exchange markets (1 if yes, O otherwise) and is 
observed at December 31rst, 2004. P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is different from 0 are in pa-
rentheses. 
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TABLE 1.7: Bid-ask spread model. 
Regression’s results 
 
iiiiiii ratiosMillInvFFtLogVLTYLogVLMELogMVLogIRBASLog εβββββββ +++++++= '.)()()()()( 6533210  
 
 
Bid-Ask Spread Model                                                            
Variable        I                            II 
 
Constant                                                     0.0021   0.2324 
     (0.9951)   (0.5040) 
 
IR    -0.2081   -0.5886 
     (0.0036)   (0.0005) 
 
Log(MV)    -0.2137   -0.1870  
     (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
Log(Volume)   -0.1265   -0.1159 
     (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
Log(Volatility)   0.8035   0.8437 
     (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
Log(Free Float)   -0.2636   -0.2834 
     (0.0001)   (0.0000) 
 
Inv. Mill’s ratio   -   21.4391 
        (0.0116) 
 
 
R squared    0.8802   0.8863 
Adj. R squared   0.8756   0.8809 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0000 
No. Obs      159   159 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s average bid-ask spread ratio (difference between ask 
and bid divided by the average sum between bid and ask) observed from 1.1.04 to 
31.12.04. IR is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm adopts an international ac-
counting standard during 2004. MV is the firm’s market value, Volume is the daily aver-
age share’s turnover, Volatility is the standard deviations of daily price’s returns and Free 
Float is the percentage of share’s floating. MV and Free Float are observed at 31.12.2004 
while Volume and Volatility from 1.1.04 to 31.12.2004. The Inv. Mill’s ratio id added for 
adjust the error for the selection bias and is computed from the probit model. Column I and 
II show regression without and with Inv. Mill’s ratio respectively. P-values of the t-test 
that the coefficient is different from 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 1.8: Trading Volume model 
OLS Regression’s results 
 
iiiiii ratiosMillInvFreeFloatVolatilityLogMVIRVTR εββββββ ++++++= '.543210  
 
Trading Volume Model                                                                                           
Variable         I                                            II 
 
Constant                                                     -0.0030   -0.0029 
     (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
IR     0.0002   0.0004 
     (0.3423)   (0.3534) 
 
Log(MV)     0.0004   0.0004  
     (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
Volatility    0.0404   0.0380 
     (0.0027)   (0.0075) 
 
Free Float    0.0016   0.0016 
     (0.0001)   (0.0001) 
 
Inv. Mill’s ratio    -   16.1322   
        (0.5484) 
 
 
R squared    0.3932   0.3953 
Adj. R squared   0.3767   0.3744 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0000 
No. Obs    159   159 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the median of daily volume turnover ratio (daily number of 
shares changed divided by total number of outstanding shares) observed from 1.1.04 to 
31.12.04. IR is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm adopts an international ac-
counting standard during 2004. MV is the firm’s market value, Volatility is the standard 
deviations of daily price’s returns, and Free Float is the percentage of share’s floating. MV 
and Free Float are observed at 31.12.2004 while Volume and Volatility from 1.1.04 to 
31.12.2004. The Inv. Mill’s ratio is added for adjust the error for the selection bias and is 
computed from the probit model. Column I and II shows regressions without and with the 
Inv. Mill’s ratio respectively. P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is different from 0 
are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 1.9: Volatility model.  
OLS Regression’s results 
 
iiiiii ratiosMillInvBetaFreeFloatMVLogIRVolatilityLog εββββββ ++++++= '.)()( 543210  
 
Volatility Model                              
Variable        I                                               II 
 
Constant                -3.6094    -3.6197                                        
     (0.0000)   (0.0000)  
 
IR    -0.0184   0.2557 
     (0.7539)   (0.0665) 
 
Log(MV)    -0.1146   -0.1371   
     (0.0000)   (0.0000)  
   
Free Float    -0.0509   -0.0493 
     (0.6202)   (0.6269) 
 
Beta    0.3112   0.2767 
     (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
Inv. Mill’s ratio   -   19.1926 
        (0.0307) 
 
 
R squared    0.4163   0.4349 
Adj. R squared   0.4004   0.4154 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0000 
No. Obs    159   159 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s volatility (standard deviations of daily price’s returns) 
observed from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. IR is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm 
adopts an international accounting standard during 2004. MV is the firm’s market value, 
Free Float is the percentage of share’s floating and Beta is the firm’s correlation with the 
SPI Index. MV, Free Float and Beta are observed at 31.12.2004 while Volume and Vola-
tility from 1.1.04 to 31.12.2004. The Inv. Mill’s ratio is added to adjust the error for the se-
lection bias and is computed from the probit model indicating the accounting choice. Col-
umn I and II show regressions without and with Inv. Mill’s ratio respectively. P-values of 
the t-test that the coefficient is different from 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 1.10: Simultaneous System.  
Two Stage Regression’s Results 
 
 
Model                            I                           II       III      IV 
Variable  P(IR=1)     Log(BAS)    VTR  Log(VLTY) 
 
Constant                -0.8458  -0.4677   0.0097  -3.7638                       
     (0.9378)  (0.7135)  (0.0001)  (0.0000) 
 
IR    -  -0.8064  -0.0006   0.3345 
     (0.0063)  (0.3899)  (0.0549) 
 
Log(MV)    -0.4361  -0.2929   0.0007  -0.1244  
      (0.7596)  (0.0006)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
 
Free Float    -1.024  -0.5812   0.0016  -0.0365 
     (0.6323)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.7256) 
 
Log(VLTY)    0.7542     0.3598   0.0032   - 
     (0.6434)  (0.3730)  (0.0000) 
 
Log(BAS)    -1.5965   -  -  - 
     (0.6197) 
 
Log(VLME)   -  -0.0506  -  - 
     (0.2019) 
 
Beta    -  -  -   0.2638 
         (0.0000) 
 
Inter     0.4486   -  -  - 
     (0.5834) 
 
Salg     0.0690  -  -  - 
     (0.6608) 
 
 
McFadden/R squared    0.1947*               0.8219  0.4665  0.4462 
Adj. R squared    -     0.8151  0.4502  0.4291 
Prob(LR/F-statistic)    0.00001*      0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
No. Obs     159  159  159  159 
 
 
The table shows the result of the second stage estimation of one simultaneous system of four 
equations in which the dependent variables are endogen definite. In the first model the de-
pendent variable is a dummy IR indicating whether the firm adopts an international account-
ing standard during 2004. For the other models the continuous dependent variables are the 
firm’s average bid-ask spread ratio (difference between ask and bid divided by the average 
sum between bid and ask), the firm’s average volatility (daily return’s standard deviation) 
and the daily average volume turnover ratio (daily number of shares changed divided by total 
number of outstanding shares) and are observed from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. The model I is es-
timated with a ML method while the others are estimated with OLS method. MV is the 
firm’s market value, Free Float is the percentage of share’s floating, Volatility VLTY is the 
standard deviations of daily price’s returns, Volume VLME is the daily average share’s turn-
over, PRICE is the daily average share’s price, Beta is the firm’s correlation with the SPI In-
dex, Inter is a dummy indicating if the company is listed in a foreign exchange market and 
Salg  is the average sales growth rate from 2001 to 2004. MV, Free Float, Beta and Inter are 
observed at 31.12.2004 while Volume, Volatility and Price from 1.1.04 to 31.12.2004. P-
values of the t-test that the coefficient is different from 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 1.11: Price’s Variable Added  
OLS Regression’s results 
 
 
Model                                      I                               II       III   
Variable  Log(BAS) Log(VLTY)    VTR 
 
 
Constant               0.0062  -3.614  -0.0028          
   (0.9828)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   
 
IR   -0.5529  0.2735  0.0006   
   (0.0001)  (0.0531)  (0.3181)   
 
Log(MV)  0.0895  -0.1384  0.0004   
   (0.0396)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
 
Log(Free Float)  -0.0658  -  -   
   (0.2635)       
 
Free Float  -  -0.0522  0.0016 
     (0.6089)  (0.0000) 
 
Log(VLTY)  0.7583     -  -      
   (0.0000)     
 
VLTY   -  -  0.0342 
       (0.0144) 
 
Log(VLME)  -0.3364  -  -   
   (0.0000)   
 
Log(PRICE)  -0.3107  -  -   
   (0.0000)      
 
PRICE  -  -0.0001  -0.0001 
     (0.8173)  (0.0202) 
 
BETA   -  0.2728  - 
     (0.0000) 
 
Inv Mill’s Ratio  21.873   20.019  19.381   
   (0.0049)  (0.0237)  (0.4019) 
 
R squared  0.9237  0.4368  0.4170  
Adj. R squared  0.9195  0.4133  0.3928  
No. Obs  159  159  159  
  
 
The dependent variables are the firm’s average bid-ask spread ratio (difference between 
ask and bid divided by the average sum between bid and ask), the firm’s average volatil-
ity (daily return’s standard deviation) and the daily average volume turnover ratio (daily 
number of shares changed divided by total number of outstanding shares) for the models 
I, II and III respectively and are observed from 1.1.04 to 31.12.04. IR is a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the firm adopts an international accounting standard during 
2004. MV is the firm’s market value, Free Float is the percentage of share’s floating, 
Volatility VLTY is the standard deviations of daily price returns, Volume VLME is the 
daily average share’s turnover, PRICE is the daily average share’s price and Beta is the 
firm’s correlation with the SPI Index. MV, Free Float and Beta are observed at 
31.12.2004 while Volume, Volatility and Price from 1.1.04 to 31.12.2004. The Inv. 
Mill’s ratio is added for adjust the error for the selection bias and it is computed from 
the probit model indicating the accounting system. P-values of the t-test that the coeffi-
cient is different from 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 1.12: BAS and DScore model. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Regression’s results 
 
iiiii InterVLTYMVLogDScoreBASLog εβββββ +++++= 43210 )()(  
 
 
Bid-Ask Spread and DScore Model                                                            
Variable        I                            II 
 
Constant                                                -2.3944   -3.4521 
     (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
DScore    0.4445   0.3177 
     (0.0436)   (0.0338) 
 
Log(MV)    -0.4054   -0.2823  
     (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
Volatility      -   39.311 
        (0.0010) 
 
Inter    -   -0.6130 
        (0.0000) 
 
 
R squared    0.7221   0.8245 
Adj. R squared   0.7161   0.8166 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0000 
No. Obs      95   93 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the firm’s average bid-ask spread ratio (difference between ask 
and bid divided by the average sum between bid and ask) observed from 1.1.04 to 
31.12.04. DScore is the fractional disclosure score computed as the ratio between the  
2004 firm’ s value reporting rank and the maximum value reporting rank of the sample. 
The value reporting rank is yearly elaborate by the Swiss Banking Institute of the Univer-
sity of Zurich and is published in “Bilanz”, a Swiss economic and business monthly maga-
zine. MV is the firm’s market value, Volatility is the standard deviations of daily price’s 
returns and is a dummy variable indicating if the firm is listed in foreign exchange market 
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise). MV and Inter are observed at 31.12.2004 while Volume and Vola-
tility from 1.1.04 to 31.12.2004. P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is different from 
0 are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Trading Liquidity, Asymmetric Informa-
tion  and Increase in Disclosure: Swiss 
evidence. 
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2.1 Abstract 
 
The relationship between asymmetric information and trading liquidity is a relevant 
topic in finance and accounting theory. Theoretical prediction suggests that lower 
asymmetric information should increase the trading liquidity due to an increase of the 
investors’ confidence. In this paper I empirically analyze the impact on variables such as 
the share volume and the volume turnover from the reduction of the firm’s asymmetric 
information through the adoption of an international accounting standard. I hypothesize 
that there is an increase in the firm’s trading liquidity as consequence of the switch to an 
international accounting standard, and that the magnitude of the increase is relatively 
higher for smaller firms. Analysis results confirm a median  increase of about 10 percent 
of the time series share volume’s means for a sample of 64 Swiss firms, while the mag-
nitude of the increase doubles if only a  third less liquid firms are considered. The in-
crease of the number of shares outstanding, contemporarily to the adoption of an interna-
tional accounting standard, negatively impacts the measure of the trading liquidity espe-
cially if the volume turnover is used as proxy. Controlling for this effect, analysis results 
confirm the hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G14, G19 
Keywords: Trading liquidity, Information asymmetry, Accounting standards, Cost of 
Capital. 
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2.2. Introduction  
  
 Finance and accounting theory has largely studied the relation between trading 
liquidity and level of information through the paradigm that an increase in the level of 
information between firms and investors should increase the trading activity.  
 The trading activity has been linked to the degree of the information asymmetry 
in several theoretical models [e.g., Glosten and Milgron (1985), Karpoff (1986)] follow-
ing the paradigm that an increase in asymmetric information leads to a lower volume of 
trades because uninformed investors reduce their trades in less transparent securities. 
Therefore, an increase of the quantitative level of the information disclosed should fol-
low an increase of the trading activity’s level due to an increase of the investor’s confi-
dence to ask for securities that become more transparent. One way41 to increase the level 
of disclosure could be the adoption of an international accounting standard.  
  In this work I want to investigate if there is a definite relation between the choice 
of an international accounting standard and an increase in the trading liquidity for a 
sample of Swiss listed firms. This goal comes out from the gap in the literature on the 
Swiss evidence and from an unclear result of  the previous chapter. In fact, analyzing the 
relation between adoption of an international accounting standard and cost of capital fol-
lowing the models proposed by Leuz and Verecchia (2000), a significant cross relation 
between the adoption of an international accounting strategy and the increase in firm’s 
trading liquidity for a sample of Swiss listed firms was not found.  
 The approaches used are the time series tests of the means and medians of the 
volume turnover, share volume and of an adjusted measure of the volume turnover; and 
the time series regressions and the cross sectional analysis of the percentage variation in  
volume turnover and in share volume. Results of the time series tests and of the time se-
ries regressions report a significant increase in the trading activity after the event of 
switching from a local to an international accounting standard, while results of the cross 
sectional regressions show that the magnitude of the increase is higher for the small 
firms. The magnitude of the median increase of the time series share volume’s means is 
                                               
41
 Several studies showed that accounting quality is determined primarily by market forces and institu-
tional factors, rather than accounting standards (e.g., Ball et al., 2000; Leuz, 2003). 
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about 10% for all samples, while the magnitude of the increase doubles if only the third 
less liquid firms are considered. Moreover, results show that the measure with the vol-
ume turnover proxy couldn’t be accurate due to a denominator effect that artificially 
generates variation in the measure of the trading activity. Controlling the analysis for 
this effect, results remain in line with the previous. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews prior re-
search on the topic. Motivations, Hypothesis and Research design are presented in sec-
tion three. Section four provides sample selection and descriptive statistics and section 
five describes the trading volume variables used. Section six and seven present time se-
ries  analysis while in section eight the cross sectional analysis is reported. Conclusions 
and suggestions for future research appear in the final section. 
 
2.3 Review of the literature 
 
Several theoretical models have linked the trading volume to the levels of asymmetric 
information. One of the first tentative theories on trading in market with asymmetric in-
formation was the model proposed by Morse (1980) in which he argues that trading is an 
effect of the asymmetric information. The successive analytical studies by Kyle (1985), 
Glosten and Milgron (1985), Merton (1987) and Diamond and Verecchia (1991) reveal 
the intuition of the existence of a well established relationship between trading volume 
reactions and different levels of information among investors. When more information 
on a security is available, the investors’ confidence to ask for them increases, so deter-
mining a consequential increase in trading volume. Generally, they argue that trading 
volume reactions are inversely proportional to the degree of asymmetric information. 
Kyle (1985), in his dynamic model of insider trading, argues that a consequence of the 
existence of asymmetric information is a reduction of the market liquidity that arises 
from the reluctance of informed investors to hold non transparent securities. Glosten and 
Milgron (1985) analyze the bid-ask spread as a function of the presence of imperfect in-
formation between investors. They propose a formal model in which the market liquidity 
is expressed as an inverse function of the adverse selection and their results show the ex-
istence of a reduction of the informative asymmetry as a benefit of the increase in dis-
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closure. Merton (1987) in his model of capital market equilibrium argues that trading by 
uninformed investors is decreasing in the level of information asymmetry. Diamond and 
Verecchia (1991) in their model on liquidity argue that the expected trading volume is an 
increasing function of the precision of the information, hence the higher the precision of 
information, the lower the asymmetric information level among investors. Furthermore 
their analysis shows that firms that reveal public information to reduce information 
asymmetry can increase the liquidity of its securities and so reduce the firm’s cost of 
capital. 
 The intuition in these models is recurrent in more recently models like the one 
proposed by Kim and Verecchia (2001); a model in which firm’s returns depend on trad-
ing volume in the cases where the firm defers disclosure, and argues that firms commit-
ting to more disclosure should experience a reduction in the slope coefficient of trading 
volume. 
 From an empirical point of view, several studies have tried to verify these theo-
retical predictions and generally results are in line with the theoretical predictions. 
Moreover the empirical research can be divided into two distinct areas: those that have 
directly studied the relation between trading reaction and level of information and those 
that, studying other relations, have found evidence of association between trading vol-
ume and different levels of information. 
 Among them that belong to the first research area are Leuz and Verecchia (2000), 
Bartov and Bodnar (1996) and Welker (1995). Leuz and Verecchia (2000) have ana-
lyzed for German companies the impact on the cost of capital from the commitment to 
give more information, measuring the asymmetric component of the cost of capital 
through the measure of the bid ask spread, of the market liquidity, and of the price return 
volatility. The commitment to give more information is proxied by the decision to adopt 
an international accounting standard. The results are in line with the theoretical predic-
tions and show significant relationships. They especially show the existence of a direct 
association with the market liquidity and an inverse association with the bid-ask spread 
from an increase in disclosure levels, while they do not find a significant association 
with the price return volatility. Bartov and Bodnar (1996), exploring the relevance of in-
formation asymmetries in order to explain accounting policy, show that firms can in-
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crease the market liquidity as a consequence of a reduction of the informative asymme-
try through the adoption of more informative accounting methods. Welker (1995) ana-
lyzes for a sample of firms listed on the NYSE the relation between information level 
and market liquidity through the variation of the bid ask spread. This variable is used as 
proxy for the market liquidity according to the paradigm  that a reduction of the bid ask 
spread indicates an increase in the market liquidity as a consequence of a higher demand 
of securities that become more transparent after the increase of the information level. 
Results show that the trading liquidity is higher for companies with a low information 
index in respect to those with a higher one, therefore in line with the theoretical predic-
tion that says an increase of the information level increases the market liquidity, reduc-
ing the spreads between ask and bid. They observe that spreads decrease; hence the trad-
ing liquidity increases more rapidly for companies with a low initial information level.  
 Among them that belong to the second research area are Bamber (1986), Bes-
sembinder et al (1996), Lang and Lundholm (1996, 1999), Alford and Jones (1998), 
Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), Bailey at al. (2006). Bamber (1986) studying the vol-
ume reactions to earnings announcements finds an inverse relationship between firm size 
and trading volume. If the firm size can be used as proxy for degree of information 
asymmetry42 the consequence is of an inverse relation between trading volume and dif-
ferent levels of information among investors. Bessembinder et al (1996) show that the 
trading volume is a useful tool to proxy for the information flows. In their study, they 
report results of a positive reaction of the trading volume to the specific information for 
all the firms, while the common information seems to have a positive impact only on the 
trading volume of the large firms. Lang and Lundholm (1996, 1999) find that for firms 
that give more information a higher analyst following43 can be observed, as well as less 
dispersion of the analyst’s forecasts, less volatility of the revision of the result’s fore-
casts, and a positive impact on the price of new shares issues44. Alford and Jones (1998) 
in their analysis that compares information asymmetry for three samples of Nasdaq 
NMS companies that trade in different home markets, find a negative relation between 
                                               
42
 Several authors argue that the firm size is inversely related with the degree of asymmetric information. 
See, for example, Atiase (1980) Merton (1987) and Bamber (1987). 
43
 The number of analysts following is often used as proxy for the asymmetric information. 
44
 In their study there is evidence that the management voluntarily increases the amount of information to 
the investor in correspondence of the emission of new shares for being able to obtain a higher issue price.  
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share turnover and adverse selection component of the spread bid ask that is used as 
proxy of asymmetric information. Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999), studying whether 
firms benefit from expanded voluntary disclosure examining change in market factors, 
show that an increase of the disclosure level is followed by an increase of the stock li-
quidity, of the firm’s performance, of the institutional ownership and of the analysts fol-
lowing. Bailey at al. (2006) examine the consequence of the increase in disclosure that 
non-U.S. firms experience when listing shares in the U.S.. They find empirical evidence 
of a general increase in trading volume after listing shares in U.S., and they argue that 
among the possible reasons, the increase is also due to a reduction of the asymmetric in-
formation among investors.  
 Recently, the literature focusing on the relation between trading volume and re-
turn comovements has shown evidence of a persistent inverse relation between degree of 
asymmetric information and trading volume. Llorente et all. (2002) propose and test em-
pirically a model which predicts that the relation between trading volume and return 
autocorrelation is related to the degree of information asymmetry, and Gagnon and 
Karolyi (2006) report evidence that stocks characterized by different degree of informa-
tion asymmetry tend to experience high volume. Finally, a series of studies on emerging 
markets report empirical evidence of an increase in trading volume as consequence of 
adopting more informative accounting rules.  
  
  2.3 Motivations, Hypothesis and research design. 
 
Economic theory suggests the existence of a well defined relationship between 
asymmetric information and trading liquidity according to which a reduction of the in-
formation asymmetry is reflected positively on the trading activity for one listed com-
pany. Adopting an international accounting standard, and by doing so deciding to in-
crease the quantitative level of disclosure, leads to a higher transparency on the eco-
nomic and financial firm’s situation. An increase of the firm’s transparency is followed 
by an increase in the investors’ confidence45 to ask for a firm’s shares, thereby increas-
ing the trading volumes. Moreover, the increase in trading activity should be relatively 
                                               
45
 Mainly for informed investors. 
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higher for the small firms, considering that these start from a higher level of asymmetric 
information. In fact, small firms have a higher level of asymmetric information than the 
larger firms due to the limitation of their numbers and sources of information46. It fol-
lows that the standardization of the level of disclosure through the adoption of an inter-
national accounting standard should have more effect on the firms with higher informa-
tion asymmetries, hence with the small firms.  
The theoretical argumentations described and the evidence of the previous re-
search suggests the formulation of two hypotheses on the consequences coming from the 
choice to adopt an international accounting standard:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: firms that adopt an international accounting standard benefit from an in-
crease in the trading liquidity. 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: the magnitude of the increase in trading liquidity that comes from an 
adoption of an international accounting standard is positively associated with the de-
gree of asymmetric information. It follows that the magnitude of the increase is rela-
tively higher for the small firms. 
 
Time series statistical tests and time series regression are used to test the first hy-
pothesis, while cross sectional analysis is used to test the second one, using the shares 
volume and the volume turnover as proxies for trading activity. The volume turnover is 
indicate in literature as the canonical tool47 for measure the trading volume, but it could 
be inappropriate in this case due to a denominator effect that reduces artificially the 
measure of the trading liquidity of a firm when the total number of shares outstanding is 
increased. To verify this and to test the formulated hypothesis I first use an adjusted ver-
sion of the volume turnover ratio as ulterior proxies for trading liquidity and then esti-
mate regressive models controlled by the firms that have not changed the number of 
shares outstanding in the before and after event period. 
 In the time series analysis I first test differences between the time series mean 
and median of trading liquidity proxies on two windows of 52 weeks before and after the 
                                               
46
 The tendency of the media is to report more news on large firms.  
47
 See Lo and Wang (2000). 
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event of adoption of an international accounting standard and second, estimate two time 
series firms effect models that relate the level of the share volume and of the volume 
turnover between the before and the after event windows. In the cross sectional analysis, 
I estimate two regressive models that relate the percentage variation of the average trad-
ing liquidity proxy with firms’ characteristics like the size and the liquidity level. Re-
gressive models are built considering the evidence of the recent literature on the deter-
mined of the cross sectional variation of the trading volume, especially the theoretical 
and empirical evidence reported by Lo and Wang (2000).  
 
2.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics. 
  
 The sample selection begins from the 399 Swiss firms included in a predefined 
stocks list of the Worldscope database called “WSCOPESW.LLT”. That list contains all 
the firms that were and are traded in Switzerland. For each firm I have verified if and 
when they have changed their accounting standard from a local to an international one. 
From 1987 to 2004 I have individuated 117 firms that have adopted for the first time an 
international accounting strategy. Among these, 8 have successively returned back to a 
local accounting strategy and 16 are financial firms. The latter are excluded from the 
sample because they are characterized by different accounting rules and also because 
their financial reporting differs from that of the non-financial firms; while for those that 
have changed their accounting standard more than one time I consider only the first 
change. 
 A successive selection is necessary due to the data availability. Firms that have at 
least two years of observations before the event and two years after the event are in-
cluded in the sample. This sample inclusion criteria avoids including firms that were 
listed or delisted in the year prior to the before event window and in the year following 
the after event window, respectively. Following this inclusion criteria, 37 other firms ei-
ther for having no data or for insufficient number of observations are excluded, reducing 
the final sample to 64 non-financial firms. Panel A of Table 2.1 reassumes the procedure 
of selection process and panel B shows the distribution of the event of adoption of an in-
ternational accounting standard among years. 
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 The statistic description of the sample is reported in table 2.2. At the fiscal year 
end before the adoption of an international accounting standard the average (median) 
size of the market value of the sample is of 1.17 (0.241) billion of CHF, with the larger 
firm that capitalizes 17,143 billion while the smaller 4,92 million. The average (median)  
volume turnover, that is calculated as the average of daily volume turnovers during the 
last fiscal year before the switch, is 4.7% (0.32%), with the highest being 96.96%, the 
second highest 52.07% and the smallest 0.00372%. The percentiles statistics reveal that 
90% of the firm’s samples have an average volume turnover during the last fiscal year 
before the switch lower than the 10%, showing so presence of segmentation by volume 
turnover. In fact, the 64% of the sample firms have a turnover ratio lower than 1%, the 
26% have a turnover ratio between 1 and 10% and the remaining 10% have a turnover 
ratio higher than 10%. The average (median) share volume, that is calculated as the av-
erage of the daily shares traded during the last fiscal year before the switch, is 60.21 
(3.3) thousand shares, with the highest at 2503.56, the second highest at 283.23 and the 
smallest at  0.055 thousand shares. 
 
2.5 Trading volume variables 
 
 As measure of trading volume I use three proxies: share volume, volume turn-
over and adjusted volume turnover.  
 Share volume SV is defined as the daily number of shares traded, representing 
thereby a firm’s specific measure of the trading liquidity. 
  
           a) tradedsharesofvolumeshares #=                                                     (2.1) 
 
   
 Volume turnover VT is defined as the ratio to the shares volume of the number of 
shares outstanding, representing a firm relative measure of the trading activity. 
 
  b)       
goutstandinsharesof
tradedsharesof
turnovervolume
#
#
=
                                       (2.2) 
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 Adjusted volume turnover Adj-VT is defined as the ratio to the shares volume of  
the average of the number of shares outstanding in the analysis period, representing an 
adjusted firm relative measure of the trading activity. The motivation to take the average 
of the number of shares outstanding is given by the possibly negative impact on the vol-
ume turnover ratio by the change in the number of shares outstanding. In fact, a variation 
in the number of shares outstanding could imply an exogenous variation in the turnover 
ratio as consequence of a variation of the denominator of the ratio.  
 
 
 c)       
goutstandinsharesoftheofAverage
tradedsharesof
turnovervolumeAdj
#
#
=−
     (2.3) 
 
2.6 Univariate Statistics 
 
In this section, I analyze cross-sectional differences in firm level trading liquidity be-
tween the before and the after period of the firm’s switch from a local to an international 
accounting standard. I analyze average and median measures of trading liquidity present-
ing t-statistics to test the null hypothesis that the measures are the same between the two 
event periods. 
 Results show as expected a significant increase in the trading volume after the 
adoption of an international accounting standard for a sample of 64 Swiss firms. This re-
sult is obtained generalizing the evidence of the time series analysis of the share volume 
and of the adj-volume turnover, while the analysis of the volume turnover does not show 
results in line with the hypothesis due to a decrease of the ratio given by the increase of 
the number of shares outstanding. I use a weekly horizon as the best compromise be-
tween the necessities of minimizing the volume fluctuation and maximizing the sample 
size, so all data are computed as the weekly average of the daily observations. All the 
proxies show same results for the less liquid firms while seemingly contrasting results 
for the higher liquid firms. 
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2.6.1 Share Volume. 
  
 The Share Volume SV is calculated for each firm as the weekly average of the 
daily numbers of share changed of the total daily number of shares outstanding on two 
windows of 52 weeks before and after the event of adoption of an international account-
ing standard. It is a direct measure of the firm trading volume and is measured in unit of 
thousands. 
  Table 2.3 shows mean and median cross sectional results of the time series 
means and medians of the share volume. The time series of the SV’s means increases af-
ter the event in mean from 61’200 to 68’472 and in median from 58’710 to 63’030 
shares. That means an increase of 11.9% and 7.4% in mean and in median, respectively. 
Moreover the difference in mean and in median between the before and the after event 
windows are statistically significant at level higher the 95% and the 90%, respectively. 
 The time series of the SV’s medians increases in mean from 2141 to 2529, and in 
median from 2090 to 2530 shares. That means an increase of 18.1% and 21.1% percent 
in mean and in median, respectively. Moreover, the differences in mean and in median 
between the two events windows are both statistically significant at a level higher than 
99%. 
 The percentiles analysis shows that the magnitude of the increase seems to be 
higher for small variations of SV, especially for the time series of the median. That sug-
gests the possibility that magnitude of the variation could be different for different level 
of liquidity. To verify this, I break the sample in three sub-samples in function of the 
trading liquidity level. Results, reported in panel A of table 2.6, show that for all the ter-
ciles there is an increase in the number of share traded after the event. For the more liq-
uid firms’ tercile, even the difference in mean and in median between the before and the 
after event time series SV’s means are not significant, the magnitude of the increase is of 
9.2% and 4.9% in mean and in median respectively, again a statistically significant in-
crease for the less liquid firms tercile of 41.9% and 42.4% in mean and in median re-
spectively. The time series of the SV’s medians show a more contained increase for the 
less liquid firms’ tercile of 22.4% and 20% against the 10.1% and 10.5% increase in 
mean and in median respectively of the more liquid firms’ tercile. Hence, the analysis of 
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the sub-samples shows that the magnitude of the increase in the share volume is rela-
tively higher for the less liquid firms. 
 In conclusion, the analysis of the share volume confirms an increase of the num-
ber of shares traded after the adoption of an international accounting standard for a sam-
ple of 64 Swiss firms. Moreover, this analysis suggests that the magnitude of the in-
crease is an inverse function of the trading liquidity level, a relation that will be investi-
gated in the cross sectional analysis. 
 
 
2.6.2 Volume Turnover 
 
 The Volume turnover ratio VT is calculated for each firm as the weekly average 
of the ratio of the daily number of shares changed to the total daily number of shares 
outstanding on two windows of 52 weeks before and after the event of adoption of an in-
ternational accounting standard. 
  Table 2.4 shows mean and median cross sectional results of the time series 
means and medians of the volume turnover ratio. Results show, against the expectations, 
a reduction of turnover ratio after the event. However, while there is a significant reduc-
tion both in mean and in average of the time series of the share turnover mean, the time 
series of the median share turnover decreases insignificantly both in mean and median in 
the after event windows. The time series of VT’s means shows a decrease of the trading 
volume in the after event window of 26.7% and of 25.4% in mean and median respec-
tively, and these decreases are both statistically significant at a level higher than 99 per-
cent. Instead, the time series of the VT’s medians shows an insignificant decrease in the 
trading volume of 2.7% and of 3.4% in mean and in median respectively.  
 Moreover, the high differences between the mean and median values of the two 
time series suggest that higher negative values of share turnover characterize the time se-
ries of mean. To verify this, as for the share volume proxy, I break the sample in three 
sub-samples in function of the trading liquidity level. Results reported in panel B of ta-
ble 2.6 show that for the tercile less liquid results there is a significant increase in the 
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trading volume after the event, while for the middle and for the more liquid tercile there  
is a significant decrease in trading liquidity in the after window event.  
 These results seem to confirm for the VT ratio an increase in the trading liquidity 
only for the firms with lower trading liquidity level, while the trading volume for the 
middle and more liquid firms seem to decrease after the event of adoption of an interna-
tional accounting strategy. Moreover, it is noted that the nature of the different results 
with respect to those obtained with the share volume proxy, could depend on a denomi-
nator effect that artificially decreases the magnitude of the volume turnover ratio. The 
denominator effect is due to an increase of the total number of shares outstanding and in 
this analysis its effect is important. Panel B of table 2.2 shows that from one year before 
to one year after the adoption of an international accounting standard, 50% of the firm’s 
sample increased the total numbers of share outstanding and the increase is in average of 
421.5%. This increase is in line with the evidence of Ashbaugh (2001), which argues 
and documents that firm’s tend to adopt an international accounting standard in occasion 
of a new equity issuing. To take in account the presence of the denominator effect, the 
analysis on the volume turnover is repeated with an adjusted version of the volume turn-
over ratio in which the denominator is constant and it is calculated as the average of the 
daily number of shares outstanding during the two event windows.  
 
2.6.3 Adjusted Volume turnover 
 
 The adjusted volume turnover Adj-VT is calculated for each firm and for each 
week as the weekly average of the ratio between the daily number of shares changed to 
the average number of shares outstanding on two windows of 52 weeks before and after 
the event of adoption of an international accounting standard. The nature of this adjust-
ment is due to the possibly negative and exogenous effect on the volume turnover ratio 
by the increase of the number of share outstanding. In fact, 50% of the firms’ sample 
changes its number of shares outstanding during the analysis period. Moreover, consid-
ering the magnitude of the increase, which is in average of 421%, the negative impact on 
the variation of the ratio between the two event windows should not be negligible. Fur-
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thermore the results obtained with the canonical volume turnover ratio are, differently 
from those obtained with the share volume, not in line with the theoretical evidence. 
 The result reported in table 2.5 show, as expected, that the Adj-VT present a 
similar pattern with the Share volume. The time series of the Adj-VT’s means increase 
in the after event windows of 9.6% and of 11.3% in mean and in median respectively, 
but these increases are not statistically significant. Instead, more significant are the in-
creases in mean and in median of the time series of the median Adj-VT with increases of 
23.3% and of 23.5% respectively on the after event window. The analysis of the percen-
tile does not show particular evidence, except the fact that the max variation in the time 
series means is negative. The analysis of the sub-sample show the different magnitude of 
the increase among liquid firm’s terciles, confirming that the less liquid firms benefit 
from a higher relative increase in trading liquidity after the event of adoption of an inter-
national accounting standard. 
 
 
2.6.4 Result’s  comments. 
 
 The results of the time series tests confirm the first hypothesis showing that there 
is an increase in the trading liquidity for a sample of 64 Swiss firms that have changed 
its accounting standard from a local to an international one. The analysis suggests that 
the measure must be made with appropriate tools. In fact, if it used the canonical tool of 
the trading activity, namely the volume turnover ratio, the evidence of an increase in the 
trading liquidity should be hidden by other effects like, in these cases, the increase of the 
denominator of the ratio that artificially determines a decrease in the measure of the trad-
ing activity. For this reason I measure the variation in trading activity using the share 
volume that is not directly influenced by the number of shares outstanding. The results 
obtained with the share volume are confirmed by those obtained using the adjusted ver-
sion of the volume turnover, namely the adj-VT. The analysis evidence is of a statisti-
cally significant increase of the time series medians of the share volume and of the ad-
justed volume turnover ratio in the after event window. Moreover the subsample analy-
sis shows that the less liquid firms benefit from a higher relative increase in trading li-
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quidity after the event, suggesting the existence of an inverse function between the  trad-
ing liquidity level and the magnitude of the increase in trading liquidity. The cross sec-
tional analysis may show the existence of this relation. 
 
 
2.7 Time series regression. 
 
The univariate results of the previous section provide useful evidence on the increase of 
firms’ trading liquidity level after the adoption of an international accounting strategy. In 
this section I present a more formal test, regressing the firm’s trading liquidity level 
measured by the share volume and the volume turnover on the indicator variable of 
adoption of an international accounting standard. I run a pooled time series regression 
using the following firm48 fixed49 effect model: 
 
   ti
n
ntintiiti CVIRy ,,,,, ** εγβα +++= ∑                                        (2.4) 
 
where i indexes firms from 1 to 64, t indexes weeks from 52 before to 52 after the event 
of the switch from a local accounting standard to an international one, iα  correspond to 
firms’ fixed effect, tiIR ,  is a set of indicator variables equal to 1 when the firm adopts an 
international accounting standard or 0 otherwise, and ti ,ε  is a random disturbance as-
sumed to be possibly heteroskedastic and correlated within firms50 (Petersen (2006)). 
The coefficient β  indicates the deviation of y  from the firm specific average before the 
switch from a local accounting standard to an international one; and tiCV ,  is a set of n 
control variables. 
 Table 2.7 reports results when the share volume is used as dependent variable. 
Results show a statistical significant increase (β=7.29, p-value 0.0383) in the share vol-
                                               
48
 I do not control for time effect because the panel data is composed of observations on different firms in 
different times. Moreover, due to the low number of observations, there are not enough degrees of free-
doms for estimating the model considering the time effects. 
49
 The Hausman test of the random effects specification against the fixed effects specification rejects the 
random effects specification.  
50
 Tests on serial correlation made with the Wooldridge (2002) procedure reject the null hypothesis of no 
correlation within firms. 
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ume after the adoption of an international accounting standard. The positive relation re-
mains significant (β = 7.64, p-value 0.0403) after controlling for variables such as firm’s 
price, firm’s size and firm’s return volatility51. Table 2.8 reports results when the volume 
turnover is used as dependent variable. The first column reports regression results when 
all the firms are considered, while in columns II and III the results are obtained control-
ling the relation for a dummy variable indicating the no-change of the number of shares 
outstanding during the period of analysis, eliminating any possible denominator effect. 
In fact, while results in column I report a decrease in the volume turnover ratio, results in 
column II and III report a significant increase of the volume turnover ratio after the 
switch. This analysis confirms the negative impact of the variation in the total number of 
shares outstanding on the increase of the volume turnover ratio. 
 Table 2.9 and 2.10 report regressions’ results when the sample is split in three 
terciles based on the firm’s liquidity level. The first column reports estimations’ results 
of the cross product among each tercile and the dummy indicating the switch to an inter-
national accounting standard, while in the second and third column results are obtained 
controlling the cross products for the firms that have not changed their number of shares 
outstanding during the analysis’s period. Results show in general an increase of the trad-
ing liquidity in each tercile after the switch to an international accounting standard. Es-
pecially, if the regressions are controlled by the firms that have not changed their num-
ber of shares outstanding, results report a significant increase of the trading liquidity af-
ter the event only for the first terciles when the share volume is used as dependent vari-
able, and only for the first and third terciles when the volume turnover ratio is used as 
dependent variable. However, for the other terciles, even if statistically insignificant, 
they show almost always a positive sign. Moreover, the impact of the denominator effect 
on the VT ratio is evident. In fact, while the estimation of the full model indicates a 
negative relation between the dependent variable and the dummy IR, this relation be-
comes positive when the regression is controlled by the firms that have not changed their 
number of shares outstanding (Table 2.8). Finally, the low number of observations does 
not permit, due to a near singularity, estimation of the magnitude of the increase in trad-
                                               
51
 The relation still remains positively significant after adding the lagged dependent variable as an ulterior 
control variable.  
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ing liquidity for each tercile that it is hypothesized to be negatively related to the firm’s 
size and will be investigated in the next section. 
Concluding, this analysis confirm the results of the univariate analysis, showing evi-
dence of increase of the firm’s trading liquidity after the adoption of an international ac-
counting standard, then in line with the first hypothesis.  
 
2.7.1 Cross-Listening as possible confounding effect. 
 
The firm’s cross-listing could be a possible confounding effect. It is interesting to con-
trol the nature of the relationship between trading liquidity and adoption of an IAS for 
this possible effect.  
 Using the “Aktienführer Schweiz”, a yearly finance book with information on all 
the Swiss firm’s listed at the SWX, I have found cross-listed information on only 57 
firms of the sample 64. Of these 57 firms, only 7 are cross-listed and none have them-
selves cross-listed during the analysis period. This characteristic does not allow the use 
of a firm fixed effect model. As a valid alternative, I run a pooled time series regression 
controlling the regression  for time  effects using a set of year dummy variables. 
 The regression results are reported in table 2.11. In the first column there are re-
sults when the Share Volume is used as proxy of the trading liquidity, and in the second 
and third columns, when the Volume turnover is used as proxy of the trading liquidity. 
There is a positive and significant association (β=6.2398, p-value 0.0881) between the 
share volume and the dummy IR, indicating the adoption of an international accounting 
strategy and the relationship result to be positive (β=0.0001, p-value 0.0000) when the 
VT is used as proxy for the trading liquidity only when the regression is controlled for 
the firms that did not change the total number of shares outstanding. These results are in 
line with the previous indicating once again that the trading liquidity increases signifi-
cantly after the adoption of an International accounting standard. 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
2.8 Firm size and liquidity level. 
 
In this section I investigate the relation between the variation in the trading volume and 
some specific firms characteristics like the size and the level of the trading liquidity, 
controlling for some variables that the literature has shown useful in explaining the cross 
section of turnover. The aim of this section is to test the second hypothesis, namely to 
test that the magnitude of the increase in trading liquidity after the switch from a local to 
an international accounting standard is higher for the small and the less liquid firms. 
 
2.8.1 Determinants of trading volume 
 
 Atiase (1980) argues that firm size is positively related to the investor’s incentive 
to acquire private pre-disclosure information, which means the quantity of pre-disclosure 
information should be lower for the small firm, thereby determining higher information 
asymmetries. Successively, Atiase (1985) reports empirical evidence consistent with his 
argumentations. Moreover, Bamber (1987) suggests that small firms have higher levels 
of asymmetric information than the large due to the limitation of their numbers and 
sources of information, and Merton (1987) argues that the existence of asymmetric in-
formation could explain why uninformed investors do not invest at all in certain securi-
ties such as the small firms. It follows that the standardization of the level of disclosure 
through the adoption of an international accounting standard should have more effect in 
term of trading liquidity on the firm with higher information asymmetries, hence with 
the small firm. Therefore, in line with these argumentations the association between the 
variation in trading liquidity and the firm size should be negative.  
 Moreover, the literature reveals that the less liquid firms are those with higher 
degrees of asymmetric information. An implication of the Diamond and Verecchia 
(1991) model, revealed by Bartov and Bodonar (1996), is that the increase in trading ac-
tivity is a concave function of the precision of the information. This concavity implies 
that increases in liquidity are higher for more higher levels of asymmetric information. It 
follows that the less liquid firms should benefit from a relatively higher increase in trad-
ing activity. Gagnon and Karolyi (2006), using the stock’s illiquidity and the firm size as 
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measure of the asymmetric information, find evidence that stocks characterized by dif-
ferent degree of asymmetric information tend to experience high volume trading. There-
fore, in line with these argumentations, the association between the variation in trading 
liquidity and the firm’s liquidity level should be negative. 
 Moreover, excess expected returns and high levels of return’s volatility should 
increase trading volumes. In consideration of that, following Lo and Wang (2000), I add 
in the regression model three variables α , β  and σ  that are respectively the intercept, 
the slope and the residual standard deviation of the time series regression of each firm’s 
stock return on the market return. The expected signs should be all positive, considering 
the fact that excess returns give investors an incentive to sell or buy more shares than the 
average, thereby increasing change volumes, while high levels of volatility should both 
generate more portfolio rebalancing needs and act as incentive for investors to become 
more active in going in and out from a shares investment. Another impact on the turn-
over could be represented by the trading cost, considering that higher trading cost can 
reduce trading liquidity. In consideration of that I add to the model, following Lo and 
Wang (2000) the negative covariance of the first order firm’s return γ. This variable ap-
proximates the measure of the bid ask spread, as indicated in the effective bid ask spread 
model of Roll (1984). Moreover, I expect a positive sign for that variable. In fact, a 
negative value of γ implies a large bid ask spread, hence higher trading cost and, conse-
quentially, less trading activity. The share price plays another significant role in deter-
mining the trading activity. In fact, for the same investment amount the number of shares 
traded is high if the price is lower.  
 
2.8.2 Cross sectional analysis 
 
The analysis of the correlations, reported in table 2.12, shows a negative relation be-
tween the trading volume measures and both the firm size and the liquidity level degree. 
However, these correlations are statistically not different from zero, probably due to the 
low number of observations in the sample. The analysis among the possible explanatory 
variable highlights a high correlation among the first order autocovariance of returns γ 
and the three variables α, β and σ of 0.385, 0.475 and -0.639, respectively. This suggests 
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possible collinearity effects if they are used together in a regression model. For this rea-
son, γ is excluded from the set of the possible explanatory variables52.  
 Results of the cross sectional analysis show the existence of a negative relation 
among variation in trading volume, firm’s size and firm’s liquidity level for a sample of 
64 Swiss listed firms that have changed their accounting standard from a local to an in-
ternational one. 
The two models used for the cross sectional analyses are the following: 
0 1 2 3 4 5% ( )i i i i i i iVT Log MV Liqγ γ γ γ α γ β γ σ ε∆ = + + + + + +                (2.5) 
0 1 2 3 4 5% ( )i i i i i i iSV Log MV Liqγ γ γ γ α γ β γ σ ε∆ = + + + + + +                 (2.6) 
These are the volume turnover and the share volume models respectively53. 
The regression’s results of the volume turnover model are reassumed in table 2.13. The 
univariate analysis results, summarized in the first two columns, show the existence of a 
significant negative relation between the variation in volume turnover on the one hand 
and the logarithm of size and liquidity level on the other hand. However, while the loga-
rithm of size explains about 11% of the total variance, the liquidity level doesn’t seem to 
be a powerful explanatory variable. The multivariate analysis confirms the existence of a 
significant negative relation among the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
of the logarithm of size and the liquidity level. Furthermore, the multivariate analysis 
shows the existence of a significant positive relation between the variation in volume 
turnover and the α, while the relation with β and σ are insignificant. That suggests that 
the excess expected returns contribute to explain the difference in variation in volume 
turnover across firms, while the variables for the systematic and residual risk don’t seem 
to contribute to explain the difference in variation in volume turnover across a sample of 
64 Swiss firms. Moreover, considering the high slope of the α, it is possible that this 
variable captures high effects on the volume turnover making the other explanatory vari-
ables insignificant. For this reason I compute a new regression excluding the α variable. 
Results, reported in column VII, are similar to those in which the α variable is included, 
                                               
52
 When γ is added as control variable, its coefficient results to be insignificant, decreasing the explanatory 
power of the models. 
53
 The Price is not included in the models, however its adding is insignificant and does not change the es-
timations` values. 
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except for the sign of σ that still remains insignificant but becomes negative, and for the 
explanatory power of the model that decreases more than 15%. In columns V and VI, 
regression results are summarized excluding the size and the liquidity level variables for 
reason of possible multicollinearity, respectively. Results confirm once again the exis-
tence of negative relations between the dependent variable and the variables of size and 
liquidity level, showing an increase in the levels of significance. The last column reports 
coefficients estimation when all the control variables are used,  showing that they do not 
help in increasing the explanatory power of the model, leaving unaltered the relation be-
tween the dependent variable and both the firm size and the liquidity level variable54. 
Therefore, cross regression results of the volume turnover model show the existence of a 
significant negative association between the variation in volume turnover on the one 
hand and the firm’s size and the firm’s liquidity level on the other hand. However, re-
sults obtained with the volume turnover model cannot eliminate the doubt that the nega-
tive relation is influenced by the denominator effect, namely by a variation of the firm’s 
number of shares outstanding during the period of analysis.  
 Table 2.14 reassumes regression’s results of the share volume model. The uni-
variate analysis results, reassumed in the first two columns, show the existence of a sig-
nificant negative relation only between the variation in share volume and the logarithm 
of the firm’s size while insignificant is the relation with the firm’s liquidity level. In the 
last column are reported regression results when α, β are added as control variables. The 
variable σ is not added55 due to its negative correlation of 0.326 (p-value 0.009) with the 
logarithm of the firm’s size. Results show a negative significant relation between the 
variation of share volume and the logarithm of the firm’s size, while insignificant re-
mains the negative association with the variable indicating the firm’s liquidity level56. 
Moreover, for the share volume model too, it is possible that the variable α, considering 
its high slop, captures high effects on the share volume making insignificant the other 
explanatory variables. For this reason I compute a new regression excluding the α vari-
                                               
54
 The adding of the firm’s price and of the increase in firm’s return volatility, estimations of which are 
statistically insignificant, do not contribute to the explanatory power of the model, leaving unaltered the 
relation between the dependent variable and both the firm size and the liquidity level variable. 
55
 If the variable σ is added in the share volume model, the relation between the dependent variable and the 
logarithm of firm’s size becomes insignificant with a p_value of  0.5913 
56
 Regression results do not change when the firm’s price and the increase in firm’ return volatility are 
added as ulterior control variables. 
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able. Results, reported in column VII, are similar to those in which the α variable is in-
cluded, except for the explanatory power of the model that decreases more than 10%. In 
columns V and VI are summarized regression’s results excluding the size and the liquid-
ity level variables for reasons of possible multicollinearity, respectively. Results confirm 
one more time the existence of negative relations between the dependent variable and 
the variables of size, showing an increase in the levels of significance, while insignifi-
cant remains the relation with the liquidity level. So, cross regression results of the share 
volume model confirm the existence of a significant negative association between the 
variation in share volume and the firms’ size, while not confirming the relation between 
the variation in share volume and the firms’ liquidity level, which, although in line with 
the expectation, remains statistically insignificant. 
 The first two columns of Table 2.15 report results of the regressions controlled 
by the variation in the total number of shares outstanding during the period of analysis. I 
use a dummy variable NONOSH that is equal to 1 when the firm has not changed its 
number of shares outstanding from one year before to one year after the adoption of an 
international accounting standard, 0 otherwise. Results are in line with the previous, 
showing again the existence of a significant negative relation between the variation in 
trading liquidity and the firm’s size, while the relation with the liquidity level remains 
insignificant. Moreover, the SV model reveals the existence of a negative (p-value 
0.1067) relation with the dummy NONOSH. This relation reveals that the magnitude of 
the increase in SV is in average lower for the firms that have not changed their number 
of shares outstanding during the analysis period. The second two columns of the table 
2.15 report results57 of the cross product regressions, showing that only for the SV model 
there is a negative and statistically significant relation with the cross product between 
the logarithm of the firm size and the dummy indicating the no-change  in the number of 
shares outstanding. This relation reveals that the variation in share volume between the 
before and the after event period is higher for the small firms among those that have not 
changed their number of shares outstanding. This result is in line with the second hy-
pothesis confirming that the magnitude of the increase in trading liquidity is higher for 
                                               
57
 Regression results do not change when control variable α  is excluded.  
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the small firms. However, this result is not confirmed by the VT model that reports in-
significant estimations. 
 Results obtained from the cross sectional analysis confirm the evidence of the  
time series analysis about the existence of a negative relation between the variation in 
trading liquidity and firm’s size, while not all significant is the relation between the 
variation on trading liquidity and the firm’s liquidity level, especially when regressions 
are controlled by the firms that have not changed their number of shares outstanding, 
avoiding a denominator effect. Concluding, these results confirm that for a sample of 64 
Swiss firms that have adopted an international accounting standard, those with a small 
firm size benefit from an increase in trading liquidity more than the larger firms.  
 
2.9 Summary and conclusions 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate if there is a definite relation between the choosing 
of an international accounting standard and the increase in the trading liquidity for a 
sample of Swiss listed firms. This purpose comes out from the gap58 in the literature on 
the Swiss evidence, and also because in the previous essay, a significant cross relation 
between the adoption of an international accounting strategy and the increase in firm’s 
trading liquidity for a sample of Swiss listed firms was not found.  
Theoretical evidence suggests the paradigm according to which increases of the 
quantitative level of firm’s disclosure determine an increase in the firm’s trading activ-
ity. Adopting an international accounting standard, and by doing so deciding to increase 
the quantitative level of disclosures, leads to a higher transparency on the economic and 
financial firm’s situation. An increase of the firm’s transparency is followed by an in-
crease in the investors’ confidence to ask for firm’s shares, increasing thereby the trad-
ing volumes.  
The analysis of the trading activity is made with three proxies: volume turnover, 
share turnover and adjusted volume turnover. The use of the adjusted volume turnover is 
given by the fact that the volume turnover, which is the canonical proxy for trading ac-
                                               
58
 Recently, the analysis of Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2007) has contributed to reduce this gap, report-
ing evidence of an increase in market liquidity for European firms, Switzerland included, that switched to 
IFRS before this reporting became mandatory. 
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tivity, could give a wrong measure of the variation in trading activity during the event 
windows due to a variation of its denominator, namely a variation of the total number of 
shares outstanding. Therefore, in the adjusted measure, the denominator is taken as con-
stant as the average of the total numbers of shares outstanding during the period of 
analysis. 
 The hypotheses tested in this study are two: the first one hypothesizes an increase 
in the trading liquidity as consequence of the switch from a local to an international ac-
counting standard, and the second one hypothesizes that the magnitude of the increase is 
relatively higher for small firms. Results of the time series tests and of the time series 
regressions confirm the evidence of an increase in the trading liquidity for a sample of 
64 Swiss firms. The analysis suggests that the measure must be made with appropriate 
tools. In fact, if it is used the volume turnover as proxy, the evidence of an increase in 
the trading liquidity should be hidden by other effect like the increase of the denomina-
tor of the ratio that artificially determines a decrease in the measure of the trading activ-
ity. The results obtained with the share volume are confirmed by those obtained using 
the adjusted version of the volume turnover. The analysis evidence is of a statistically 
significant increase of the time series medians of the share volume and of the adjusted 
volume turnover ratio in the after event window. The time series regressions confirm 
again the evidence of the time series test analysis even when regressions are controlled 
by a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has not changed its number of shares 
outstanding during the analysis period. The subsample analysis tests show that the less 
liquid firms benefit from a higher relative increase in trading liquidity after the event, 
suggesting the existence of an inverse function between the trading liquidity level and 
the magnitude of the increase in trading liquidity. The cross sectional analysis does not 
at all confirm this inverse relation. The evidence is significant for the firm’s size, while 
it is significant for the liquidity level only when the trading liquidity is measured in 
terms of volume turnover. Moreover, controlling the regressions for the firms that have 
not changed their number of shares outstanding during the period of analysis, there is 
still evidence of an inverse relation between the variation in share volume and the firm 
size, while results of the volume turnover model are insignificant.  
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 Concluding, these results confirm, in line with the first hypothesis, the evidence 
of a significant increase in the trading activity for a sample of 64 Swiss firms that have 
adopted an international accounting standard. Furthermore, the analysis also confirms 
that those firms with a small firm size benefit from an increase in trading liquidity more 
than the larger firms, hence in line with the second hypothesis, while not at all clear are 
the results on the relation between the increase in the trading liquidity and the firm’s li-
quidity level.  
 One limit of this research is given by the low data availability. Of 117 Swiss 
firms that have switched their accounting standard from a local to an international one 
between 1985 and 2004, only for 64 of those is data available. Therefore, the little sam-
ple dimension is not enough for obtaining a general result. It follows that future research 
could be orientated to verify if the results of this study are valid in general and not only 
for a sample of 64 Swiss firms. Moreover, another important evidence of this study is on 
the validity of the volume turnover used to measure the trading liquidity. In fact, espe-
cially in an event like the change of the accounting standard, firms often decide to 
change the number of shares outstanding, too. This operation has a not negligible impact 
on the measure of the trading liquidity when the volume turnover is used as proxy. The 
presence of this impact can help in explaining the insignificant results relatively to the 
second hypothesis of the previous essay. 
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2.11 Tables 
 
 
TABLE 2.1: Sample Selection Procedures 
 
Panel A: Sample selection   Number Percent 
 
Firms that have adopted an 
International accounting standard     117    100 
Financial firms          16    13.7 
Firms excluded         37    32.5  
Total sample firms          64    53.8 
 
The sample is composed by firms that were and are included in the SPI Swiss Performance Index from 
1985 to 2004 and for which it was possible spot the change of the accounting standard from a local to an 
international one. Financial firms are firms that belong to the sectors of bank, insurance and asset man-
agement. For firms excluded are considered firms for which is not available a daily time series of the 
numbers of shares traded (35) and firms that do not have more than one year of life before the adoption (2)  
 
 
Panel B: Number of switch by year 
 
   Year       Number        Year          Number 
 
   1989  1  1996  2 
   1990  3  1998  2  
   1991  4  1999  4 
   1992            14  2000  3 
   1993  9  2001  4  
   1994  5  2002  7 
   1995  2  2003  4 
 
For each year it is reported the number of firms that have changed their accounting standard from a local 
to an international one. Only the 64 firms included in the analysis sample are considered. 
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 TABLE 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the firm’s sample. MV is the firm’s Market Value in millions of 
Swiss francs and is observed at fiscal year end before the adoption of an international accounting standard, 
VT is the yearly average of the firm’s daily volume turnover ratio (number of shares changed divided by 
total number of outstanding shares) and SV is the yearly average of the firm’s daily number of shares 
traded express in thousand. VT and SV are observed during the last fiscal year before the adoption of an 
international accounting standard. Panel B reports descriptive statistics on the variation in the number of 
shares outstanding NOSH from one year before to one year after the adoption of an international account-
ing standard. NOSH is a dummy with value 1 when the firm has changed its number of shares outstanding, 
0 otherwise. 
 
 Panel A: Firm Characteristics  
Variable  MV       VT SV  
Mean  1169.72  0.047  60'205.9 
Median  240.38  0.003  3'303.9 
Std. dev.  2540.90  0.144  314'388.6 
Skewness  4.51  4.93  7.51 
       
Percentiles:       
Min  4.92  3.7E-05  55.1 
10%  41.61  3.8E-04  121.2 
20%  71.80  8.6E-04  452.9 
30%  111.05  1.6E-03  699.4 
40%  168.35  2.7E-03  1'395.6 
50%  240.38  3.2E-03  3'303.9 
60%  423.75  5.8E-03  4'967.7 
70%  834.60  1.4E-02  10'803.2 
80%  1535.69  2.9E-02  31'931.8 
90%  2624.09  9.4E-02  55'447.0 
Max  17143.01  9.7E-01  2'503'575.4 
Obs.  64     64  64 
 
 
 
Panel B: Variation in number of shares outstanding NOSH 
Firms  ∆ NOSH (000) 
  #  Mean  Median  Min  Max 
          
All 64  2801,75  0  -16  122970 
 100%  210.75%  0%  -11.5%  2200% 
 
         
NOSH=1 32  5603.5  135  -16  122970 
 50%  421.5%  35.3%  -11.5%  2200% 
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TABLE 2.3: Share Volume 
 
Cross sectional statistics of the time series means and medians of the SV. 
Share volume SV is defined as the daily number of shares traded. The time series of the share volume is 
the time series of the weekly average of the daily share volume for each firm on two windows of 52 weeks 
before and after the event of switch from a local to an international accounting standard. The time series 
mean of SV is the equally–weighted average of the time series of the share volume of each firm. The time 
series median of SV is the median observation of time series of the share volume of each firm. The col-
umns labelled “∆” report the percentage variation between the before and the after event window of the 
time series mean and median of the share volume. * (†), **(††) and *** (†††) indicate that the test of dif-
ferences in mean (the test that the relative measure is different from zero) or in median are (is) statistically 
significant at a level of 99, 95 and 90 percent, respectively. Obs. indicates the number of weekly average 
volume turnover used for each firm. SV is expressed in unit of thousands. 
 
Cross sectional statistics of the time series means and medians of the SV. 
Variable 
 Time series Mean of SV  Time serie Median of SV 
Statistic  Before  After  ∆  Before  After  ∆ 
Mean  61.20†  68.47†  11.9%**  2.141†  2.529†  18.1%* 
Median  58.71†  63.03†  7.4%***  2.090†  2.530†  21.1%* 
Std. dev.  15.9706  19.7681    0.59303  0.46711   
Skewness  0.4528  1.4630    0.61488  0.44474   
# firms  64  64    64  64   
Percentiles:             
Min  32.56  40.65  24.9%  1.27  1.62  27.6% 
5%  39.84  46.88  17.7%  1.32  1.71  29.9% 
10%  42.95  48.95  14.0%  1.40  1.90  35.3% 
25%  48.82  54.76  12.2%  1.74  2.28  31.1% 
50%  58.71  63.03  7.4%  2.09  2.53  21.1% 
75%  73.65  76.37  3.7%  2.46  2.73  10.8% 
90%  82.75  92.50  11.8%  2.95  3.09  4.5% 
95%  93.68  107.63  14.9%  3.26  3.25  -0.3% 
Max  96.82  138.20  42.7%  3.75  4.06  8.3% 
Obs.  52  52    52  52   
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TABLE 2.4: Volume Turnover. 
 
Cross sectional statistics of the time series means and medians of the VT. 
Volume turnover VT is defined as the average of the ratio of the daily number of shares changed to the 
daily total number of shares outstanding. The time series of the volume turnover is the time series of the 
weekly average of the ratio to the daily number of share changed of the daily total number of shares out-
standing for each firm on two windows of 52 weeks before and after the event of switch from a local to an 
international accounting standard. The time series mean of VT is the equally–weighted average of the time 
series volume turnover of each firm. The time series median of VT is the median observation of the time 
series of the volume turnover of each firm. The columns labelled “∆” report the percentage variation be-
tween the before and the after event window of the time series mean and median of the volume turnover. * 
(†), **(††) and *** (†††) indicate that the test of differences in mean (the test that the relative measure is 
different from zero) or in median are (is) statistically significant at a level of 99, 95 and 90 percent, respec-
tively. Obs. indicates the number of weekly average volume turnover used for each firm. 
 
Cross sectional statistics of the time series means and medians of the VT. 
Variable 
 Time series Mean of VT  Time series Median of VT 
Statistic  Before  After  ∆  Before  After  ∆ 
Mean  0.0469†  0.0343†  -26.7%*  0.00254†  0.00247†  -2.7% 
Median  0.0426†  0.0318†  -25.4%*  0.00239†  0.00231†  -3.4% 
Std. dev.  0.0176  0.0126    0.0007  0.0006   
Skewness  0.5925  1.3099    1.2189  0.4458   
# firms  64  64    64  64   
Percentiles:             
Min  0.0206  0.0155  -24.6%  0.00153  0.00157  2.4% 
5%  0.0226  0.0186  -17.9%  0.00167  0.00172  2.6% 
10%  0.0275  0.0209  -24.1%  0.00185  0.00186  0.7% 
25%  0.0325  0.0269  -17.3%  0.00213  0.00204  -4.3% 
50%  0.0426  0.0318  -25.4%  0.00239  0.00231  -3.4% 
75%  0.0576  0.0382  -33.7%  0.00288  0.00297  3.4% 
90%  0.0774  0.0566  -26.9%  0.00334  0.00329  -1.7% 
95%  0.0798  0.0575  -27.9%  0.00339  0.00344  1.5% 
Max  0.0850  0.0726  -14.6%  0.00463  0.00367  -20.8% 
Obs.  52  52    52  52   
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 TABLE 2.5: Adjusted Volume Turnover 
 
Cross sectional statistics of the time series means and medians of the Adj-VT. 
Adjusted volume turnover Adj-VT is defined as the ratio of the daily number of shares changed to the av-
erage number of shares outstanding from 52 weeks before to 52 week after the adoption of an international 
accounting standard. The time series of the adjusted volume turnover is the time series of the weekly aver-
age of daily adjusted volume turnover for each firm on two windows of 52 weeks before and after the 
event of switch from a local to an international accounting standard. The time series mean of Adj-VT is 
the equally–weighted average of the time series of the adjusted volume turnover of each firm. The time 
series median of Adj-VT is the median observation of the time series of the adjusted volume turnover of 
each firm. The columns labelled “∆” report the percentage variation between the before and the after event 
window of the time series mean and median of the adjusted volume turnover. * (†), **(††) and *** (†††) 
indicate that the test of differences in mean (the test that the relative measure is different from zero) or in 
median are (is) statistically significant at a level of 99, 95 and 90 percent, respectively. Obs. indicates the 
number of weekly average volume turnover used for each firm. 
 
Cross sectional statistics of the time series means and medians of the Adj-VT 
Variable  Time series Mean of Adj-VT  Time series Median of Adj-VT 
Statistic  Before  After  ∆  Before  After  ∆ 
Mean  0.0321†  0.0352†  9.6%  0.0021†  0.0026†  23.3%* 
Median  0.0294†  0.0327†  11.3%  0.0021†  0.0026†  23.5%* 
Std. dev.  0.0120  0.0124    0.0004  0.0004   
Skewness  1.8082  1.2630    0.6059  0.3883   
# firms  64  64    64  64   
Percentiles:             
Min  0.016  0.017  5.4%  0.0014  0.0019  27.8% 
5%  0.019  0.020  8.4%  0.0015  0.0020  33.1% 
10%  0.021  0.022  4.6%  0.0017  0.0021  23.9% 
25%  0.024  0.027  13.4%  0.0018  0.0023  27.7% 
50%  0.029  0.033  11.3%  0.0021  0.0026  23.5% 
75%  0.037  0.039  3.8%  0.0024  0.0029  23.3% 
90%  0.047  0.058  22.5%  0.0027  0.0032  19.2% 
95%  0.055  0.060  8.2%  0.0028  0.0035  25.5% 
Max  0.083  0.072  -13.1%  0.0033  0.0035  6.3% 
Obs.  52  52    52  52   
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 TABLE 2.6: Cross Sectional statistics across terciles 
 
Panel A reports the cross sectional statistics of the time series means and medians of the share volume 
across terciles. Share volume SV is defined as the daily number of shares traded. The time series of the 
share volume is the time series of the weekly average of the daily share volume for each firm on two win-
dows of 52 weeks before and after the event of switch from a local to an international accounting standard. 
Panel B reports the cross sectional statistics of the time series means and medians of the volume turnover 
across terciles. Volume turnover VT is defined as the average of the ratio to the daily number of shares 
changed of the daily total number of shares outstanding. The time series of the volume turnover is the time 
series of the weekly average of the ratio of the daily number of shares changed to the daily total number of 
shares outstanding for each firm on two windows of 52 weeks before and after the event of switching from 
a local to an international accounting standard. Panel C reports the cross sectional statistics of the time se-
ries means and medians of the adjusted volume turnover across terciles. Adjusted volume turnover Adj-
VT is defined as the average of the ratio of the daily number of shares changed to the average number of 
shares outstanding from 52 weeks before to 52 weeks after the adoption of an international accounting 
standard. The time series of the adjusted volume turnover is the time series of the weekly average of the 
ratio of the daily number of share changed to the average number of shares outstanding for each firm on 
two windows of 52 weeks before and after the event of switch from a local to an international accounting 
standard. The first tercile is composed of the 21 more liquid firms of the sample, the second of the 21 sec-
ond liquid and the last of the 22 less liquid firms. The columns labelled “∆” report the percentage variation 
between the before and the after event window of the time series means and medians of the relative proxy 
used. P-value of the test of difference in mean and in median are reported in the column labelled “P-
Value”. * and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5%  respectively of the t-test on the hypothesis that the 
relative measures are zero. 
 
Panel A: Statistics of the time series means and medians of the SV across terciles. 
  Mean SV 
 Median SV 
Liquidity level  Before  After  ∆  P-Value  Before  After  ∆  P-Value 
                 
1/3 more liquid Mean 179.54*  196.05*  9.2%  0.1163  28.098*  30.928*  10.1%  0.0722 
Median 170.63*  178.95*  4.9%  0.1732  26.868*  29.700*  10.5%  0.1098 
 # firms 21  21      21  21     
                 
1/3 between Mean 3.380*  4.774*  41.3%  0.0000  2.125*  2.534*  19.2%  0.0016 
Median 3.118*  4.218*  35.3%  0.0000  2.013*  2.500*  24.2%  0.0018 
 # firms 21  21      21  21     
                 
1/3 less liquid Mean 0.360*  0.511*  41.9%  0.0000  0.175*  0.214*  22.4%  0.0034 
Median 0.320*  0.455*  42.4%  0.0000  0.167*  0.200*  20.0%  0.0041 
  # firms 22   22           22   22         
 
 
 
Panel B: Statistics of the time series means and medians of the VT across terciles. 
  Mean VT  Median VT 
Liquidity level  Before  After  ∆  P-Value  Before  After  ∆  P-Value 
                 
1/3 more liquid Mean 13.83%*  9.75%*  -29.50%  0.0000  3.32%*  2.47%*  -25.6%  0.0002 
Median 12.31%*  9.01%*  -26.83%  0.0000  3.14%*  2.42%*  -22.9%  0.0003 
 # firms 21  21      21  21     
                 
1/3 between Mean 0.45%*  0.35%*  -23.96%  0.0001  0.261%*  0.202%*  -22.5%  0.0000 
Median 0.44%*  0.32%*  -26.53%  0.0001  0.241%*  0.200%*  -17.2%  0.0000 
 # firms 21  21      21  21     
                 
1/3 less liquid Mean 0.08%*  0.13%*  55.21%  0.0000  0.044%*  0.052%*  19.6%  0.0057 
Median 0.07%*  0.12%*  57.45%  0.0000  0.043%*  0.050%*  17.1%  0.0186 
 # firms 22  22      22  22     
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TABLE 6: Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Statistics of the time series means and medians of the Adj-VT across terciles. 
  Mean Adj-VT  MedianAdj-VT 
Liquidity level  Before  After  ∆%  P-Value  Before  After  ∆%  P-Value 
                 
1/3 more liquid Mean 9.41%*  9.99%*  6.1%  0.4247  2.08%*  2.27%*  8.9%  0.2689 
Median 8.51%*  9.28%*  9.1%  0.2432  1.92%*  1.93%*  0.2%  0.4449 
 # firms 21  21      21  21     
                 
1/3 between Mean 0.322%*  0.353%*  9.6%  0.1429  0.21%*  0.21%*  -2.1%  0.6426 
Median 0.302%*  0.330%*  9.1%  0.1499  0.22%*  0.21%*  -4.3%  0.5262 
 # firms 21  21      21  21     
                 
1/3 less liquid Mean 0.074%*  0.134%*  80.9%  0.0000  0.039%*  0.053%*  33.8%  0.0000 
Median 0.069%*  0.115%*  67.4%  0.0000  0.037%*  0.050%*  35.0%  0.0001 
 # firms 22  22      22  22     
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TABLE 2.7: Share Volume Time Series Regression 
Pooled OLS White heteroskedasticy consistence results 
 
 
 
Firms fixed effect regression Model                                                                                           
Variable         I    II                                     
 
CONSTANT                                          61.17   45.45     
    (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
IR    7.29   7.64 
    (0.0382)   (0.0277) 
 
PRICE    -   0.0122 
       (0.0147) 
 
SIZE    -   -0.0001 
       (0.1735) 
 
VOLATILITY   -   893.63 
       (0.0002) 
 
 
R squared   0.8439   0.8459 
Adj. R squared   0.8423   0.8443 
Prob (F-statistic)   0.0000   0.0000 
Number of firm-weeks  6393   6393 
Number of firms       64   64 
 
 
 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm fixed effects regressions of share volume SV on the adop-
tion of an international accounting standard. The dependent variable is the weekly average of the daily 
share volume (daily number of shares changed) observed from 52 weeks before to 52 weeks after the 
switch from a local to an international accounting standard. IR is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm adopts an international accounting. The control variables PRICE and SIZE are the weekly average of 
the daily firm’s close price and of the daily market value; VOLATILITY is the weekly standard deviation 
of daily’s price returns. Standard errors are clustered by firm and P-values of the t-test that the coefficient 
is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.8: Volume Turnover Time Series Regression 
Pooled OLS White heteroskedasticy consistence results 
 
 
 
Firms fixed effect regression Model           
Variable          I  II   III                                     
 
CONSTANT                                          0.0471  0.0391  0.0387    
    (0.0000)    (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
IR     -0.0132  -  - 
    (0.0001) 
 
IR*NONOSHD   -    0.0055  0.0057 
      (0.0226)  (0.0184) 
  
PRICE    -  -  0.0001 
        (0.0006) 
 
SIZE    -  -  -0.0001 
        (0.0000) 
 
VOLATILITY   -  -  0.1091 
        (0.0098) 
 
 
R squared   0.4351  0.4337  0.4338 
Adj. R squared   0.4294  0.4280  0.4279 
Prob (F-statistic)   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of firm-weeks  6393  6393  6393 
Number of firms       64  64  64 
 
 
 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm fixed effects regressions of volume turnover VT on the 
adoption of an international accounting standard. The dependent variable is the weekly average of the 
daily volume turnover (daily number of shares changed divided by the total number of shares outstanding) 
observed from 52 weeks before to 52 weeks after the switch from a local to an international accounting 
standard. IR is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm adopts an international accounting standard. 
NONOSH is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm hasn’t changed its number of shares out-
standing during the analysis’s period. The control variables PRICE and SIZE are the weekly average of 
the daily firm’s close price and of the daily market value; VOLATILITY is the weekly standard deviation 
of daily’s price returns. Standard errors are clustered by firm and P-values of the t-test that the coefficient 
is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.9: Terciles’ Share Volume Time Series Regression 
Pooled OLS White heteroskedasticy consistence results 
 
 
 
Firms fixed effect regression Model        
Variable          I  II   III                                     
 
CONSTANT                                         61.15  64.94  48.31    
    (0.0000)   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
T1*IR     20.16    -  -  
    (0.0539)   
 
T2*IR    1.32  -  - 
    (0.0000) 
 
T3*IR    0.146  -  -    
    (0.0000)     
 
T1*IR*NONOSH   -  -1.93  3.94 
      (0.2957)  (0.0544) 
 
T2*IR*NONOSH   -  -0.0183  0.8559 
      (0.9499)  (0.4001) 
 
T3*IR*NONOSH   -  0.1474  -1.26 
      (0.0025)  (0.2155) 
 
PRICE    -  -  0.0134 
        (0.0078) 
 
SIZE    -  -  -0.0001 
        (0.1842) 
 
VOLATILITY   -  -  896.95 
        (0.0002) 
 
 
R squared   0.8441  0.8437  0.8458 
Adj. R squared   0.8425  0.8421  0.8441 
Prob (F-statistic)   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of firm-weeks  6393  6393  6348 
Number of firms       64  64  64 
 
 
 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm fixed effects regressions of the percentage variation of the 
share volume SV on the adoption of an international accounting standard when the sample is split in three 
terciles based on the firm’s liquidity level at the end of the last fiscal year with a local accounting stan-
dard. T1 is a dummy variable indicating the more liquid terciles, T2 the second more liquid and T3 is the 
less liquid tercile. The dependent variable is the weekly average of the daily share volume (daily number 
of shares changed) observed from 52 weeks before to 52 weeks after the switch from a local to an interna-
tional accounting standard. IR is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm adopts an international ac-
counting and NONOSH is a dummy variable indicating whether the firms hasn’t changed its number of 
shares outstanding during the analysis’s period. The control variables PRICE and SIZE are the weekly av-
erage of the daily firm’s close price and of the daily market value; VOLATILITY is the weekly standard 
deviation of daily’s price returns. Standard errors are clustered by firm and P-values of the t-test that the 
coefficient is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.10: Terciles’ Volume turnover Time Series Regression 
Pooled OLS White heteroskedasticy consistence results 
 
 
 
Firms fixed effect regression Model         
Variable          I  II   III                                     
 
CONSTANT                                         0.0471  0.0391  0.0389    
    (0.0000)   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
T1*IR     -0.0375    -  -   
    (0.0000)     
 
T2*IR    -0.0021  -  - 
    (0.5395)     
 
T3*IR    0.0006  -  -    
    (0.0513)     
 
T1*IR*NONOSH   -  0.0133  0.0146 
      (0.0045)  (0.0021) 
 
T2*IR*NONOSH   -  0.0046  0.0046 
      (0.4333)  (0.4305) 
 
T3*IR*NONOSH   -  0.0013  0.0009 
      (0.0063)  (0.0589) 
 
PRICE    -  -  0.0001 
        (0.0816) 
 
SIZE    -  -  -0.0001 
        (0.0000) 
 
VOLATILITY   -  -  0.1143 
        (0.0069) 
 
 
R squared   0.4337  0.4338  0.4339 
Adj. R squared   0.4318    0.4279  0.4278 
Prob (F-statistic)   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of firm-weeks  6393  6393  6348 
Number of firms       64  64  64 
 
 
 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm fixed effects regressions of percentage variation in volume 
turnover VT on the adoption of an international accounting standard when the sample is split in three terci-
les based on the firm’s liquidity level at the end of the last fiscal year with a local accounting standard. T1 
is a dummy variable indicating the more liquid terciles, T2 the second more liquid and T3 is the less liquid 
tercile. The dependent variable is the weekly average of the daily volume turnover (daily number of shares 
changed divided by the total number of shares outstanding) observed from 52 weeks before to 52 weeks 
after the switch from a local to an international accounting standard. IR is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm adopts an international accounting. NONOSH is a dummy variable indicating whether 
the firm hasn’t changed its number of shares outstanding during the analysis’s period. The control vari-
ables PRICE and SIZE are the weekly average of the daily firm’s close price and of the daily market 
value; VOLATILITY is the weekly standard deviation of daily price returns. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm and P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.11: Cross-Listening Time Series Regression 
Pooled OLS White heteroskedasticy consistence results 
 
 
 
Pooled Time Series Regression           
Variable         SV  VT  VT                                     
 
CONSTANT                                          -34.76  0.3369  0.3417    
    (0.0201)  (0.0000)   (0.0000)   
 
IR     6.2398  -0.0089  -   
    (0.0881)  (0.0038) 
 
IR*NONOSHD   -  -     0.0001   
        (0.0000)   
  
CROSS    -13.849   0.0046  0.0066 
    (0.0000)  (0.0010)  (0.0000)   
 
SIZE    2.3619  -0.0219  -0.0225   
    (0.0137)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   
 
VOLATILITY   -230.21  -0.3896  -0.4052 
    (0.1004)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   
 
 Year dummy Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
 
R squared   0.0918  0.1353  0.1356   
Adj. R squared   0.0891  0.1326  0.1331   
Prob (F-statistic)   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000   
Number of firm-weeks  5675  5675  5675   
Number of firms   57   57  57   
 
 
 
The table presents coefficient estimates of the pooled time series regressions of share volume SV and vol-
ume turnover VT on the adoption of an international accounting standard. The SV is the weekly average 
of the daily share volume (daily number of shares changed) and VT is the weekly average of the daily vol-
ume turnover (daily number of shares changed divided by the total number of shares outstanding). SV and 
VT are observed from 52 weeks before to 52 weeks after the switch from a local to an international ac-
counting standard. IR is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm adopts an international accounting 
standard. NONOSHD is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has not changed its number of 
shares outstanding during the analysis’s period. The control variables CROSS is a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the firm is cross-listed. SIZE is the weekly average of the daily close market value; 
VOLATILITY is the weekly standard deviation of daily’s price returns. The Year dummy indicates the 
presence of dummy variables controlling for yearly effects from 1989 to 2003. P-values of the t-test that 
the coefficient is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.12: Correlations 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Firm Characteristics 
 
Variable  MV ∆%SV ∆%VT ∆%Adj-VT  PRICE LIQ α  Β σ γ 
  
 
         
∆%SV  -0.123          
  
(0.338) 
         
∆%VT  -0.128 0.640         
  
(0.319) (0.000) 
        
∆%Adj-VT  -0.123 1.000 0.640        
  
(0.338) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
PRICE  0.112 -0.081 -0.012 -0.081       
  
(0.381) (0.527) (0.923) (0.527) 
      
LIQ  0.259 -0.073 -0.163 -0.073 -0.125      
  
(0.041) (0.568) (0.202) (0.568) (0.328) 
     
α  -0.048 0.383 0.438 0.383 0.010 0.025     
  
(0.710) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.936) (0.846) 
    
β  0.312 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.111 -0.069 0.019    
  
(0.013) (0.993) (0.950) (0.993) (0.386) (0.588) (0.885) 
   
σ  -0.216 0.183 0.049 0.183 -0.156 -0.047 -0.359 -0.217   
  
(0.090) (0.152) (0.705) (0.152) (0.223) (0.713) (0.004) (0.087) 
  
γ  0.029 -0.149 0.110 -0.149 0.053 -0.157 0.385 0.475 -0.639  
  
(0.819) (0.243) (0.389) (0.243) (0.680) (0.218) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
∆NOSH  0.190 -0.008 -0.187 -0.008 -0.069 0.005 0.016 0.222 -0.009 0.013 
  
(0.137) (0.953) (0.142) (0.953) (0.590) (0.966) (0.900) (0.080) (0.945) (0.920) 
 
MV is the firm’s Market Value observed at fiscal year end before the adoption of an international accounting standard. ∆%SV, ∆%VT and ∆%Adj-VT are respectively 
the percentage variations of the average time series of the weekly mean share volume, volume turnover and adjusted volume turnover between the 52 weeks before and 
after the event of switch from a local to an international accounting standard. LIQ indicates the firm’s liquidity level and is defined in function of the volume turnover 
VT such as the firm with the higher VT is the most liquid. Alpha, beta and sigma are respectively the intercept, the slope and the residual standard deviation of the time 
series regression of each firm’s stock return on the market return and gamma is the negative covariance of the first order firm’s return. ∆NOSH indicate the variation 
of the total number of shares outstanding during the two event windows. The p-values in parentheses are for a two-tail test of statistical significance. 
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TABLE 2.13: Cross sectional regression: volume turnover variation. 
OLS White heteroskedasticy consistence results 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5% ( )i i i i i i iVT Log MV Liqγ γ γ γ α γ β γ σ ε∆ = + + + + + +  
Variable           I            II     III             IV       V                  VI           VII  VIII 
 
Constant       0.9115 0.1214 0.8991 0.7319 0.7506 0.1116 1.0188  0.4478 
 (0.0164) (0.2244) (0.0176) (0.0219) (0.0206) (0.2069)  (0.0255)  (0.2438) 
 
Log(MV) -0.1458 - -0.1384  -0.1106 -0.1195 - -0.1545  -0.0938 
 (0.0109)  (0.0162) (0.0325) (0.0199)   (0.0148)  (0.0882) 
 
Liq - -0.8312 -0.5684 -0.6724 - -0.8876 -0.5311  -0.66542 
  (0.0075) (0.0968) (0.0276)  (0.0003) (0.0854)  (0.0319) 
 
α  - - - 426.07 418.81 473.52 -  487.75  
    (0.066) (0.0077) (0.0044)   (0.0047) 
 
β  - - - - - - 0.1054  0.1023 
       (0.6063)  (0.5758) 
          
σ  - - - - - - -6.629  15.15 
       (0.5809)  (0.1451) 
 
 
R squared 0.1236 0.0266 0.1358 0.2896 0.2727 0.2221 0.1443  0.3066 
Adj. R squared 0.1092 0.0106 0.1069 0.2535 0.2484 0.1962 0.0853  0.2458 
F-statistic 8.59 1.66 4.72 8.02 11.24 8.57 2.44  5.04 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0047 0.20  0.0125          0.0001           0.0000              0.0005       0.056  0.0006 
No. Obs 64 64  64          64     64              64       64  64 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage variation of the firm’s average volume turnover VT between the time windows of 52 weeks before and after the event of 
switching from a local to an international accounting standard. VT is calculated as the weekly average of the ratio to the daily number of share changed of the daily to-
tal number of shares outstanding. Log (MV) is the  natural logarithm of the firm’s market value observed at fiscal year end before the adoption of an international ac-
counting standard. The variable Liq indicates the firm’s liquidity level and is defined in function of the VT such as the firm with the higher VT is the most liquid. Vari-
ables alpha, beta and sigma are respectively the intercept, the slope and the residual standard deviation of the time series regression of each firm’s stock return on the 
market return. P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is equal to 0 are in parentheses.  
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TABLE 2.14: Cross sectional regression: share volume variation 
OLS White heteroskedasticy consistence results 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5% ( )i i i i i i iSV Log MV Liqγ γ γ γ α γ β γ σ ε∆ = + + + + + +   
Variable      I      II    III    IV      V     VI   VII  VIII 
 
Constant  1.0788 0.3544 1.1048 0.9096 0.9198 0.3661    0.1108  0.9146   
 (0.0062) (0.0098) (0.0056) (0.0101) (0.0083) (0.0030) (0.0072) (0.0109) 
   
Log (MV) -0.1311 - -0.1299 -0.0969 -0.1018 - -0.1388  -0.1024 
 (0.0167)  (0.0197) (0.0678) (0.0417)  (0.0313) (0.0541) 
 
Liq - -0.4451 -0.2452 -0.3673 - -0.5559 -0.2001  -0.3398 
  (0.2169) (0.5861) (0.4923)  (0.2093) (0.6263) (0.4802)  
 
α  - - - 500.45 496.48 542.04 -  497.07 
    (0.0432) (0.0391) (0.0322)   (0.0431) 
 
β  - - - - - - 0.1297  0.0768 
       (0.6352) (0.8035) 
 
R squared 0.0561 0.0049 0.0607 0.1833 0.1803 0.1533 0.0641  0.1845 
Adj. R squared 0.0409 -0.0117 0.0294 0.1417 0.1531 0.1251 0.0165  0.1282 
F-statistic 3.6868 0.2674 1.94 4.41 6.60 5.43 1.34  3.28 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0594 0.6071 0.1528 0.0072 0.0025 0.0067 0.2678  0.0171 
No. Obs 64 64 64 64 64 64 64  64 
  
The dependent variable is the percentage variation of the firm’s average share volume SV between the time windows of 52 weeks before and after the event of switch 
from a local to an international accounting standard. SV is calculated as the weekly average of the daily number of shares changed. Log (MV) is the natural logarithm 
of the firm’s market value observed at fiscal year end before the adoption of an international accounting standard. The variable Liq indicates the firm’s liquidity level 
and is defined in function of the volume turnover VT such as the firm with the higher VT is the most liquid. Variables alpha, beta and sigma are respectively the inter-
cept, the slope and the residual standard deviation of the time series regression of each firm’s stock return on the market return. P-values of the t-test that the coeffi-
cient is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2.15: Interaction Cross sectional regression  
OLS White heteroskedasticy consistence results 
 
 
 
Variable  %∆ SV  %∆ VT %∆ SV %∆VT 
   
Constant     1.1034 0.3088 0.8835 0.4091 
 (0.0124) (0.4484) (0.0259) (0.3338) 
   
Log(MV) -0.0941 -0.0947 -0.0514 -0.1094 
 (0.0773) (0.0763) (0.4075) (0.0901) 
 
Liq -0.7183 -0.4626 -0.8369 -0.4665 
 (0.2431) (0.1708) (0.1957) (0.2443) 
 
Log(MV)*NONOSH - - -0.0723 0.0281 
   (0.0619) (0.3321) 
 
Liq*NONOSH - - -0.7401 1.1171 
   (0.8497) (0.7792) 
 
NONOSH -0.3995 0.2036 -  - 
 (0.1067) (0.2525)    
 
α  502.68 494.51 522.19 482.39 
 (0.0328) (0.0043) (0.0358) (0.0086) 
 
β  0.0305 0.1301 0.0081 0.1368 
 (0.9141) (0.5024) (0.9709) (0.4811) 
 
σ  - 17.39 - 17.12 
  (0.0998)  (0.1109) 
      
 
R squared 0.2242 0.2303 0.3201 0.3241 
Adj. R squared 0.1561 0.1479 0.2336 0.2517 
F-statistic 3.29 2.79 3.71 4.52 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0011 0.0189 0.0023 0.0009 
No. Obs 64 64 64 64   
 
 
In the first and in the third columns, the dependent variable is the percentage variation of the firm’s 
average share volume SV between the time windows of 52 weeks before and after the event of 
switch from a local to an international accounting standard, while in the second and in the forth col-
umns the dependent variable is the percentage variation of the firm’s average volume turnover VT. 
SV is the weekly average of the daily number of shares changed while the VT is calculated as the 
weekly average of the ratio to the daily number of shares changed of the daily total number of shares 
outstanding. Log(MV) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value observed at fiscal year end 
before the adoption of an international accounting standard. NONOSH is a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the firms haven’t changed their number of shares outstanding during the analysis’s pe-
riod. The variable Liq indicates the firm’s liquidity level, defined in function of the VT such as  the 
firm with the higher VT is the most liquid, and measured at the at fiscal year end before the adoption 
of an international accounting standard. Variables alpha, beta and sigma are respectively the inter-
cept, the slope and the residual standard deviation of the time series regression of each firm’s stock 
return on the market return. P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Asymmetric information and firms 
trading volume before a scheduled 
announcement:  The Swiss evidence. 
Presented to the 31th EAA annual Congress, Rotterdam, 23-25 Apr 2008
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3.1 Abstract 
 
It is generally known that trading volume is positively related to asymmetric infor-
mation amongst investors, but when there is a time discretion, the relation is likely 
to become negative. The aim of this paper is to empirically verify the existence of 
this inverse relation for a sample of Swiss listed firms. Trading volume trends are 
analysed before earnings announcements for a sample of 1540 events distributed 
across 85 firms from 1995 to 2006. I hypothesize that before an earnings an-
nouncement there is a decrease in the firm’s trading liquidity due to the presence of 
asymmetric information amongst investors, and a positive relationship between 
trading volume and simultaneous changes in stock prices. Moreover, the magnitude 
of the price change should be higher in the case of a positive earnings release. Event 
analysis confirms a significant daily average decrease of about 2% in the abnormal 
volume turnover from 10 to 3 trading days before the announcement, while regres-
sion analysis reveals evidence that matching a lower decrease in trading liquidity 
there will be an upturn in the level of stock prices. Furthermore, the analysis reveals 
that prior to a positive announcement there will be a higher increase in the firm’s 
share price. The analysis does not show evidence of any relationship between the 
decrease in trading liquidity, firm size and bid-ask spread. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G14 
Keywords: Trading volume, Information asymmetry, Time information, Investor’s 
behavior. 
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3.2 Introduction 
 
Voluminous finance literature reports evidence of an increase in a firm’s trad-
ing liquidity when asymmetric information amongst investors increases because of 
different investors’ resources and abilities to process public information [e.g., Ha-
kansson (1977), Kim and Verecchia (1991 and 1994), Atiase and Bamber (1994), 
He and Wang (1995)]. However, in the presence of events such as scheduled an-
nouncements, this relationship can be inverted [e.g. Krinsky and Lee (1996), Chae 
(2005), Saffi (2006)] because time discretionary investors, due to the presence of an 
adverse selection problem, are likely to postpone their investment when the adverse 
selection problem is less severe [Foster and Viswanathan (1990)]. This behaviour 
determines a decrease in the trading activity during the period before the an-
nouncement.  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the limited research field opened by 
Chae (2005) on the trading volume before scheduled announcements. Chae’s analy-
sis is concentred on specialist markets. Differently than Chae (2005), I investigate 
whether the decrease in trading liquidity before scheduled announcements will be 
evident for a stock exchange market with an open-limit order book where the ad-
verse selection problem amongst investors should be less severe with respect to 
stock exchanges with market makers. In fact, the possibility to read the order book 
allows the investors to infer competitor’s information with a consequential reduc-
tion in the asymmetric information.  
In this work I want to empirically verify the existence of this inverse relation 
for a sample of Swiss listed firms contributing to the research field opened by Chae 
(2005), with his evidence on the U.S. firms. Furthermore, in this work I want to in-
vestigate the relation between the firm’s trading activity and the simultaneous stock 
price variation around the scheduled announcement. I hypothesize the existence of a 
positive relationship between trading volume and the simultaneous price change be-
fore an announcement and that the magnitude of the price change should be higher 
in case of ex-post positive release. In fact, informed investors can be motivated to 
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take a position before announcements, and especially when they expect positive 
surprises. They can ask for shares at higher price levels, even to take a position. 
This follows a consequential increase in trading activity and in price levels. 
Following Chae (2005), I use as scheduled announcements the earnings an-
nouncements that, as shown by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyan (2001), are the 
more appropriate proxies for scheduled announcements owing to the characteristics 
of release relevant specific firms’ information at a predefined time that is publicly 
known. 
The approaches used are: (i) a study of the abnormal volume turnover from 
10 trading days before to 10 trading days after the scheduled announcement, (ii) a 
time series analysis of the abnormal volume turnover around the announcement and 
(iii) the time series of the cumulative abnormal volume turnover before the event. 
The findings of the event study report a significant average daily decrease of around 
2% of the abnormal volume turnover from 10 to 3 trading days before the an-
nouncement. On the other hand, the results of the time series analysis reveal evi-
dence that with a higher abnormal volume turnover59 there will be a higher change 
in the stock price levels, and that the magnitude of the price’s increase will be 
higher when the earnings announcements are positive. The time series analysis on 
the cumulative abnormal volume turnover is achieved with the goal to test if the de-
crease in trading liquidity is given by the presence of asymmetric information 
amongst investors. The analysis result does not show significant evidence of rela-
tionships between decrease in trading liquidity and either firm size or bid-ask 
spread. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews 
prior research on the topic. Motivations, hypotheses and research design are pre-
sented in section three. Section four provides sample selection and descriptive sta-
tistics. Section five presents event study analysis while section six and seven report 
the regression analyses. The final section is devoted to conclusions and suggestions 
for future research. 
                                               
59
 Considering that on average the abnormal volume turnover is negative, a higher volume turnover 
corresponds to a lower decrease in trading volume 
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3.3 Review of the literature 
 
 The literature on trading liquidity around and after a scheduled announce-
ment is voluminous, unlike the literature on trading liquidity prior to a scheduled 
announcement, which is very limited and, to my knowledge, completely ignores the 
Swiss evidence.  
Glosten and Milgron (1985), in analyzing their model used to determine the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread in an exchange market with het-
erogeneous expectations, predicted that spreads are large in the period before a 
firm’s report is made public, especially if it is a small firm’s report and contains 
considerable new information. This reveals a presence of higher adverse selection 
before a scheduled announcement. Adamati and Pfleiderer (1988), in modelling 
trading patterns in financial markets characterized both by informed investors and 
by discretionary liquidity investors, argued that well informed investors trade more 
actively in periods when liquidity trading is concentrated, and that discretionary li-
quidity investors, which can allocate their trades across different periods and trade 
for portfolio rebalancing reasons, are more likely to postpone their trading until 
asymmetric information is lower or resolved. 
 The consequence of this behaviour, which depends on the strategic interac-
tion amongst informed and discretionary liquidity investors, determines a negative 
impact on the trading activity, especially before scheduled announcements in which 
information asymmetry is higher. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) show, in their two 
periods model of trading patterns in which informed investors behave strategically, 
that in cases of the presence of discretionary liquidity investors and of public infor-
mation, there is always a higher trading cost and lower volume in the first period. 
This is because discretionary liquidity investors postpone their trades, avoiding to 
trade when the adverse selection problem is most severe. This discretionary liquid-
ity investors’ behaviour negatively impacts the trading activity by reducing volume 
before a scheduled announcement. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) in their intra-
day analysis on spreads, depths and earnings information of NYSE firms, report 
evidence of an increase in the adverse selection risk immediately before an earnings 
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release. They argue that the expectation of an imminent earnings release may stimu-
late some investors to search for information, increasing the asymmetric informa-
tion with respect to the other investors. Wang (1994), in his model of competitive 
stock trading with heterogeneously informed investors, argues that the behaviour of 
trading volume is closely linked to the heterogeneity amongst investors, especially 
to the different levels of information amongst uninformed and informed investors. 
He shows that as the information asymmetry between the two classes of investors 
increases, the adverse selection problem of the uninformed investors worsens and 
trading volume decreases. Krinsky and Lee (1996) in their study on the behaviour 
of the components of the bid-ask spread around earnings announcements, report 
evidence that the period prior to an earnings announcement is characterized by 
greater information asymmetry amongst market participants and thus increased ad-
verse selection costs. Chae (2005) argues that the decrease in the trading activity 
before a scheduled announcement is due to the presence of severe asymmetric in-
formation between differently informed investors. In his investigation on a sample 
of U.S. firms, he shows that cumulative trading volume decreases inversely to in-
formation asymmetry prior to a scheduled announcement, due to the fact that unin-
formed investors tend not to participate in the market when it is likely to trade with 
an informed counterparty. Saffi (2006), in his paper focused on the impact on turn-
over by the dispersion of opinions and asymmetric information near public informa-
tion releases, derives and tests empirically a model in which agents, who receive 
private information of heterogeneous quality, trade stocks before and after they 
have observed a public signal. He finds evidence that trading before announcements 
is negatively related to information asymmetry when dispersion of opinion is lower.    
 
3.4 Motivation, Hypothesis and Research Design 
 
 Trading liquidity trends are mainly explained by the investors’ behaviours 
that differ amongst investors and classes of investors in function of their private in-
formation’s precision. Different levels of information’s precision aim at the pres-
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ence of asymmetric information amongst investors that is likely to rise around earn-
ings announcements, as shown in Krinsky and Lee (1996). Generally, trading vol-
ume is positively related to the asymmetric information, but when there is time dis-
cretion the relation is likely to become negative, as shown in Admati and Pleiderer 
(1988) and in Foster and Viswanathan (1990). The goal of this article is to empiri-
cally verify the existence of this inverse relationship for a sample of Swiss listed 
firms, contributing to the research field opened by Chae (2005) with his evidence 
on U.S. firms. I analyze trading volume trends before scheduled earnings an-
nouncements. The choice of earnings announcements is due to the characteristic 
that they release specific firms’ information at predefined times that are known to 
the public. Before such events, asymmetric information between informed and un-
informed investors is higher60 and the adverse selection problem of the uninformed 
investors worsens as argued by Wang (1994). In this situation, rational uninformed 
investors, to protect themselves from adverse selection risk, either tend to postpone 
their investment after the announcement when an adverse selection problem is re-
solved, or demand a higher discount price in order to cover the risk of trading 
against informed investors. 
 These behaviours should have both a negative impact on trading volume be-
fore earnings announcements and a positive impact on the relationship between 
trading volume and simultaneous price change. In fact, if an uninformed trader is 
time discretionary, he can decide to postpone their investments until the adverse se-
lection problem is less severe or resolved. By doing so, the trading liquidity before 
an earnings announcement should decrease. This argumentation and the predictions 
of the previous researches suggest the formulation of the following hypothesis. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Before a scheduled earnings announcement there is a decrease in 
the firm’s trading liquidity because of the presence of asymmetric information 
amongst investors. 
 
                                               
60
 Informed investors increase their process of acquisition and elaborate private information in prox-
imity of an earnings announcement, thereby increasing the asymmetric information with uninformed 
investors. 
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According to this hypothesis, it is likely that uninformed investors will trade less to 
avoid being overwhelmed by investors with more precise private information before 
scheduled announcements. On the other side, if uninformed investors are not time 
discretionary and cannot avoid trading, they will protect themselves by asking for a 
premium for trading against pre-disclosure private information. In response, the 
stock’s price change should be positively related to trading liquidity before a sched-
uled earnings announcement. This argumentation suggests the formulation of the 
second hypothesis. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Before a scheduled earnings announcement, the magnitude of the de-
crease in the trading liquidity should be positively related to the simultaneous price 
change because of the presence of asymmetric information amongst investors. 
 
Moreover, informed investors, using their pre-disclosure private information, try to 
anticipate the announcement by rebalancing their portfolio before news is released. 
In the case that they expect positive surprises from the earnings announcement, they 
can be motivated to ask for stocks at higher price levels even to take a position. In a 
contrary case, they can be motivated to not take a position or to close their position 
if they already have one. It follows that in case of positive earnings surprises ex-
ante firm’s price levels should increase more than in the case of non positive earn-
ings surprises. This argumentation suggests the formulation of the following hy-
pothesis. 
 
 HYPOTHESIS 3: If there is a positive relationship between trading volume and simul-
taneous price change before a scheduled earnings announcement, the magnitude of 
the correlation should be higher in case of positive announcements surprises. 
 
 I investigate the behaviour of the trading liquidity before a scheduled an-
nouncement with an event study analysis of the abnormal volume turnover ALVT. 
The abnormal log volume turnover is estimated from t = -10 to t = +10 days around 
earnings announcements using the trading volume market model indicated by Tkac 
(1999). The parameters of the model are estimated on a pre-event window of 200 
days from t = -210 to t = -11 days before the announcement at t = 0. The results’ ro-
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bustness is checked using a different estimation period, the raw measure of the vol-
ume turnover and a different method of estimation for the abnormal volume turn-
over. 
 In the second part of the empirical analysis, the pooled regression technique 
is used first, to confirm the event study results and second, to analyze the relation-
ship between the firm’s trading activity and the ex-ante price change. In the last 
part, a firm fixed effect model is used to test if the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion is the motivation of the decrease in trading liquidity before scheduled an-
nouncements. 
 
3.5 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
The selection of the sample is determined by the available information on the firm’s 
earnings announcement date. Unfortunately, in contrast to U.S. and other European 
Countries, for the Swiss firms there is not a predefined and complete database with 
time series information on the firm’s earnings announcement, so the only way to get 
a reasonable sample of analysis is to do firm by firm research. I have built the sam-
ple using the earnings announcements’ dates on the press releases of firms listed on 
the Swiss Exchange stock market. For this task I have used the LexisNexis data-
base, which contains a necessary number of financial firm’s press releases. I have 
found 1901 announcements61 from 1995 to 2006 distributed on 89 non-financial 
Swiss firms. Financial data are collected in Datastream Advance. For each event, I 
have collected information on the volume turnover VT from 211 days trading be-
fore to 10 days trading after the announcement, building an estimation window of 
200 days trading and an event window of 20 days trading. A successive selection 
criterion of at least 90 observations in the estimation window and of at least 15 ob-
servations in the event window has excluded 361 events, reducing the final analy-
sis’s sample to 1540 events distributed on 85 non-financial firms. Panel A of Table 
3.1 reassumes the procedure of selection process and panel B shows the distribution 
                                               
61
 Quarter, Semiannual and annual Earnings announcements.  
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of the events throughout the years. It is evident how low the numbers of events are 
before 1999. This is due to the fact that the firm’s earnings press releases are sys-
tematically reported in the LexisNexis database only after 1999, while in the pre-
ceding period not all the earnings press releases are available, especially for the 
small firms. Where the firm’s press releases were not available, I collected the in-
formation in different financial newspapers that are also available in the LexisNexis 
database. Panel C of the table 3.1 classifies the event by type differentiating 
amongst first, second, third and fourth quarter. It is interesting to outline that some 
small firms62 disclose earnings only relatively to the second and the last quarter, and 
this behaviour explains why the number of events is higher in correspondence with 
these periods. Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics of the analysis’s sample. The 
firm’s market value on the day of the announcement is 12031.4 and 1086.6 millions 
of CHF in mean and median, respectively. Sub-periods statistics show that observa-
tions before 1998 are mainly referred to large firms. In fact, while the average mar-
ket value is of 18.7 billion for the sub-period 1995-1998, it is of 12.5 billion and of 
10.8 billion for the sub-periods 1999-2002 and 2003-2006, respectively. Moreover, 
the minimum observation is of 96.76 million for the sub-period 1995-1998, against 
the minimum observation of 6.44 and 8.46 millions for the two following sub-
periods. This reveals that more information is always made available for the me-
dium and small firms over time.  
 Daily average volume turnover is 1.95% for the whole sample of analysis. 
The sub-periods statistics show a decreasing trend for the average volume turnover 
ratio over time. This decreasing trend, which passes from 10.93% in the period 
1995-1998 to 0.36% in the period 2003-2006, is due to the progressive introduction 
over time of events referred to small firms.  
 
  
                                               
62Generally, firms that disclose only two times per fiscal year are those that do not following an in-
ternational accounting standard.  
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3.6 Event Analysis  
 
3.6.1 Variables’ description. 
 
Volume turnover is always a positive measure and its distribution with positive 
skewness and extreme kurtosis (5.187 and 28.761, respectively) presents large de-
partures from normality. In order to make the turnover distribution better behaved, I 
apply the logarithmic transformation on the volume turnover ratio. Thus, daily log 
volume turnover itτ   is defined as: 
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Event analysis is conducted on the abnormal log volume turnover tiξ  that is 
calculated as the difference between the observed log volume turnover and the es-
timated log volume turnover. 
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where iα  and iβ  are estimated using the one factor trading volume market model 
indicated in Tkac (1999). The trading volume market model is the following:  
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where tiτ  is the log volume turnover ratio at time t for announcement i and is calcu-
lated as the ratio between the  firm’s daily number of shares exchanged and the 
firm’s daily total number of common shares outstanding; tMτ  is the market volume 
turnover ratio at time t and is given by the ratio of the aggregate number of the daily 
shares exchanged on the aggregate number of the daily common shares outstanding 
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of all the firms63 of the Swiss Performance Index SPI. The parameters α and β are 
estimated on a pre-event window of 200 days from t = -210 to t = -11 days before 
the announcement at t = 0.  
3.6.2 Empirical Results 
 
Event study reports a statistical decrease in the firm’s trading liquidity be-
fore a scheduled announcement. Table 3.5 reports daily cross sectional means and 
medians of the abnormal log volume turnovers from 10 trading days before to 10 
trading days after the event. From t = -10 to t = -2 means and medians abnormal log  
volume turnovers are negative, indicating a decreasing trend in the firm’s trading 
liquidity. However, not all the negative signs are statistically significant, but statis-
tically significant is the mean and the median of the daily abnormal log volume 
turnovers from 10 to 3 days before the scheduled announcement, showing an aver-
age decrease of 2.12% (p-value 0.0000) and a median decrease of 3.19% (p-value 
0.0000) per day with respect to the pre-event period. The day before the event, ab-
normal log volume turnover starts to increase, increasing by around 5% in mean 
and in median. This increase, which is also evident in the Chae’s analysis (2005), is 
due to the increase of the investor’s beliefs in proximity of the announcements64. 
Around the time of the announcement, from two days before to two days after the 
event, the abnormal log volume turnover increases by 14.5% and 11.5% in mean 
and in median, respectively. After the event, results are in line with voluminous 
previous research reporting a statistical significant increase in the trading volume. 
 Similar results are of a cumulative point of view. Figure 3.1 shows the pat-
tern of the cumulative abnormal log volume turnover65. There is a decreasing trend 
                                               
63
 I have used all the firms included in a predefined stocks list of the Worldscope database called 
“WSCOPESW.LLT”. In April 2007, that list contains 411 firms that were and are traded on the 
Swiss exchange stocks market.  
64
 As suggested in Ziebart (1990), Atiase and Bamber (1994), Bamber, Barron and Stober (1997), 
Kim and Verecchia (2001), near earnings announcement investors not only start to use their private 
pre-disclosure information, but also consider the pre-disclosure signals coming from the market. 
This has a consequential impact on the investor’s beliefs. 
65
 Cumulative Abnormal Log Volume Turnover CALVT is defined as the sum of the daily Abnormal 
Log Volume turnover. 
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from 10 to 2 days before the event and an increasing trend from the day before the 
event until the end of the period of analysis. The cumulative abnormal log volume 
turnover from 10 to 2 days before the event is negative indicating a decrease  of 
17%. This result confirms the hypothesis of the existence of a decrease in the firm’s 
trading liquidity before a scheduled announcement. Furthermore, these results are 
confirmed by the sub-sample analysis.  
In the sub-sample analysis I divided the sample into more sub-samples by 
function of the firm’s size at the event day, in function of the announcement’s pe-
riod, in function of the firm’s industry level and in function of the type announce-
ment. On average, the abnormal log volume turnover estimations of the sub-
samples are in line with the full sample, revealing some interesting characteristics. 
The sub-sample by firm’s size is built considering the firm’s closing market 
value on the announcement day. Observations are divided into quintiles in function 
of the firm’s size from the smallest Quintile 1 to the larger Quintile 5. Table 3.6 re-
ports results of the cross sectional means and medians of the abnormal log volume 
turnovers estimation before, around and after the earnings announcement. Averages 
of the daily abnormal log volume turnovers from 10 to 3 days before the event are 
negative and statistically significant for all the quintiles except the first that is nega-
tive but insignificant. The same evidence for the medians abnormal log volume 
turnover is significant for the first quartile, too. These results confirm, as in the 
whole sample analysis, the existence of a decrease in the firm’s trading liquidity be-
fore an earnings announcement. Moreover, the analysis reports that the magnitude 
of the decrease is positively related to the firm’s size, suggesting that it is higher for 
the small firms. In fact, the median decrease for the two small quintiles are of 
6.15% and 4.68 % per day from t = -10 to t = -3 against the 2.35% and 0.74% of the 
two larger. The same trend exists for the averages, except for the first quintile that is 
statistically insignificant. This evidence is not confirmed by the univariate analysis 
between firm size and abnormal volume turnover that, as reported in table 3.4, 
shows the existence of a negative (δ = -0.0005) but insignificant (p-value = 0.9837) 
correlation. 
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 The sub-sample by periods is built considering the year in which the earnings 
announcement is made. I have aggregated the different years in three periods: be-
fore 1999, from 1999 to 2002 and from 2003 to 2006. Table 3.7 reports results of 
the cross sectional means and median of the abnormal log volume turnover before, 
around and after earnings release. For all the periods there is a significant decrease 
in the abnormal log volume turnover from 10 to 3 days before the announcement. 
Moreover, even if the events in years prior 1999 are referred mainly to large firms, 
the trend is decreasing, revealing that the magnitude of the decrease in the volume 
turnover before a scheduled announcement was higher in the past years than in the 
recent years. This is in line with the increase in the source of information of the last 
decade that has contributed to a decrease in the levels of asymmetric information 
amongst investors.  
The analysis by sectors shows the existence of a negative abnormal log vol-
ume turnover before the announcement for all of the sectors. Results, reported in ta-
ble 3.8, show that the averages and medians decreases in abnormal log volume 
turnover from 10 to 3 days before the announcement are always statistically signifi-
cant, going from the lowest decreases of 0.71% of the industrial sector to the higher 
of 4.01%  of the consumer goods and services sector. These results confirm the ex-
istence of a decrease in trading liquidity before earnings announcement. 
Finally, table 3.9 reports results of the subsample analysis by type of an-
nouncement, differentiating amongst first Q1, second Q2, third Q3 and fourth Q4 
quarter earnings announcements. It is interesting to note that the decrease in the  
abnormal log volume turnover before the event is insignificant for the Q1 an-
nouncements while significant for the Q4 announcement only in median. Consider-
ing that Q1 and Q4 announcements are disclosed closely in terms of time, some-
times even on the same day, and that the Q4 releases are often preceded by sales 
announcements, it follows that in proximity of the disclosure relative to the last 
quarter more forecasts and information on the possible firm’s earnings are avail-
able, thus reducing the level of asymmetric information amongst investors with a 
consequential positive effect on the decrease in the trading liquidity. So, the analy-
sis by type of announcements reveals that the trading liquidity before an earnings 
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announcement decreases significantly for the second and third quarter announce-
ment while it is insignificant for the first and fourth announcement.  
In conclusion, event analyses of the whole sample and of the different sub-
samples report a significant decrease in the abnormal volume turnover before earn-
ings announcements, confirming empirically the first hypothesis. 
 
 
3.6.3 Robustness Check 
 
The event study of the abnormal volume turnover is made with an estimation win-
dow from t = -211 to t=-11 days before the scheduled announcement. As a first ro-
bustness check, I used a short estimation window. The first column of the table 3.10 
reports event study summary with an estimation period from t = -70 to t = -11 days. 
The results are in line with the previous, showing a decrease in the abnormal log 
volume turnover of 1.57% (p-value = 0.0000) in mean and of 3.32% (p-value = 
0.0000) in median per day from 10 to 3 trading days before the event. As a second 
robustness check, I used the raw volume turnover instead of log volume turnover. 
The estimated abnormal volume turnover is again significantly negative in mean 
and in median, therefore confirming the decreasing trend of the trading liquidity be-
fore earnings announcements. As a final robustness check, a different method of es-
timation of the abnormal volume turnover was used. I estimated the abnormal log  
volume turnover as difference between the daily log volume turnover and a bench-
mark log turnover t iB ,τ  defined as the average of the daily log volume turnover on a 
pre-event period of 40 days trading. 
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Event study results, reported in the last column of table 3.10, are again in line with 
the previous, reporting a significant daily decrease of  0.93% (p-value=0.0004) and 
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of 2.92% (p-value=0.0000) in median from 10 to 3 days trading before earnings an-
nouncements. 
 The obtained results are robust to the change of the estimation window, to 
the using of raw volume turnover and to the using of a different method of estima-
tion of the abnormal volume turnover. There is still, as reported in table 3.10, a sig-
nificant decrease in the abnormal volume turnover from 10 to 3 days before the 
scheduled announcement.   
 
3.7 Regression Analysis 
 
The event analysis confirms an average decrease in the firm’s trading liquid-
ity before an earnings announcement. The aim of the regression analysis section is 
to confirm and explain this trend, trying to identify relations with investor’s and 
firm’s characteristics. I tested the change in firm’s trading liquidity in a period of 
time before the earnings announcement using panel data regression analyses. Then, 
I analyzed the relationship amongst the firm’s trading activity and the price change 
in order to test the second and third hypothesis. I controlled the regressions for vari-
ables like the firm size, which should be positively related to the trading activity 
due to the presence of adverse selections that motivates investors to invest more in 
large firms, for the share price’s level, which should be inversely related to the trad-
ing activity because for an equal amount of investment it is possible to change more 
shares if the price is small, and for the return volatility, which should be positively 
related to the trading activity because of a variation in volatility that increases 
around earnings announcements as various empirical studies have shown66. This 
implies a change in the risk level that could not be more compatible with the risk 
aversion’s degree of some investors, who precede in a portfolio rebalancing with a 
consequential increase in the trading activity.   
                                               
66
 For example, Donder and Vorst (1996), analyzing the derivatives of implied volatility around a 
scheduled earnings announcement found that the implied volatility increased significantly during the 
pre-event period and reach a maximum on the event. After the news release, implied volatility drops 
and gradually moves back to its long-run level. 
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 To test the decrease in volume before a scheduled announcement, I re-
gressed the daily abnormal log volume turnover ALVT on a dummy variable DPE-
RIOD, which indicates the period before the event, and on various control variables 
to consider both the firms characteristics and the time effects. The model used is the 
following: 
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where i indexes announcement events from 1 to 1540, t indexes days from 10 be-
fore to 10 after the event of announcement, ALVT indicates the abnormal log  vol-
ume turnover estimated using the volume market model on an estimation window 
from 210 to 11 days trading before the event, DPERIOD is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for days before the event, 0 otherwise, Log(MV) is the logarithm of the firm’s 
market value at t=0, Log(Price) is the logarithm of the mean firm’s share price from 
t=-10 to t=-3, ∆volatility is the difference between the long-run volatility and pre-
event volatility and it is calculated as the difference between the  firm’s return stan-
dard deviations of 200 days and of 10 days  before the event, and DTIMEy are 
dummy variables controlling for year effects  from 1995 to 2006.  
 The results, reported in table 3.11, show the existence of a significant nega-
tive relation (α1 = -0.0957; p-value = 0.0000) between the explanatory variable and 
the dummy indicating the period before the event, confirming the existence of an 
average decrease in firm level liquidity before the event of a scheduled announce-
ment, hence in line with the event study evidence. This relation remains significant 
(α1 = -0.0957; p-value = 0.0000) after controlling for some firms’ characteristics 
like the firm size, the stock price and the return volatility, and for the years effect.   
 To analyze the relation amongst the price variation and the firm trading ac-
tivity, I regress the absolute percentage of the daily firm’s share price variation on 
the daily abnormal log volume turnover ALVT before the event. The model used is 
the following: 
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where i indexes announcement event from 1 to 1540, t indexes days around the 
event of announcement, ∆%Price is the percentage difference between the daily 
price level and its lagged, ALVT indicates the abnormal log volume turnover esti-
mated using the volume market model on an estimation window from 210 to 11 
days trading before the event, Log(MV) is the logarithm of the firm’s market value 
at t = 0, Log(Price) is the logarithm of the daily firm’s share price,  ∆volatility is the 
difference between the long-run volatility and pre-event volatility and it is calcu-
lated as the difference between the  firm’s return standard deviations of 200 days 
and of 10 days before the event, and DTIMEy are dummy variables controlling for 
year effects  from 1995 to 2006. 
Regression results, reported in table 3.12, show the existence of a significant 
positive relationship between the simultaneous price change from t = -10 to t = -3 
days before the announcement and the ALVT (α1 = 0.01383; p-value = 0.0000). 
This suggests that, in correspondence of a higher stock price variation there is a 
lower decrease in trading liquidity before the announcement. Similar results (α1 
=0.0136; p-value = 0.0000) when the regression is made for a period of time from t 
= -8 to t = -2 days before the event.  
Table 3.13 reports regression results when the percentage price change is re-
lated with the cross product between the simultaneous abnormal log volume turn-
over and a dummy variable DPOSITIVE, which is used as proxy of the quality of 
the announcement and is expressed in function of the price’s return variation after 
the announcement. An increase in the firm’s price level after the announcement re-
veals that the announcement was positive, while a decrease shows that it was no-
positive. Considering that the informed investors already have an expectation on the 
quality of the announcement, it is possible to identify a relationship between change 
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in simultaneous stock’s price and expected quality of the announcement. Results 
shows a positive relationship (α1 = 0.0046; p-value = 0.0804), indicating that in the 
case of a positive earnings release the ex-ante  magnitude of the simultaneous price 
change is higher than in the case of a non positive earnings release.  
This regressive analysis confirms the second and third hypothesis,  revealing 
that before earnings announcements there will be a decrease in firm’s trading li-
quidity, which is positively related to the simultaneous price change whose magni-
tude is higher in case of positive earnings release.  
 
3.7.1 Endogeneity 
 
The relation between the simultaneous price change and the trading activity could 
be endogenously determined. That means, the change of the firms’ price shares is 
not a consequence of the variation in trading activity, but a simultaneous event, 
suggesting that firms that achieve a certain change in the levels of price are those 
that recognize lower decrease in trading activity. To test this, I estimate a simulta-
neous equations system in which the two variables of abnormal log volume turn-
over and of percentage price variation are endogenously considered. The regression 
of the simultaneous equations model is made with the pooled two stage last squares 
2SLS procedure. Results, reported in the last column of the table 3.12, show the ex-
istence of a significant positive relation (α1 = 0.01985; p-value = 0.0000) between 
the absolute value of the percentage share price change and the trading activity 
variation. Hence, in line with the result of the pooled OLS regression.   
 
3.8 Asymmetric information 
 
The event analysis has shown the existence of a significant decrease in the trading 
liquidity before an earnings announcement. This decrease is due to a problem of 
adverse selection. In fact, before such events, asymmetric information between in-
formed and uninformed investors is higher [Krinsky and Lee (1996); Saffi (2006)] 
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and uninformed investors tend to postpone their trading after the announcement 
when the adverse selection problem is resolved [Foster and Viswanathan (1990)]. 
 The goal of this section is to test if the presence of asymmetric information 
is the motivation of the decrease in trading liquidity before scheduled announce-
ments. For this purpose, I related the cumulative abnormal volume turnover before 
the announcement with variables like firm size and bid-ask spread, which are used 
as proxy for asymmetric information. Firm size and bid-ask spreads are indicated in 
literature as reasonable proxy for the asymmetric information. Amongst researchers 
that report evidence on the firm size, Atiase (1985) and Freeman (1987) report em-
pirical evidence that an investor’s incentive to acquire private predisclosure infor-
mation is higher for large firms than for small firms, suggesting that the asymmetric 
information is decreasing in firm size; Bamber (1987) suggests that small firms 
have higher levels of asymmetric information than the larger ones due to the limita-
tion of their numbers and sources of information; Merton (1987) argues that the ex-
istence of asymmetric information could explain why uninformed investors do not 
invest at all in certain securities such as the small firms’ stocks; and Lev and Pen-
man (1990) report that more forecast on earnings are reported in the financial press 
for large firms than for small firms. Amongst researchers that report evidence on 
the bid-ask spread, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), using a formal model to show how 
the bid-ask spread arises from the adverse selection, show that the bid-ask spreads 
are positively related with the asymmetric information; Lee, Mucklow and Ready 
(1993) in their analysis on the relation amongst spreads, depths and earnings infor-
mation, show evidence that firms with lower bid-ask spreads have a lower degree of 
asymmetric information; Greenstein and Sami (1994), in analyzing the effect of the 
increase in disclosure on bid-ask spread with a time series approach, observe that 
the spread decreases more rapidly for firms with a low initial information level; and 
Welker (1995), analyzing for a sample of firms listed on the NYSE the relation be-
tween information level and bid-ask spread, reports evidence that the bid-ask spread 
is higher for firms with a low information index with respect to those with a higher 
one, therefore in line with the prediction that an increase in the information level 
reduces the spread between ask and bid price. From this evidence, it can be deter-
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mined that the asymmetric information is a negative function of the firm size and a 
positive function of the bid-ask spread. Furthermore the univariate analysis reports 
evidence of a  negative correlation (δ
 
= -0.1544; p-value = 0.0000) between the firm 
size and the bid-ask spread, confirming for the analysis’s sample that the small 
firms are those with higher bid-ask spreads, hence with higher levels of asymmetric 
information. 
 The first hypothesis implies that the larger the asymmetric information, the 
less trading activity will occur before earnings announcements. It follows that we 
should expect a positive statistical relation between trading volume and firm size 
and a negative statistical relation between trading volume and bid-ask spread before 
earnings announcements.  
 To test the relation between trading liquidity and asymmetric information, I 
use a panel data regression and, considering the presence of both firms and periods 
(time) effects, and that the time effect is not constant during years67, the more ap-
propriate estimation procedure is to control both by firm and by time effect, as sug-
gested in Petersen (2006).Therefore, I ran a pooled time series regression using the 
following firm fixed effect model: 
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where i indexes firms from 1 to 85, and t indexes periods from 1 to 48. The depend-
ent variable is the cumulative daily abnormal log  volume turnover CALVT from 10 
to 3 days before the announcement, iα  is a dummy variable corresponding to the 
firm fixed effect, tϕ  are dummies variables corresponding to the period (time) ef-
fect, AI is the proxy for the asymmetric information level, tiCV ,  is a set of n control 
variables and ti ,ε  is a random disturbance assumed to be possibly heteroskedastic 
and correlated within firms.  
                                               
67
 The OLS White heteroskedasticy consistent regression reports decreasing significance estimation 
relatively to the year dummies from 1995 to 2000 and insignificant estimation from 2001.  
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The regression’s results when the firm size is used as proxy for the asymmet-
ric information are reported in table 3.14. There is evidence of an insignificant 
negative relation (β = -0.0177, p-value = 0.8444) between the cumulative abnormal 
log volume turnover and the firm market value. This relation remains insignificant 
(β = 0.0625, p-value = 0.6693) after controlling the relation for some factors like 
the price level, the price change and the return volatility. The insignificant relation 
suggests that the cumulative abnormal volume turnover before the announcement is 
not correlated to the firm’s market value.  
Regression results when the bid-ask spread is used as proxy for the level of 
asymmetric information are reported in table 3.15. The relation between the cumu-
lative abnormal log volume turnover from 10 to 3 days before the announcement 
and the bid-ask spread is insignificant (β = 0.0741, p-value = 0.2744) and it remains 
insignificant (β = 0.0782, p-value = 0.2221) after controlling for factors like the 
price level, the price change and the return volatility. The insignificant relation does 
not show evidence that the cumulative abnormal volume turnover before the an-
nouncement is correlated with the bid-ask spread.  
This analysis does not show evidence that the decrease in trading liquidity is corre-
lated either to the firm size or to the bid-ask spread. Moreover, considering the uni-
variate analysis that shows an insignificant correlation between the abnormal trad-
ing liquidity and the firm size, and a significant but positive relation between the 
abnormal trading and the bid-ask spread, it is possible to conclude that there is no 
evidence of a relationship between decrease in trading liquidity and asymmetric in-
formation. This result is not in line with the prediction that the existence of asym-
metric information amongst different types of investors is the reason for the de-
crease in the firm’s trading liquidity before earnings announcements. At least two 
reasons could justify the insignificant results. The variables used as proxies and the 
effect on the asymmetric information from the open order book market’s character-
istic.  
The use of the firm size as proxy of the asymmetric information could be too ge-
neric, considering also the restricted number of observations of the analysis’s sam-
ple. In fact, the firm size can be used as proxy for different effects; hence it could be 
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more appropriate to use a specific proxy as, for example, the dispersion of the ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts. In this analysis I did not follow this approach because of 
the data unavailability, especially for the small firms. Moreover, the use of the bid-
ask spread,  which is  the canonical tool to proxy for the asymmetric information, 
also doesn’t yield significant results. Probably, this is due to the fact that in comput-
ing the bid-ask spread, I have used the last day bid price and the last day ask price. 
By using a intraday bid and ask traded price, the results can become more signifi-
cant. A second possible reason of this evidence, which is contrary to the Chae 
(2005) results, may arise from the fact that in an open order book market the ad-
verse selection problem could be lower due to the possibility to read the order book 
before trading. In fact, investors, due to this characteristic, can infer information on 
the counterparty, with a positive impact on the asymmetric information’s level.     
 
3.9 Summary and conclusions 
 
In this study I analyze the trend of the trading volume before a scheduled 
earnings announcement for a sample of Swiss listed firms. The aim is to contribute 
to the research field opened by Chae (2005) with his evidence on the U.S. firms. 
Unlike Chae’s research (2005), my analysis is conducted on firms listed in a stock-
exchange market with a limited order book.  
Generally, abundant literature provides evidence of a positive relation be-
tween trading volume and asymmetric information. However, when there is a 
scheduled event like the earnings announcement, this relation is likely to be in-
verted by the presence of time discretionary investors who, because of an adverse 
selection problem, tend to postpone their investments when this problem is less se-
vere. The consequence is a decrease in the firm’s trading activity before the event.  
The analysis of the trading volume is made with various approaches. In the 
first part, an event study of the abnormal log volume turnover around the event is 
performed with the aim of testing the decrease in the trading activity in the period 
before the event. Results report a daily average decrease of 2.12 percent in the ab-
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normal volume turnover from 10 to 3 trading days before the announcement. More-
over, the subsample analysis confirms this trend, highlighting that the magnitude of 
the decrease in trading activity declines over the years, hence it is in line with the 
increase in the source of information in the last decade that has contributed to lower 
the levels of asymmetric information amongst investors. Results of the event study 
empirically confirm the first hypothesis and they are robust to the change of the es-
timation window, to the use of the raw volume turnover and to the use of a different 
method of estimation of the abnormal volume turnover. In the second part of the 
analysis, a pooled time series regression of a model that relates the abnormal log 
volume turnover before the event with the simultaneous price change is estimated, 
with the aim of investigating the relation amongst the firm’s trading activity, the 
price variation and its magnitude in the case of ex-post positive earnings an-
nouncements. Regression results confirm the existence of a positive relation be-
tween the abnormal volume trading and the simultaneous price change, and also 
confirm that the magnitude of the price variation is higher when positive earnings 
are released. In the last part, a pooled time series regression of a model that relates 
the cumulative abnormal log volume turnover before the announcement with the 
firm’s asymmetric information level is estimated, with the aim of verifying if the 
necessary condition of the decrease in trading liquidity is the presence of asymmet-
ric information measured by the firm size and the bid-ask spread. Regressions re-
sults do not show statistical evidence of any connection between the cumulative ab-
normal volume turnover and the level of asymmetric information. A possible moti-
vation could be the open order book characteristic of the exchange market. In fact, 
it is known that in an open order book exchange market, information asymmetries 
amongst investors are lower than in a specialist market, if nothing else because 
there are lower inventory risks and higher transparency68. 
The magnitude of the decrease in the trading volume before scheduled an-
nouncements is similar compared to Chae’s (2005) evidence for the U.S. case, (cu-
mulative average abnormal log trading volume of 17% against over 15%), and dif-
                                               
68
 In an open order book market investors have access to the order book and can infer their competi-
tors’ information. 
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ferently from Chae (2005), this analysis does not reveal statistical evidence of a re-
lation between a decrease in trading liquidity and asymmetric information amongst 
investors. However, we must consider that in an open order book exchange market 
information asymmetries are lower because of the possibility to read the order book, 
and this should have an effect in resolving the adverse selection problem of the un-
informed investors.  
In conclusion, this study accepts the hypothesis of the existence of a decrease 
in the trading liquidity before a scheduled earnings announcement but does not con-
firm that the decrease is due to the presence of asymmetric information. Moreover, 
this analysis shows that matching a lower decrease in trading liquidity before an 
earnings announcement there is a higher increase in the simultaneous price variation 
and that the magnitude of the variation is higher in case of positive announcement 
surprises. One limitation of this study is given by the low availability of the earn-
ings announcement date, above all for events before 1999, in which the earnings 
disclosure dates are available almost only for the large firms. This limit should be 
considered for future research, along with the suggestion to verify the existence of 
these relationships not only for firms listed to the Swiss stock exchange. Further-
more, considering that the basic motivation of the decrease in liquidity before a 
scheduled announcement is the existence of asymmetric information amongst inves-
tors, the evidence of a relation between decrease in trading liquidity and asymmetric 
information should be analyzed with a different approach. Finally, it may be inter-
esting to verify if the increasing use of derivatives can also help to explain the fal-
ling trend in the trading activity before scheduled earnings announcements. 
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3.11  Tables 
 
TABLE 3.1: Sample Selection Procedures 
 
The table reports figures on the sample selection. Panel A summarizes the selection procedure. The 
sample is composed by non-financial firms that were and are included in the Swiss Performance In-
dex SPI from 1995 to 2006 and for which it was possible to point out the dates of earnings an-
nouncements. Excluded events are considered events for which are not available at least 90 trading 
days on the estimation window and at least 15 trading days on the event window of the volume turn-
over ratio, that is defined as the ratio of the daily number of the share changed on the total number of 
shares outstanding. In panel B for each year the number of events in the sample analysis is reported. 
In panel C the total number of events found are classified in function of the type of event amongst all 
the quarter earnings announcements (Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4) available.  
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
   
Number 
 
Percent   Distibuted on: 
        
 
Event found 
 1901  100%  89 firms 
        
Event excleded 361  19%   
 
        
Total events Sample 1540  81%  85 firms 
                      
 
 
Panel B: Event by Year 
Year N %  Year N %  Year N % 
           
1995 4 0.26%  1999 71 4.61%  2003 202 13.12% 
1996 24 1.56%  2000 161 10.45%  2004 203 13.18% 
1997 33 2.14%  2001 181 11.75%  2005 214 13.90% 
1998 51 3.31%   2002 198 12.86%   2006 198 12.86% 
 
 
Panel C: Event by Type 
Type 
  
 N 
   
% 
  
           
Q1  First Quarter  255 
   
16.56% 
  
Q2 Second Quarter  494 
   
32.08% 
  
Q3 Third Quarter   280 
   
18.18% 
  
Q4 Fourth Quarter   511 
      
33.18% 
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TABLE 3.2: Summary Statistics 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics of the analysis’s sample. Volume Turnover is the ratio of the 
daily number of shares traded on the total number of shares outstanding, Log Volume Turnover is 
the log of the volume turnover and Market value is the firm’s market value in millions of Swiss 
francs. Statistics on Volume turnover are computed on a period of one year (266 days trading) before 
the event of the earnings announcement while the firm’s market value is observed at the announce-
ment’s day. 
 
 
Period   Mean   Median   St.Dev   Skewness   Kurtosis   N 
             
Daily Volume Turnover 
             
1995-2006  0.0195  0.0031  0.0624  5.1872  28.7613  1540 
1995-1998  0.1093  0.0151  0.1528  1.2098  -0.0102  112 
1999-2002  0.0244  0.0048  0.0610  4.7931  26.7680  611 
2003-2006  0.0036  0.0026  0.0040  3.7985  19.5376  817 
             
Daily Log Volume Turnover 
             
1995-2006  -1.9936  -2.1094  0.3541  2.5391  6.7169  1540 
1995-1998  -1.4954  -1.8166  0.6604  0.4822  -1.3771  112 
1999-2002  -1.9190  -2.0579  0.3831  1.6262  2.3780  611 
2003-2006  -2.1176  -2.1386  0.1173  1.3273  2.5623  817 
             
Market Value 
             
1995-2006   12031   1087   33503   3.6827   16.0374  1540 
1995-1998   18747   1811   35796   2.1756   6.7679  112 
1999-2002   12465   1180   34881   3.6782   16.0399  611 
2003-2006    10787    879    32020    3.9652    17.9918   817 
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TABLE 3.3: Explanatory Variables 
 
The table reports statistics of the explanatory variables. MV is the firm’s market value in millions of  
Swiss francs and is observed  at the  announcement day. Price is the average firm’s share price. BAS 
is the average of the daily bid-ask spread ratio (difference between ask and bid divided by the aver-
age of the bid and the ask) and is calculated with the daily close bid and ask prices. ∆volatility is the 
difference between the long-run volatility and pre-event volatility and it is calculated as the differ-
ence between the firm’s return standard deviations of 200 days and of 10 days before the event. 
∆%Price is the average of the percentage difference between the daily price level and its lagged 
value. All averages are calculated from t = -10 to t = -3., DPositive is a dummy variable equal to 1 
when the cumulative firm’s share return on two days after the announcement is positive, 0 otherwise.  
             
Variable   Mean   Median   St.Dev   Max   Min   N 
             
MV 
 
12031.43  1086.65  33503.2  201805.7  6.44  1540 
Price 
 
294.91  136.41  489.18  6543.75  0.87  1540 
BAS 
 
1.26%  0.76%  1.67%  16.32%  0.04%  1539 
∆Volatility 
 
-0.08%  0.02%  1.43%  10.09%  -16.30%  1540 
∆%Price 
 
0.09%  0.06%  0.86%  5.91%  -7.49%  1540 
Dpositive 
  
0.53   1   0.5   1   0   1540 
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TABLE 3.4: Correlations 
 
The table reports a correlation amongst variables. MV is the firm’s market value in millions of Swiss 
francs and is observed at the announcement day. BAS is the average of the daily bid-ask spread ratio 
(the difference between ask and bid divided by the average of the bid and the ask) and is calculated 
with the daily close bid and ask prices. Price is the average of the daily close firm’s share price. 
∆%Price is the average of the percentage difference between the daily close price level and its 
lagged. ∆volt is the difference between the long-run volatility and pre-event volatility and it is calcu-
lated as the difference between the firm’s return standard deviations of 200 days and of 10 days be-
fore the event. The abnormal log volume turnover ALVT is the residual of the one factor volume 
turnover market model which parameters are estimated in a [-210,-11] days window and  log volume 
turnover is defined as the log of the ratio of the daily number of shares traded on the total number of 
shares outstanding. DPositive is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the cumulative firm’s share re-
turn on two days after the announcement is positive, 0 otherwise. All averages are calculated from t 
= -10 to t = -3. The p-values in parentheses are for a two-tail test of statistical significance. 
 
 MV BAS Price ∆%Price ∆Volt ALVT 
       
BAS -0.1544      
 (0.0000)      
 
      
Price -0.0627 -0.0936     
 (0.0138) (0.0002)     
 
      
∆%Price 
-0.0309 0.0145 -0.0237    
 (0.2259) (0.5698) (0.3518)    
 
      
∆Volt 0.0026 -0.0098 -0.0060 0.0293   
 (0.9186) (0.7006) (0.8153) (0.2497)   
 
      
ALVT -0.0005 0.0493 0.0185 0.1489 -0.0505  
 (0.9837) (0.0533) (0.4670) (0.0000) (0.0475)  
 
      
Dpositive 0.0249 -0.0135 -0.0045 0.0306 0.0250 0.0098 
 (0.3289) (0.5974) (0.8593) (0.2302) (0.3265) (0.7003) 
 
      
N 1540 1539 1540 1540 1540 1540 
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TABLE 3.5: Abnormal Volume Turnover 
 
 
The table reports the cross sectional means and medians of the daily abnormal log volume turnover 
around a scheduled announcement for firms listed at the SWX between 1995 and 2006. The abnor-
mal log volume turnover is the residual of the volume turnover market model which parameters are 
estimated in a [-210,-11] days window. Log volume turnover is defined as the log of the ratio of the 
daily number of shares traded on the total number of shares outstanding. [-10,-3], [-2,+2] and 
[+2,+10] indicate the period before, around and after an earnings announcement, respectively. A 
standard t-test is used to measure whether the mean is statistically different from zero and a Wilcox-
on signed-rank test is used to measure whether the median is statistically different from zero. P-
values for both tests are reported in parenthesis.  
          
Time  Mean  Median 
     
-10  -0.0254  (0.0009)  
-0.0425  (0.0000) 
-9  -0.0237  (0.0021)  
-0.0366  (0.0000) 
-8  -0.0234  (0.0022)  
-0.0416  (0.0000) 
-7  -0.0442  (0.0000)  
-0.0520  (0.0000) 
-6  -0.0225  (0.0026)  
-0.0299  (0.0001) 
-5  -0.0215  (0.0041)  
-0.0248  (0.0002) 
-4  -0.0115  (0.1321)  
-0.0228  (0.0045) 
-3  0.0023  (0.7693)  
-0.0127  (0.4047) 
-2  -0.0004  (0.9643)  
-0.0074  (0.6406) 
-1  0.0556  (0.0000)  0.0501  (0.0000) 
0  0.3090  (0.0000)  0.2946  (0.0000) 
1  0.2274  (0.0000)  0.2011  (0.0000) 
2  0.1281  (0.0000)  0.1040  (0.0000) 
3  0.0911  (0.0000)  0.0652  (0.0000) 
4  0.0590  (0.0000)  0.0400  (0.0000) 
5  0.0355  (0.0000)  0.0177  (0.0001) 
6  0.0257  (0.0013)  0.0095  (0.0230) 
7  0.0170  (0.0332)  
-0.0039  (0.3973) 
8  0.0147  (0.0621)  
-0.0001  (0.1140) 
9  0.0080  (0.3205)  
-0.0081  (0.8885) 
10  0.0027  (0.7368)  
-0.0121  (0.6916) 
     
 [-10,-3] 
 
-0.0212  (0.0000) 
 
-0.0319  (0.0000) 
 [-2,+2] 
 
0.1450  (0.0000) 
 
0.1150  (0.0000) 
 [+3,+10] 
 
0.0316  (0.0000) 
 
0.0121  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Obs. 1540 
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TABLE 3.6: Abnormal Volume Turnover by Size  
 
 
 
The table reports the cross sectional means of the daily abnormal volume turnover around an earn-
ings announcement across a firm’s size quintile. Quintile 1 contains the 20% smaller firms of the 
sample, while quintile 5 the 20% bigger. The abnormal log volume turnover is the residual of the 
volume turnover market model which parameters are estimated in a [-210,-11] days window and log 
volume turnover is defined as the log of the ratio of the daily number of shares traded on the total 
number of shares outstanding. (-10,-3), (-2,+2) and  (+3,+10) indicate periods before, around and af-
ter the earnings announcement, respectively. A standard t-test is used to measure whether the mean 
is statistically different from zero and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to measure whether the 
median is statistically different from zero. P-values for both tests are reported in parenthesis.  
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time   Quintile 1 
  
Quintile 2 
  
Quitile 3 
  
Quintile 4 
  
Quintile 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-10,-3)  -0.0105 
 
-0.0343 
 
-0.0249 
 
-0.0215 
 
-0.0101 
  (0.1773) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0136) 
  
         
 (-2,+2)  0.1593 
 
0.1383 
 
0.1652 
 
0.1568 
 
0.1128 
  (0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
  
         
 (+3,+10)  0.0514 
 
0.0311 
 
0.0500 
 
0.0221 
 
0.0117 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0045) 
  
         
Median 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-10,-3)  -0.0615  -0.0468  -0.0398  -0.0235  -0.0074 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0111) 
           
 (-2,+2)  0.1069  0.1104  0.1280  0.1400  0.0911 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
  
         
 (+3,+10)  0.0030  0.0109  0.0204  0.0272  0.0042 
  (0.0000)  (0.0010)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0166) 
  
         
Obs 
  308 
  
308 
  
308 
  
308 
  
308 
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TABLE 3.7: Abnormal Volume Turnover by Period 
 
The table reports the cross sectional means and medians of the daily abnormal log volume turnover 
around a scheduled announcement across three periods of time. The abnormal log volume turnover 
is the residual of the volume turnover market model which parameters are estimated in a [-210,-11] 
days window and log volume turnover is defined as the log of the ratio of the daily number of shares 
traded on the total number of shares outstanding. (-10,-3), (-2,+2) and  (+3,+10) indicate periods be-
fore, around and after the earnings announcement, respectively. A standard t-test is used to measure 
whether the mean is statistically different from zero and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to 
measure whether the median is statistically different from zero. P-values for both tests are reported 
in parentheses. Obs. indicates the number of earnings announcements. 
 
Time 
  
1995-1998 
  
1999-2002 
  
2003-2006 
 
      
Mean 
 
      
 (-10,-3)  -0.0554  -0.0335  -0.0073 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0424) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-2,+2)  0.0971  0.1160  0.1781 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (+3,+10)  0.0370  0.0001  0.0574 
 
 (0.0010)  (0.9785)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median 
 
      
 (-10,-3)  -0.0535  -0.0440  -0.0257 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-2,+2)  0.0544  0.0955  0.1410 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (+3,+10)  0.0093  -0.0103  0.0310 
 
 (0.0152)  (0.6892)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs   112     611    817 
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TABLE 3.8: Abnormal Volume Turnover by Sector 
 
The table reports the cross sectional means and medians of the daily abnormal log volume turnover 
around a scheduled announcement for firms in the SWX between 1995 and 2006. Each firm is as-
signed according to the Datastream industry classification to one of the following sectors: Basic Ma-
terials (BMATR), Consumer Services and Goods (CNSMS&G), Health Care (HLTHC), Industrials 
(INDUS), Technologies (TECNO), Utilities and Telecommunications (UT&TEL). The abnormal log 
volume turnover is the residual of the volume turnover market model which parameters are esti-
mated in a [-210,-11] days window and log volume turnover is defined as the ratio of the log of the 
daily number of shares traded on the total number of shares outstanding. (-10,-3), (-2,+2) and  
(+3,+10) indicate periods before, around and after the earnings announcement, respectively. A stan-
dard t-test is used to measure whether the mean is statistically different from zero and a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used to measure whether the median is statistically different from zero. P-values 
for both tests are reported in parentheses. Obs.indicates the number of earnings announcements. 
 
 
            
Time   BMATR   CNSMS&G   HLTHC   INDUST   TECNO   UT&TEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-10,-3) 
 
-0.0296 
 
-0.0401 
 
-0.0231 
 
-0.0071 
 
-0.0376 
 
-0.0317 
 
 (0.0002)  (0.0000)  (0.0010)  (0.1045)  (0.0000)  (0.0009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-2,+2)  0.1307  0.1209  0.1670  0.1539  0.1850  0.0251 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0870) 
             
(+3,+10)  -0.0151  0.0421  0.0181  0.0450  0.0449  -0.0078 
  (0.0581)  (0.0000)  (0.0140)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.4986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-10,-3) 
 
-0.0307 
 
-0.0611 
 
-0.0212 
 
-0.0287 
 
-0.0526 
 
-0.0322 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0004)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-2,+2) 
 
0.1149 
 
0.0796 
 
0.1326 
 
0.1211 
 
0.1721 
 
0.0070 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1709) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (+3,+10) 
 
-0.0168 
 
0.0217 
 
0.0183 
 
0.0136 
 
0.0306 
 
-0.0127 
 
 (0.0933)  (0.0000)  (0.0010)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.2367) 
 
            
Obs 
  
140 
  
270 
  
249 
  
693 
  
140 
  
48 
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TABLE 3.9: Abnormal Volume Turnover by Type 
 
The table reports the cross sectional means of the daily abnormal volume turnover around an earn-
ings announcement across type of announcement differentiating amongst first, second, third and 
fourth quarter earnings disclosures. The abnormal log volume turnover is the residual of the one fac-
tor volume turnover market model which parameters are estimated in a [-210,-11] days window and 
log volume turnover is defined as the log of the ratio of the daily number of shares traded on the total 
number of shares outstanding. (-10,-3), (-2,+2) and  (+3,+10) indicate periods before, around and af-
ter the earnings announcement, respectively. A standard t-test is used to measure whether the mean 
is statistically different from zero and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to measure whether the 
median is statistically different from zero. P-values for both tests are reported in parentheses.  
 
Time 
  
Q1 
  
Q2 
  
Q3 
  
Q4 
 
        
Mean 
 
        
 (-10,-3)  0.0020  -0.0524  -0.0323  0.0071 
 
 (0.7802)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1523) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-2,+2)  0.1315  0.1428  0.0948  0.1914 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (+3,+10)  0.0076  0.0218  -0.0119  0.0834 
 
 (0.2851)  (0.0000)  (0.0564)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median 
 
        
 (-10,-3)  -0.0096  -0.0549  -0.0415  -0.0197 
 
 (0.3009)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0568) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-2,+2)  0.1115  0.1142  0.0712  0.1601 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (+3,+10)  0.0108  0.0041  -0.0256  0.0544 
 
 (0.0421)  (0.0015)  (0.0010)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs   255    494    280    511  
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TABLE 3.10: Robustness Results 
 
The table reports results of robustness check analysis of the abnormal volume turnover around earn-
ings announcements for a sample of Swiss firms listed at the SWX between 1995 and 2006. The first 
column reports cross sectional means and medians when the abnormal log volume turnover is esti-
mated with the one factor market turnover model on a prevent window of 60 days trading. The 
second column reports cross sectional means and medians of the raw abnormal volume turnover es-
timated with the one factor market turnover model on a pre-event window of 200 days trading. The 
last column report cross sectional means and medians when the abnormal log turnover is calculated 
as the difference between the observed log volume turnover and a benchmark log volume turnover 
defined as the average of log volume turnover on a pre event period of 40 days trading. (-10,-3), (-
2,+2) and  (+3,+10) indicate periods before, around and after the earnings announcement, respective-
ly. A standard t-test is used to measure whether the mean is statistically different from zero and a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to measure whether the median is statistically different from zero. 
P-values for both tests are reported in parentheses. Obs. Indicates  the number of earnings an-
nouncements. 
 
       
Time 
  
ALVT 
[-70,-11] 
  
AVT 
[-210,-11] 
  
Benck 
40 
 
      
Mean 
 
      
 (-10,-3)  -0.0157  -0.0027  -0.0093 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-2,+2)  0.1547  0.0081  0.1612 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (+3,+10)  0.0395  0.0016  0.0437 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0019)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median 
 
      
 (-10,-3)  -0.0332  -0.0006  -0.0292 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (-2,+2)  0.1200  0.0002  0.1238 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (+3,+10)  0.0192  -0.0004  0.0224 
 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs    1540   1540    1540  
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TABLE 3.11: Abnormal Volume Turnover around the event  
OLS Pooled regression 
 
 
 
 ALVT                             ALVT 
Variable                                                          -10 ≤ t ≤ 10                     -10≤ t  ≤10 
 
Constant     0.0891  0.1016   
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
 
DPeriod -0.0957 -0.0956   
 (0.0000) (0.0000)   
 
Log(MV) -  -0.0026   
  (0.0021) 
 
Log(Pricet) - -0.0011    
  (0.4318)    
 
|∆Volatility| -  2.1344     
  (0.0000) 
    
Years dummy Yes  Yes 
     
 
R squared 0.0303 0.0361  
Adj. R squared 0.0299 0.0355  
F-statistic 80.82 77.26   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000        
No. announcements 1540 1540   
No. Obs 31038 31038  
 
The table presents the OLS Pooled regression of the abnormal volume turnover around the scheduled 
announcement. The dependent variable is the daily abnormal log volume turnover ALVT estimated 
with the market volume turnover model. DPERIOD is a dummy variable equal to 1 for days before 
the event, 0 otherwise; Log(MV) is the logarithm of the firm’s market value at t=0; Log(Price) is the 
logarithm of the daily close firm’s share price, ∆volatility is the difference between the long-run 
volatility and pre-event volatility and it is calculated as the difference between the firm’s return stan-
dard deviations of 200 days and of 10 days  before the event, Years dummy indicates the presence of  
dummy variables controlling for year effects  from 1995 to 2006. Standard errors are clustered by 
time and P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is equal to 0 are in parentheses.  
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TABLE 3.12: Percentage Price Change before the event  
OLS/2SLS Pooled regression 
 
 
                                                       OLS    OLS    2SLS 
 |∆%PRICE|     |∆%PRICE|        |∆%PRICE| 
Variable -10 ≤ t ≤ -3 -8≤ t  ≤ -2 -10 ≤ t ≤ -3 
 
Constant    0.0216 0.0204  0.0221  
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
ALVTt  0.01383 0.0136 0.0198 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
 
Log(MV) -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
Log(Pricet) -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0014 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
|∆Volatility| 0.3406 0.3832 0.3295 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes 
     
 
R squared 0.1712 0.1662    0.1636 
Adj. R squared 0.1702 0.1651 0.1626 
F-statistic 161.92 136.66  - 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  0.0000  - 
No. announcements 1540 1540 1540 
No. Obs 11773 10298 11773 
 
The table presents the results of the OLS/ 2SLS Pooled regression. The first column reports OLS re-
sults when the estimation is made from 10 to 3 days trading before the event. The second column 
reports OLS results when the estimation is made from 8 to 2 days trading before the event. The last 
column reports results of the 2SLS estimation made from 10 to 3 days trading before the event. The 
dependent variable is the absolute value of the percentage difference between the daily price level 
and its lagged value. ALVT is the daily abnormal log  volume turnover estimated with the market 
volume turnover model, Log(MV) is the logarithm of the firm’s market value at t=0, Log(Price) is 
the logarithm of the daily close firm’s share price, ∆volatility is the difference between the long-run 
volatility and pre-event volatility and it is calculated as the difference between the firm’s return stan-
dard deviations of 200 days and of 10 days before the event, Years dummy indicates the presence of  
dummy variables controlling for year effects  from 1995 to 2006. Standard errors are clustered by 
time and P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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      TABLE 3.13: Percentage Price change before the event  
OLS Pooled regression 
 
 
 ∆%PRICE  ∆%PRICE     
Variable               -10 ≤ t ≤ -3     -8≤ t  ≤ -2 
 
Constant    0.0026  0.0053 
 (0.1057) (0.0131) 
 
ALVT 0.0066 0.0086 
 (0.0023) (0.0000) 
 
ALVT*DPOSITIVE 0.0046 0.0016 
 (0.0804) (0.5455) 
 
Log(MV) -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.9565) (0.3079) 
 
Log(Pricet) -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.7054) (0.3712) 
 
|∆Volatility| -0.0311 -0.0778 
 (0.5681) (0.4379) 
 
Years dummy Yes Yes 
     
 
R squared 0.01316 0.0138 
Adj. R squared 0.01183 0.0123 
F-statistic 9.81 9.01 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
No. announcements 1540 1540 
No. Obs 11773 10298 
 
 
The table presents the OLS Pooled regression of the daily percentage price variation before the 
scheduled announcement. The first column reports results when the estimation is made from 10 to 3 
days trading before the event, while in the second column the estimation is made from 8 to 2 days 
trading before the event. The dependent variable is the percentage difference between the daily price 
level and its lagged value. ALVT is the daily abnormal log volume turnover estimated with the mar-
ket volume turnover model, DPositive is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the cumulative firm’s 
share return on two days after the announcement is positive, 0 otherwise; Log(MV) is the logarithm 
of the firm’s market value at t=0; Log(Price) is the logarithm of the daily close firm’s share price, 
∆volatility is the difference between the long-run volatility and pre-event volatility and it is calcu-
lated as the difference between the  firm’s return standard deviations of 200 days and of 10 days  be-
fore the event, Years dummy indicates the presence of  dummy variables controlling for year effects  
from 1995 to 2006. Standard errors are clustered by time and P-values of the t-test that the coeffi-
cient is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3.14: CALVT-SIZE Regression 
Pooled OLS White heteroskedasticity consistence results 
 
 
Firms’ fixed effect regression Model                                                                                           
Variable      I       II                                     
 
CONSTANT                                          -0.0345 -0.6906   
 (0.9577) (0.3374) 
 
Log(MV)  -0.0177  -0.0625 
 (0.8444) (0.6693) 
 
Log(PRICE) - 0.1312 
  (0.3134) 
 
∆PRICE -  6.9475 
  (0.0000) 
 
|∆VOLATILITY| -  7.0636 
  (0.2225) 
 
 
R squared 0.1134 0.1582 
Adj. R squared 0.0302 0.0763 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0053 0.0000 
Number of events 1540 1524 
Number of firms     85 85 
 
 
 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm fixed effects regressions of cumulative abnormal 
volume turnover on the firm size used as proxy for the asymmetric information. The dependent vari-
able is the cumulative abnormal log volume turnover CALVT from 10 to 3 days trading before the 
earnings announcement and it is the residual of the market volume turnover model estimation. 
Log(MV) is the logarithm of the firm’s market value at t=0; Log(Price) is the logarithm of the aver-
age daily close firm’s share price from t=-10 to t=-3 days, ∆Price is the absolute price percentage 
change from  t=-10 to t=-3 days, ∆volatility is the difference between the long-run volatility and pre-
event volatility and it is calculated as the difference between the firm’s return standard deviations of 
200 days and of 10 days before the event . Standard errors are clustered by periods and P-values of 
the t-test that the coefficient is equal to 0 are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3.15: CALVT-BAS Regression  
Pooled OLS White heteroskedasticity consistence results 
 
 
Firms fixed effect regression Model                                                                                           
Variable     I  II                                     
 
CONSTANT                                          0.1804 -0.5939 
 (0.5984) (0.2626) 
 
Log(BAS) 0.0741 0.0782 
 (0.2744) (0.2221) 
 
Log(PRICE) - -0.0823 
  (0.3757) 
 
∆PRICE - 6.9415 
  (0.0000) 
 
|∆VOLATILITY| - 11.5438 
  (0.0636) 
 
 
R squared 0.1348 0.1801 
Adj. R squared 0.0387 0.0857 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0029 0.0000 
Number of events 1311 1299 
Number of firms     85 85 
 
 
 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm fixed effects regressions of cumulative abnormal 
volume turnover on the firm size used as proxy for the asymmetric information. The dependent vari-
able is the cumulative abnormal log volume turnover CALVT from 10 to 3 days trading before the 
earnings announcement and it is the residual of the market volume turnover model estimation. 
Log(BAS) is the logarithm of the mean bid-ask spread ratio (difference between ask and bid divided 
by the average sum of bid and ask) from t=-10 to t=-3 days and calculated with the close bid and 
close ask, Log(Price) is the logarithm of the average of the daily close firm’s share price from t=-10 
to t=-3 days ∆Price is the absolute price percentage change from  t=-10 to t=-3 days, ∆volatility is 
the difference between the long-run volatility and pre-event volatility and it is calculated as  the dif-
ference between the  firm’s return standard deviations of 200 days and of 10 days  before the event . 
Standard errors are clustered by periods and P-values of the t-test that the coefficient is equal to 0 are 
in parentheses. 
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FIGURE 3.1: Cumulative Abnormal Log Volume Turnover  
 
The figure reports the percentage cumulative abnormal log volume turnover from -10 to 10 days 
around earnings scheduled announcements for firms listed on the SWX between 1995 to 2006. The 
abnormal log volume turnover is the residual of the volume turnover market model which parame-
ters are estimated in a [-210,-11] days window and log volume turnover is defined as the log of the 
ratio of the daily number of shares traded on the total number of shares outstanding. 
 
 
 
 
